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CONTROVERSY IN AFSTHETICS : IMPLICATIONS FOR METACRITICISM IN ART
EDUCATION
Aesthetic controversy over the link between art and criticism is
investigated with a view to exploring implications for
metacriticism in art education. Artistic intention is defined as a
principal controversy on the assumption that it is representative
of disputes in aesthetics as a whole concerning the relative
validity of divergent critical stances. A disparity is found to
exist between the centrality of aesthetic controversy as a focus of
metacriticism among aestheticians and its peripheral status in art
education theorizing. On the (discipline-based) assumption that
art teaching and learning should be grounded in the content and
methods of artists, art historians, art critiCS, and aestheticians,
this disparity is considered a research 'problem'. It is
hypothesized that controversy in aesthetics is a potential source
of curriculum develoJJDeYltin art education.
Relevant 'kinds' of theory are analyzed with a view to clarifying
issues underlying aesthetic controversy, such as that prompted by
intention. An analysis is made of standard oppositions in
philosophy and aesthetics with particular reference to the divide
between analytical and Continental philosophical traditions.
underlying theoretical frameworks are identified and speculations
made about the kinds of critical strategies that might arise from
them. In this connection, teaching about intention in the field of
literature education theory is explored in some detail with the a1m
of discovering strategies for metacriticism that might be applied
to art teaching. Moreover, the research addresses the problem of
translating discipline-based content in respect of controversy into
a pedagogy of metacriticism. Following an examination of
pedagogical models in general education theory, it is concluded
that furdamental controversy (in aesthetics) implies a paradoxical,
though not illogical, alignment of 'commitment' and 'impartiality'
in respect of subject content and wider educational goals.
A synthesis is finally made of arguments arising from the analyses
of separate kinds of theory and this culminates in a formulation of
principles for teaching metacriticism. This is based on key
aspects of aesthetic theory which, in combination, reflect not only
the diversity but the contestability of art criticism, namely, the
distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, descriptive
and interpretive statements, moral and aesthetic judgments, and
between intentionalism and anti-intentionalism. Discussion of the
metacritical prinCiples is illustrated by reference to relevant
classes of artworks. Moreover, the implications of teaching
aesthetics and criticism as an interactive whole are discussed in
respect of curriculum development and teacher training at both
national and institutional levels. '!be study concludes with a
reflective criticism of the research method and suggestions are
made about possibilities for future research.
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A FOCUS FOR CURRICULUM DEVElDPMENT IN ART
1.1. Definition of ProblemArea
'Ibe aim of the enquiry is to examine the nature of controversy in
aesthetics with a view to exploring its implications for metacriticism
in art education. In so domg, the controversy over artistic
intention will provide a focus of investigation, reasons for which are
given below. The key term 'metacriticism' refers to the activity of
theorizing about the relationship of art and criticism as in writings
on philosophical aesthetics. It is subsequently examined in some
detail (see Chap. 2.7).
The research is discipline-based. It accepts the premise of, for
example, Allison's (1982) 'Four Domains Model' and the protocols of
the Discipline-Based Art Education (DBAE)movementin the U.S.A.
(e.g., Hamblen,1987), which is that art teaching and learning should
be modelled on the content and methodsof professional artists, art
historians, and in particular, as far as this research is concerned,
art critics and aestheticians. '!be research is methodological also in
the sense that it constitutes an exploration of the relationship
betweentheories and methodsof criticism in respect of both aesthetic
and instructional theory. IMeed, an attempt is made to co-ordinate
aspects of these two kinds of theory with a view to this informing
existing principles and procedures for teaching metacriticism.
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'!he term 'kinds of theory' is significant, for though the research is
described as discipline-based, it is not suggested that aesthetics,
for example, is a distinct discipline; on the contrary, it is multi-
or inter-disciplinary, and involves the investigation of matters
germaneto (branches of) philosophy, sociology, psychologyand other
humanistic disciplines (Diffey, 1984, p.169). ~reover, it is
recognized that a range of divergent stances exists within each of
these contributing disciplines: philosophical aesthetics, for
example, includes a diversity of viewpoints both within Anglo-American
analytical philosophy and Continental, or Continentally-inspired,
traditions such as phenomenologyand hermeneutics (Belsey, 1980;
Eagleton, 1983). Instructional theory in art education also
encompassesa range of traditions (Efland, 1979).
1be research topic developed from a previous study of irony in the
visual arts (Rawding, 1984, Appendix I). A major finding of that
study was that the concept of artistic intention, whichwas identified
as central to the interpretation of irony, had received scant
treatment in art education theory in the U.K. 'lllis paucity of
treatment was found to be in markedcontrast to the importancewhich
aestheticians attached to the concept: for example, the philosopher
Hospers (1975, p.42) claimed that it had ' ••• promptedthe principal
controversy in the mid 20th century' in the field of aesthetics
(emphasis added). 'lllis disparity between art education theory and
aesthetic theory was thought to pose a problem or 'felt difficulty'
(VanDalen, 1979, p.12f) which it was the purpose of the present study
to investigate. The potential inter-connectedness of these two kinds
of theory is highlighted by the term 'principal controversy.' First,
2
if artistic intention is of 'principal' concern to aestbeticians, then
assuming a discipline-based view of art education, its importance
ought to be reflected in art education theory concerning the content
and methodsof teaching metacriticism. Second, if artistic intention
is a focus for 'controversy', then its status as such suggests that it
is symptomatic, even representative or paradigmatic, of that which
both aestheticians and art education theorists have described as the
controversial character of aesthetic criticism as a whole, (Erickson,
1979; Geahigan, 1983).
The underlying assumption of this research is that the study of
controversy in philosophical aesthetics is synonymous with the task of
the metacritic: it involves trying to makesense of 'diverse schools
of criticism' by examining the 'pluralism of viewpoints' which
underlie them, especially in regard to the nature of art and methods
of critical interpretation and evaluation (Margolis, 1975, pp 88-89).
SUch divergence is representative of broadly based philosophical
disputes involving questions of ontology and epistemology, namely,
questions about the nature or being of cultural entities, the
formation and validation of knowledge, and the relationship between
theoretical constructs and social action. Second-orderquestioning of
this kind has been identified as an essential part of advanced study
in most, if not all, areas of knowledge (Schwab, 1964; Dearden,
1981). Hence, the controversy over artistic intention is understood
to be representative, not only of the problematic character of
aesthetics and critiCism, but also of the problematic character of
knowledgeper se.
3
In brief, the 'problem' or 'situation' which prompted the present
research study can be stated as follows:
Controversy over the link between art and criticism, as
exemplified by the issue of intention, is a key focus for
metacritical enquiry in the field of aesthetics; hence, on
the assumption that art teaching should be discipline-based,
such controversy ought to function as a focus for teaching
metacriticism in art education.
However, controversy in aesthetics has received scant
treatment in art education theory. Hence, the aim of the
research is to explore the pedagogical potential of this
aspect of content.
1.2 Investigation of Separate Kinds of Theory
A major concern of this study is to that of cOlJl1lUI1icatingbetween
philosophical and pedagogical levels of understanding. In this
connection, the transfer of knowledge-content from the realm of
discipline-based scholarship and research to the realm of education is
considered to be problematic because of the inevitable tension between
the principles of 'complexity' and 'parsimony' which invariably
accompanies such transference (Snith & Smith, 1981, p.S). In
particular, aesthetic theory relating to art criticism is
fundamentally difficult to grasp intellectually and does not readily
translate into content and methods for teaching (Geahigan, 1983;
Lankford, 1984)• As Lankford has noted, philosophical writings on
criticism tend to be produced in an academic context that is remote
from the demands of schooling; hence, such theorizings '••• fail to
provide any correlative method for teachers or students of criticism
to use' (p.15!) and could, therefore, present a daunting prospect,
especially for the hard-pressed teacher or lecturer who, after all, is
,••• under no profeSSional obligation to join aestheticians in the
frontltnes of (a) philosophical debate' (Smith & Smith, op cit., p.7).
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Aneed exists then for the provision of theoretical materials that are
both conceptually sound and could ' ••• offer clues to a workable
teaching method' (ibid.).
In recognition of this need for what Feldman (1981, p.146) has
described as a descent from ' ••• the stratosphere of theory to the
terrestrial realm of teaching', this researcher suggests that such a
task is best fulfilled by individuals who fit Stenhouse's (1981,
pp.l09-lll) designation of 'Teacher-Researcher': namely, those whose
approach to theory is conducted either in the context of their own
classrooms, or at least with the demands and opportunities of
practical teaching in mind. This researcher is employedas a teacher
of art in a secondary school and is, concurrently, registered as a
part-time research student. As such, he is strategically placed to
engage in the 'systematic self-critical enquiry' expected of
researchers whilst remaining alert to the need for theoretical
materials to be madepedagogically relevant (ibid., cf. Wilson, 1984,
p.6; Meeson, 1977, p.4; Eisner, 1984, p.261 f.). The notion of
1
'Extended Professional' (Openuntv., 1972, pp.24-25) is also relevant
to his role, because it designates an individual whoseconcern is to
'intellectualize the task of teaching' through adopting innovations in
theory and practice from outside the school as a basis for personal
curriculum research and development. The object then is to achieve a
private 'clarification' of theoretical issues which impinge on the
problem identified in 1.1. above, with a view to producing a public
'communication' of those issues in the shape of pedagogical proposals
for the field of art education.
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The concern to 'bridge the gap' between different kinds of theory
(aesthetic, instructional) and different models of professional
involvement (aestheticians, art educators) is reflected in the
research approach (Chap. 2)• Given the need for this researcher to
develop his personal understanding of theory as a pre-requisite of
communicatingoutcomes, the research approach is defined as 'emergent'
as opposed to 'preordinate', because this is thought to offer the most
appropriate means of allowing a gradual unfolding of personal
knowledgeto take place accaopanied by a constant reflection on its
likely pedagogical application. Also, it allows the research
'problem' to be brought gradually into focus whilst under
investigation. 'lhis thesis is not, therefore, a retrospective writing
up of research findings; rather it is a piece of exploratory writing
in which the arrangement of chapters is largely representative of
developing stages of research over a seven year period beginning in
September1984. Viewedcollectively, the chapters could be said to
canprise a series of discrete ' essays' in which different kinds of
theory are investigated through a process of writing and re-writing,
involving exploration, reflection and continual refinement of the
research 'problem'.
research.
In brief, the writing of the thesis !! the
This exploratory, emergent character of the writing is conveyedby a
difficulty experienced in the application of verb tenses. '!be bulk of
the writing either coaments on the ideas of different authors or
quotes them directly. In this case, the past or perfect tenses are
used. At key points, however, a consequenceof canparing insights and
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reflecting on implications is the emergenceof 'live' issues, and
where this occurs the writing is in the present tense.
Given that an initial decision had been taken at the start of the
research that the focus should be theoretical, it was thought
necessary to analyze textual material relating to art education,
philosophy, aesthetics and literature education. '!be aim was to
clarify methodological prinCiples bearing on the teaching of criticism
and metacriticism, both in respect of the controversy over intention
and wider aesthetic controversy. First, an analytical review of art
education theory was conducted to ascertain the then current state of
knowledgeabout the teaching of criticism and metacriticism. Second,
an analysis was madeof the standard oppositions of philosophy that
underlie aesthetic controversy. 1h1.rd, aesthetic theory was analyzed
with a view to identifying conceptual issues associated with the
relationship of art and critiCism, and making tentative speculations
about practice. Fourth, in the light of arguments arising from the
previous essays, an analysis was also made of literature education
theory concerning the pedagogical implications of controversy in
literary criticism with particular reference to intention. 1his
analysis proceeded on the aSSUDptionthat because the seminal work on
the controversy over intention (Wimsatt& Beardsley, 1954)waswritten
primarily with reference to literature, it was highly probable that
pedagogical principles relating to this controversy would be
enshrined in the teaching of literary critiCism. In the event,
literature education theory proved to be less helpful than expected
and another kilxi of theory, namely, general education theory
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concerning the teaching of controversial issues was also analyzed and
found to be more productive.
The operative word which best describes the research approach to these
different kinds of theory is 'analysis' • However, it is to be
understood not in the usual sense of conceptual analysis, with the
objectivity that may connote, but in a qualified sense more akin to
'investigation', or even 'exploration'. Researching the five kinds of
theory can be briefly summarised as follows:
An analysis of ••••••
art education theory relating to the teaching of a range of
critical methods, i.e., metacriticism;
philosophical theory bearing on conceptual issues \Dlderlying
controversy between divergent intellectual traditions;
aesthetic theory bearing on controversy over the link
between ontology of art and concomitant methods of
criticism;
literature education theory regarding the pedagogical
implications of controversy in literary criticism with
particular reference to intention;
'general' education theory regarding the teaching of
controversial issues across the curriculum.
The arguments which emerge from these analyses are 'synthesized' in
the penultimate chapter to form a statement of principles for teaching
metacriticism in art education. The process of synthesizing is
anticipated in earlier chapters, particularly in the summaries where
the significance of issues emerging from each analysis is reflected
upon. The relationship between different kinds of theory and the
research approach used to investigate this remained problematic
throughout the research and, like the content of the study as a whole,
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was clarified only gradually. The issues bearing on the developnent
of a research approachare examinedin detail (Chap. 2).
1.3 Organization of ResearchWriting
Chapter 2 features a discussion of issues surrounding the development
of a research approach appropriate to the theory orientation of the
enquiry as a whole. It refers to existing paradigms of educational
research and involves differentiating empirical/analytic and
qualitative/interpretive traditions in order to define and argue for
an 'emergent' modeof enquiry.
Chapter 3 begins by querying the extent to which art education
theorists, whilst seemingto have 'neglected' aesthetic controversy as
a pedagogical focus, might nevertheless have proposed strategies for
teaching a range of critical methods. Henee, Chapter 3 is an
analytical review of relevant British and North Americanart education
literature; it aims to locate texts which offer not merely
stipulations for practice but reasons for grounding practice in both
aesthetic and instructional theory.
Chapter 4 is an analysis of the standard oppositions of philosophy and
aesthetics, in particular t the divide between analytical and
Continental traditions as discussed in recent meta-philosophical texts
(Margolis, 198Oa, Bernstein, 1983, Rorty, 1980). '!'he aim is to
identify key ontological and epistemological disputes with reference
to underlying theoretical frameworks.
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Chapter 5 continues the analysis of standard oppositions but in
respect of specific issues in aesthetic controversy over the link
between the ontology of art and concanitant methodsof criticism (esp.
MargoliS, op cit.) This includes tentative speculation about
possibilities for art teaching.
Chapter 6 is an analysis of literature education theory in which
comparisons are madewith the theoretical outcomes of the preceding
analyses. It rests on a further assumption that theorists working in
this field have had important things to say about the pedagogical
implications of controversy between different critical modes, both in
terms of the controversy over intention and in a more general sense.
Indeed, the opinions of certain art education theorists support this
assumption (Feldman, 1973; Onions, 1979; Reid, 1980; Dyson, 1981).
More especially, it is thought necessary to examine this kind of
theory because the controversy over intention is distinctly, though
not exclusively, literary in origin (Wimsatt & Beardsley, op cit.;
NewtonDe Molina, 1976; cf. Davies, 1982).
Chapter 7 examines the growing body of curricul\DDtheorizing about
'controversiality' (Dearden, 1981) and its pedagogical implications
(Stenhouse, 1970; Hulmes, 1979; Stradling, Noctor & Baines, 1984;
Kelly, 1986; wellington, 1986). Its purpose is to compareaesthetic
controversy, such as that praupted by intention, with controversy
elsewhere in the curriculum in order to gather insights, perspectives,
etc. on the teaching of controversial issues which might then be
brought to bear on the teaching of metacriticism in art education.
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Chapter 8 involves a synthesis of arguments arising from the prior
analyses of different kinds of theory. This begins with a review of
research outcomes and leads to a formulation of metacritical
principles. Subsequently, the implications of the principles for
curriculum developnent are explored with reference to examples of
different classes of artworks. In viewof the theoretical emphasisof
the research, the link betweenprinCiples and procedures is stated in
general terms rather than applied to specific teaching/learning
contexts.
Chapter 9 involves a discussion of the implications of findings
arising from the study of metacriticism for British art education as a
whole. This refers to both curriculum development and research.
Suggestions are made concerning future policy at national and
institutional levels and indications given about avenues for future
research. The chapter includes a reflective criticism of the research
method.
1.4 Levels of Application
It is anticipated that the curricular principles (Chap. 8), which are
the chief outcomes of the research, will prove relevant to art
educators in the U.K. at all levels of education (teachers, student-
teachers, teacher-trainers, examiners, advisers, inspectors) whohave
responsibility for teaching connectedwith the analytical/critical and
historical/cultural domains of art experience (Allison, ope cit.).
The curricular implications should be of special interest to art
educators operating at advanced secondary and tertiary levels of
education who, through their teaching, are seeking to explore the
11
interrelatedness of aesthetics and criticism. Reference to 'levels'
throughout the research indicates that the use of the terms 'teacher,'
'learner,' and 'teaching/learning context' is problematic. It might
be argued that the content of philosophical aesthetics may be
unsuitable for younger learners; however, as the American art educator
Ecker (1973) has shown, it is possible to simplify aesthetic concepts
for use with children and adolescents without necessarily succumbing
to superficiality. With this in mind, and, conversely, given the
range of contexts which might be identified with an 'advanced' level
of art education, the use of the above terms will be kept to a
minimum. '!hus it is recognized that, whilst general statements of
principle need to be translated into detailed procedures before they
can be considered fully operational, such a degree of specificity is
beyond the scope of, and indeed not entirely appropriate to, the





The main text of this chapter was written towards the end of the
research period and revised at the close. The content arises from a
comparative analysis of theoretical texts relating to the philosophy
of education and art education research and culminates in a
formulation of investigative principles which have been found to be
latent in the research as a whole. Since the enquiry which forms its
basis was conducted retrospectively, it is largely written in the past
tense. It was corducted in the recognition that educational research,
in line with social science research as a whole, is customarily
grounded in a theoretical understanding of method.
'l1le research as a whole arose from a 'felt difficulty' (Van Dalen,
1979, p.12 f.) concerning the controversy over artistic intention in
philosophical aesthetics. Whereas intention was found to be a key
focus for debate among aestheticians, it appeared to be a neglected
area of content as far as art education was concerned. 'Ibis
discrepancy was said to pose a research problem: namely, that the
controversy over intention was a potential source of theory frail which
to develop a pedagogy of metacriticism and that this would entail both
an analysis and synthesis of content drawn from art education theory,
aesthetics, literature education theory and general education theory.
Moreover, this controversy was believed to be representative of
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debates over the link between art and criticism which assumed that
questions about art must inevitably imply questions about the nature
of reality. This was thought to necessitate a widening of the scope
of the research to include the investigation of different interrelated
aspects of controversy in aesthetics and in philosophy as a whole.
Hence, the research entailed an emphasis on theory as the primary
source of data and required the alignment of relevant aspects of
aesthetic and education theory leading to implications for pedagogical
practice.
nte relation of theory to methodwas central to the subject matter of
the enquiry as a whole, since its aimwas to explore the implications
of particular controversies in aesthetics for the teaching of
metacriticism. Likewise, the relation of theory to methodwas central
to its function as educational research. ntis analysis of educational
research theory became a distinctive strand of enquiry, which
nevertheless developed in content along lines parallel to the main
aims of the enquiry as a whole. In particular, discussion of
qualitative research methods proved comparable with conclusions
reached concerning the application of hermeneutic theory to methodsof
criticism.
No ready-madestrategy exists in this research literature; hence it
proved necessary to combineaspects of research thinking drawn fran
1
various sources. '!bis process took place concurrently with the
investigation and was both gradual and adaptive to the research
outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to discuss those
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aspects of educational research theory which have contributed to the
'selection' and application of a research strategy.
The emphasis on exploring an aspect of aesthetic theory, namely, the
controversy over artistic intention, in relation to pedagogy, places
the enquiry as a whole more nearly in the category of philosophical,
as opposed to sociological, psychological, or historical research. It
is not, however, 'philosophical' in the specialist sense of applying
principles of philosophical analysis to conceptual problems; rather it
is an attempt to clarify a perceived problem area of aesthetic theory
with a view to this informing art education theory and practice.
2.2 'Analytical' and 'Synthetic' Orientations in the Philosophy of
Education
The claim that the enquiry is 'philosophical' in a restricted sense
can be supported by appeal to Reid's (1972, p,26) distinction between
'analytical' and 'synthetic' orientations in the philosophy of
education. Reid distinguished between, on the one hand, ' ••• the
application of philosophical methods to questions of education' and,
on the other, '••• the relation to education of the relevant results
of philosophical thinking'. He pointed out that the 'analytical'
approach necessitates a training in general philosophy; whereas the
,synthetic' approach is accessible to educators trained in fields
other than philosophy who might wish to make use of the insights
generated by philosophers as a spur to their own innovative thinking
in respect of curriculum issues. The present enquiry can be classed,
more or less, as synthetic philosophy of education in Reid's terms,
although to relate the ••• relevant results of philosophical
thinking' on a contested concept such as artistic intention
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necessitates a degree of analysis, especially in view of the
anticipated application of research outcomes to the field of art
education theory and practice. For if a branch of lmowledge is
fundamentally controversial, its translation into pedagogical
materials must be equally a matter for dispute. 'Synthesis' in this
context cannot be conceived of as merely a matter of 'bringing to
bear' or 'applying' ready-made lmowledge-content, but necessarily
involves taking issue with existing analyses. Moreover, synthetic
philosophy of education in this sense does not necessarily mean being
prescriptive. The impact of educational research overall is
characteristically indirect, supplying practitioners with 'insights'
(Wilson, 1974), 'working hypotheses' (Bellack, 1978), or 'frames of
reference' (Eisner, 1982) rather than teacher-proof materials and
ideas.
2.3 The Relationship of Aesthetic and Educational Theory
,Synthetic' philosophy of education has been defined above as '... the
relation to education of the relevant results of philosophical
thinking' (Reid, OPe cit., emphasis added). Such 'results' arise in
areas of philosophy other than the philosophy of education.
Subsequently, by means of synthetic research, these are 'related', or
applied, to aspects of educational theory with a view to this
improving educational practice. It is this researcher's claim that
aesthetics is the area of philosophy most germane to arts education
theory.
The American philosopher Beardsley (197Ob) has provided a suggestive
(though, in places, tantalisingly inexplicit ) acccunt of the
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relationship between aesthetic and educational theory. His most
important contribution to an understanding of this relationship has
been to point out that aesthetics, whichhe described as 'essentially
metacriticism' (p.3), can and should be 'used' by arts education
theorists to guide their thinking about both the content and methods
of instruction. He described this as a 'conceptual crossover' in
whichan aesthetic concept is 'clarified', not merely to be ' ••• taken
over directly into instructional theory', but to shed light on the
pedagogical process itself. Beardsley's suggestion led this
researcher to ask what clarifying the concept of artistic intention
might meanfor the 'what', the 'how' and, most importantly, the 'why'
of a pedagogyof aesthetics and criticism (see Chaps. 6.2 & 7.3).
2.4 Three Categories of Researchin the Philosophyof Education
Reid's designation of ' synthetic' research in the philosophy of
education and Beardsley's notion of 'conceptual crossover' both appear
to provide sometheoretical basis for validating the present enquiry
as research. But more is needed. At the time the enquiry began, the
question was posed: what precedents existed in British philosophy of
education for the kind of strategy hinted at thus far, and what of the
contributions of art education researchers?
In his An Introduction to Philosophical Research, Beck (1981, p.10)
identified '. •• three ccmoontypes of philosophical thesis to be
submitted at British universities in recent times', namely:
•••Curricular Research (research into someparticular sector of
the school curriCUlum),Cancer Research (involving a study
in depth of a single or very 1 ted numberof concepts) and the
Critical Reviewkind of study (by which is meant an examination
of the ideas of particular thinkers or theories). (ibid.,
emphasesadded).
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A consideration of his three categories is germane to the present
research because his discussion of 'method' enables clarification and
comparison of alternative strategies to be made with the aim of
identifying one which is compatible with 'synthetic' research.
2.4.1 Curricular Research
Beck's definition of Curricular Research (ibid., pp .10-15) refers
specifically to studies which have as their starting point an issue or
problem located in curriculum theory and practice. Briefly, such
research is field-generated. In contrast, the present research began
with a theoretical dispute located in the discipline of aesthetics,
that is, at one remove from curriculum theory and practice, and then
proceeded to a consideration of its curricular implications.
Nevertheless, in ccmnon with what Beck had to say about curricular
research as a whole, it is centrally concerned with epistemological
problems, in particular with '... studying problems of what should be'
(Engelhart, 1972, Chap.15; cf. Travers, 1978, p.105).
2.4.2 Conceptual Research
At the heart of Beck's category of Conceptual Research is linguistic
analysis. Dlis involves the close, critical examination of key
concepts in education with a view to exposing error and confusion in
the use of language; it thereby achieves clarification of meaning and
provides a firmer theoretical basis for improving practice. 'lhis
category is equatable, in the first instance, with Reid's designation
of analytical research in the philosophy of education, which, as
previously intimated, demands a level of expertise beyond that of
which most teacher-researchers are capable. (cf. Wilson, 1972, p.109;
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Peters & White, 1973, p.94). Nevertheless, as also intimated above,
analytical skill is a prerequisite for successful synthesizing,
especially when handling concepts which are essentially contested, in
2Gallie's (1964, Chap. 8) sense. Beck's definition of '••• a study in
depth of a single or very limited number of concepts' has, therefore,
a significant bearing on an enquiry in which the concept of
controversy in aesthetics is the main object of study.
2.4.3 Critical Review
This category involves comparing and contrasting the ideas of
theorists from different philosophical traditions with the aim of
discovering conceptual 'gaps', or aspects of theory which call for
more detailed treatment in the realm of pedagogy. It appears
distinctly promising as a model for this enquiry. First, its primary
data are theoretical texts. Second, it can be aligned with a small
number of art education studies in which aspects of theory associated
with particular aestheticians have been translated into principles of
teaching aesthetics and criticism. These include studies by MacGregor
(1971; see Chap. 3.4 below), who applied the critical methods of
Sibley, Stevenson, and Weitz to the training of art teachers; Lankford
(1984), who developed a 'methodology' of art criticism for classroom
teaching based on the aesthetics of Merleau-PontYi and Brookes (1988),
who explored the curricular implications of beliefs about the
relationship of art and reality found in the writings of Wollheim,
Danto, and Marcuse.
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2.4.4 Reflection on the Categories
A major area of concern coomonto all three categories of research
thesis identified by Beck is epistemology, or the investigation of
problems associated with the nature and structure of mowledge. The
difference between ' analytical' and ' synthetic' approaches in
epistemology concerns the extent to which, in the former, conceptual
analysis carried out by the researcher can be deemedoriginal work.
In 'synthetic' philosophy of education, emphasis is placed more on
that which Scott (1986, p.36), writing about research in the
humanities, has described as ••• the re-ordering of existing
lmowledge'. 'Originality' appears, therefore, to consist of making
connections between aspects of theory not previously conjoined,
thereby generating fresh insights or perspectives on substantive
issues.
Beck's alignment is with the Anglo-Americantradition of analytical
philosophy: a tradition whichdaninated philosophy of education in the
1960s and early 1970s and whichremains highly influential. Comparing
Beck's categories in the light of Reid's and Beardsley's cODlDents
suggests that though each category is relevant to the present research
in varying degrees, none is sufficiently suitable as a model. 'nle
partial lack of fit with Beck's categories is thought to spring from
the fact that analytical philosophy is geared to hypothetico-deductive
reasoning, whereas the present research is more readily identified as
open-endedand exploratory.
It was stated in Chapter 1 that the research as a whole is theory-
oriented. 'lhe overriding need has been for a formulation of research
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principles with which to validate the attempt to apply one field of
theory to another. It was recognized at the start of the research
that an appropriate research stance would be characterized as
'emergent' rather than 'preordinate', that is, it would allow for a
developing pattern of clarification, comparison,and cross-referencing
of extant theoretical 'data' leading to a formulation of pedagogical
principles. With this in mind, it is necessary to examineresearch
theory on a broader footing than that of analytical philosophy of
education.
The need was for a strategy that was theoretical in origin and an
emphasiswhich facilitated the application of one realm of theory to
another, and also which helped to inform the current state of
curricular theorizing about the nature and practice of art criticism.
The strategy had to allow for an emergingpattern of clarification,
comparison,and cross-referencing of extant theoretical 'data' leading
to a set of conclusions and recommendationsof theoretical and
practical relevance.
2.5 'Paradigms' in the PhilosophYof Fducation
In his review of British educational philosophy in the 1970s, Aspin
(1982) has observed that the question 'What counts as philosophy of
education?' has become increasingly problematic with the gradual
emergenceof a number of research 'paradigms' (pp.14-17, emphasis
added). The various paradigmshe identified, namely, 'Utilitarian,
phenomenological, relativist/pluralist, historical materialist,
transcendentaL •• ' are additional to and, in some respects,
interactive with the still highly influential analytical tradition.
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'nley are characterized by '... serious-minded and purposeful enquiry
into ••• questions of the meaning of language and the nature of
learning, knowledgeand understanding.' (ibid., p.14). In line with
the analytical tradition, they are centrally concerned with
epistemology. Equally, in line with recent analytical philosophy of
education, they are concernedwith applying philosophy or bringing its
insights to bear upon , ••• substantive matters of teaching and
learning.' (ibid.). Very few philosophical studies in art education
appear to have been published, however, in which the researcher is
clearly aligned with one or other of the paradigms identified by
Aspin. In the absence of suitable precedents, it was therefore
necessary to workwithin the frameworkof (art) education research as
a whole.
2.6 Paradi of Art Education Research: Their Relevance for
into Theoretica Issues.
Educational research in general reflects what a numberof authorities
have come to recognize as two broad theoretical orientations or
'paradigms' (Alexander, 1980): on the one hand, the 'scientific' or
'empirical/analytic' paradigmand, on the other, the 'naturalistic' or
'quali tati ve' (ibid., cf. Bellack, 1978; Stenhouse, 1978; Burgess,
1985; Eisner, 1985; Cohen & Manion, 1985). According to Alexander,
the former is characterized by 'preordinate design' and the testing of
'preformulated hypotheses'; whereas research design based on the
latter ' ••• emergesduring the investigation and is in constant flux
as new information is processed and acted upon' (dbdd,.; p.38). 'Dle
present eIKlUiry,which for reasons stated above is both emergent in
approach and theoretical in emphasis, appears, on balance, to
correspond to the naturalistic or qualitative paradigm; although,
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tmlike the vast majority of studies of this kind which investigate
classroom events by means of observation teclmiques, it focuses on
theoretical texts in the form of books, articles, conference papers,
etc.
A distinction between opposing paradigms in art education has also
been madeby the Canadianart educator Pearse (1983). His position,
which draws heavily on the social theory of Habermas and the
educational theory of Aoki, represents one of the few attempts by an
art educator to categorize art education research as a whole in terms
of underlying paradigms. A careful examination of Pearse's account of
the 'Empirical/Analytic', 'Interpretive/Hermeneutic', and 'Critical/
Theoretic' paradigms assisted this researcher's efforts at the end of
the research period to formulate investigative principles which were
at least implicit in the approachoverall.
2.6.1 Empirical/Analytic
The approach adopted in the present research is clearly not concerned
with the hypothetico-deductive reasoning and psycho-statistical
procedures typical of this paradigm, as exemplified by descriptive,
experimental and quasi-experimental research designs. Nevertheless,
it is not so clearly dissociated from the dominant philosophical
positions underlying the Empirical/Analytic paradigm, namely,
positivism and, in particular, rationalism. According to Eisner
(1985), 'academic rationalism' assumesthat
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lA!avingaside the problem of deciding what constitutes the 'best'
content in each field, the assumptionwhichunderpins this definition
of rationalism, namely, that lmowledge-content ought to be the
starting point and main focus of the curriculum, is ftmclamentalto the
present research. '!be concept of artistic intention, identified as
the 'principal controversy' of contemporaryaesthetics, self-evidently
belongs to Eisner's classification of ' intellectually significant
ideas' •
'!be present research can be aligned with rationalism, but this
alignment must be carefully qualified in the light of the critique of
rationalism in education by critical theorists such as Kelly (1986)
and Carr & Kenmis(1986). Kelly, for example, challenged what he
described as rationalist assunptions about '. •• the appropriateness
and effectiveness of lmowledge-content as a starting point for
curriculum plarming'. His chief criticism is that rationalism entails
, ••• a search for essentialist meanings and values' which leads
inevitably to an 'ossification and reification of lmowledge' and a
, ••• futile search for a single theory of curriculum developnent'. He
concluded that ' ••• the issue rests betweencurriculum as content and
curriculum as process' (ibid., p.153, emphasesadded).
The Americaneducator and critical theorist Popkewitz(1987) has also
attacked the rationalist assunptions of ' ••• the discipline-centred
curriculum IOOvementof the 1960s (in the U.S.A.) ••• which made
concepts things to be taught' (ibid., p. 340, emphasis added). He
suggested that such an approach to curriculum
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••• ignored the debate about knowledgein the disciplines, the
different ways concepts are defined by various intellectual
traditions, and the social values that underlie the scholarly
debates. (ibid.)
For Popkewitz (and Kelly) knowledgecontent is not static; moreover,
epistemological disputes are not purely philosophical but socio-
political as well. Over against ' technocratic rationalism' or
'instrumental rationality' he insisted that:
There is no one methodfor 'being rational'. Our contemporary
situation seems to offer us a pluralism of rationalities by
which to 'make sense' of our daily life. (p. 351)
These are highly critical of the rationalistic assumptions underlying
subject-centred approaches to curriculum construction; however, the
present enquiry, though subject-centred, implies a different kind of
rationalism, namelyan investigation of the curricular implications of
specific areas of aesthetic controversy. The notion of controversy
suggests not a static, reified, ossified account of knowledge,but one
that resonates with the fundamental tensions within a discipline or
field of knowledge, laying bare its ambiguities and conceptual
'lUltidiness. The 'rationalism' applicable to the present enquiry is
one that not only begins and constantly refers to knowledge-content,
but which also conceives of knowledgeas a dynamicstructure, that is,
as revisionary and pluralistic (Schwab, 1964, pp.28-30j see also
Inlow, 1966, p .15 f.; King & Brownell, 1966).
2.6.2 Interpretive/Hermeneutic
According to Pearse, researchers working within the
Interpretive/Hermeneutic paradigmseek ' ••• situational knowledge, the
knowing of the structure of interpretative meanings' (op. cit.,
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p.l60). Typically, they investigate the social reality of classrooms
(Burgess, 1985, p.8) and conduct their investigations by means of a
range of observation techniques drawn from fields in which the
interpretation of human transactions is central, for example,
anthropology and ethnography. 'Ibe kind of strategy they employ ' •••
emerges during the investigation and is in constant flux as new
3
information is processed and acted upon' (Alexander, op cit.). Social
reality, by its very complexity, requires such strategies; however,
the present research focuses not on the data of natural settings but
on the 'data' of theoretical materials which, on the face of it,
appear too static, too contrived, to invite naturalistic
investigation.
However,in this researcher's view, it is a misconception to equate
the terms 'naturalistic' and 'interpretive'. 'Ibe former refers
specifically to the investigation of natural settings, whereas the
latter, a broader term, designates enquiry with regard to both natural
settings and literary texts, as in the Continental tradition of
hermeneutics (Palmer, 1969j Ricoeur, 1971) • Social reality is a
fitting analogy of literary texts if the latter are viewed less as
stable structures having fixed meanings than as relatively unstable
structures, the meanings of which remain open to continual
interpretation. The shifting, multi-layered character of social
settings is directly analogous to the present research focus on the
curricular implications of controversy in aesthetics, because
controversy reveals knowledgeto be, at least in part, revisionary and
pluralistic. Glaser and Strauss (1967), in their classic formulation
of naturalistic enquiry 'lbe Discoveryof Gro\.Dlded'Ibeory, captured the
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essence of the analogy betweensocial reality and literary texts when
they claimed that:
There are some striking similarities - sometimes obvious
although often overlooked - between field work and library
research. Whensomeonestands in the library stacks, he is,
metaphorically, surroundedby voices begging to be heard. Every
book, every magazinearticle, represents at least one person who
is equivalent to the anthropologist's informant or the
sociologist's interviewee. In those publications, people
converse, armounceposttnons, argue with a range of eloquence,
and describe events or scenes in ways entirely comparable to
what is seen and beard during field work. The researcher needs
only to discover the voices in the library to release them for
his analytical use. (p.163)
This characterization of research gives grounds for the consideration
that theory-dominated enquiry may be conducted quasi-
phenomenologically. Typically, the objects of such investigation are
the actual wordsand phrases 0f particular realms of discourse:
••• field workers frequently 'track down' the meaningof a key
word that they notice people are using constantly ••• (so) in
library research one may be similarly struck by key words.
(ibid., p.166).
Researching key words such as 'controversy' and 'intention' led, as
the enquiry unfolded, to the 'discovery' of other related words and
phrases, such as: The Intentional Fallacy, The Ontological Status of
the Artwork (indeed, the very terms ontology and artwork),
Contextualism, Pluralism, Eclecticism, and so forth. The enquiry
involved an in-depth comparative study of the meaning, or rather
meaniI18!, in use of such words and phrases, and others related to
them, across a wide range of discourses, including art education
theory, literature education theory, general curriculum theory, art
theory, literary theory, critical writings, the history of art, and
philosophical aesthetics.
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'n1e nearest parallel in mainstreameducational research literature to
the 'voices in a library' strategy advocated by Glaser and Strauss
appears to be that which Fngelhart (1972) and others have termed
'curricul\Dl1research' • In language somewhatreminiscent of that used
by Glaser and Strauss, Engelhart has described the kind of
investigator whoworks in this modeas:
Using the procedures of the (sic) philosophical method, (he)
includes the results of his own experience and ferrets out the
observations and beliefs of other persons. He draws upon
principles fran related fields. He is especially sensitive to
implications~ to values, to underlying purposes. (p.470,
emphasesadd)
Accordingto &1gelhart, curricu1un research addresses larger questions
relating to 'the goals or objectives of education; in other words,
with problems of what should be' (ibid.). nus characterization is
reminiscent of the probing, questioning approach of investigators who
adopt Pearse's Interpretive/Hermeneutic stance; it recalls,
particularly, the phenomenologists' emphasis on intersubjectivity,
namely, the ••• understanding of contextual meaning fran the
perspectives of the participants' (Pearse, ope cit., p.l6l). In this
enquiry, the 'participants' are the theorists (aestheticians,
litterateurs, and educators) whose writings constitute 'data'.
Intersubjectivity was also pursued through a policy of individual
consultation with academicsworkingin the theoretical fields outlined
above. This approach is canparable to the seeking and establishing of
truth in historical research. As Stenhouse (1978) has observed:
For verification, history depends upon a cammmal.critical
discussion of evidence which is accessible on the same terms to
all scholars, that is, the achievement of 8 critical
intersubjectivity. (p.22, emphasisadded)
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In brief, the Interpretive/Hermeneutic paradigmappears to be, in a
numberof respects, a fitting model for the present research. Its
relevance is recognized, in particular, with regard to the
interpretation of texts, in this case of theoretical texts located
mainly in the fields of philosophical aesthetics, literature studies
and art education. '!be emergent investigation of canpeting
standpoints in philosophical aesthetics can be viewed as a paradigm
case of educational enquiry into the controversial aspects of
knowledge per se. 'lbis would involve the description, analYSiS,
interpretation, and evaluation of different theoretical standpoints;
an approach which anticipates Pearse's third paradigmof educational
research, namely, the Critical/1beoretic.
2.6.3 Critical/lbeoretic
Accordingto Pearse, this paradigm
••• takes meanings, the essences, and the understandings of
multiple realities gained from the situational-interpretative
orientation and adds the critical dimension. (op. cit., p.161)
The emphasis of researchers working within it is on achieving
contextual and intersubjective understanding of the social world in
order to intervene in the educational process and thereby improvethe
quality of society. nus objective is realized in the educational
sphere through researchers attempting ' ••• to makeproblematic what is
taken for granted and to makeexplicit and to question that which
underlies our school and communityexperiences' (ibid., p.162). This
interventionist stance is directed, in particular, to the emanCipation
of learners' thinking through the developoent of their critical
faculties.
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'!be focus of this enquiry on exploring the curricular implications of
aspects of controversy (e.g., artistic intention) is, self-evidently,
a paradigm case of 'problematizing' taken-for-granted knowledge.
Pearse's Critical-Theoretic orientation, as an extension of the
Interpretive-Hermeneutic (Pearse, OPe cit., p.161), views lmowledge
content, not as an unassailable given 'objective' reality (as in
positivism) but as a socially organized and transmitted conmodity
which serves political ends. A Critical-Theoretic orientation in
curriculum research is thus motivated by the desire to examine the
relationship betweenknowledgeand society and to expose the function
of knowledgein perpetuating societal inequalities (cf. Carr & Kenmis,
Opecit.; Kelly, Opecit.; Gibson, 1986).
The Critical/Theoretic paradigmis especially relevant for educational
researchers, such as this one, who have sought to investigate an
aspect of the epistemological foundations of the
'Geisteswissenschaften', or humanistic disciplines. The Americanart
educator Eisner (1985) has addressed the question: Whatcounts as a
Ph.D. in these disciplines? Accordingto him:
Doctoral programs (sic) socialize students to believe that the
most dependable procedure one can use to obtain knowledgeis
through science and that respectable inquiry in education, at
least respectable empirical inquiry, is scientific in character.
To use other methods, to employmetaphor, analogy, simile, or
other poetic devices, is to lack rigor (sic). (p.2l8)
His claim is that art criticism, thoughcouchedin poetic language, is
nevertheless 'an empirical undertaking' (ibid., p.2l7) which is
potentially as rigorous a model for reflective, systematic enquiry as
the moreestablished 'scientific' model.
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In a similar vein, the literary theorist Frye (1973, pp.3-7) has
suggested that the daninance of ' scientific' methodin all areas of
scholarship and research is symptanatic of a dualistic view of
reality. He insisted that 'literature' (and, by implication, art)
, ••• is a structure' which '. •• can be studied in sequence like
anything else', and that '. •• the entire study of it can assume a
scientific shape'. (ibid., p. 6)• By' scientific', Frye had in mind
••• a future developDelltof science in which the social sciences
will have discovered the fact that they are equidistant fran the
humanities and the physical sciences, and are as closely related
to the former as to the latter. (p.6)
The emphasis in both cases is on structure. '!be' objects' of enquiry,
whether artworks, educational progr8llllles,or philosophical issues, are
not inchoate; such varied objects exhibit a large degree of structural
coherence and consistency, which makes possible the task of
investigating their puzzling features. The requirements of this
enquiry seem, however, to be less well served by the modelof the art
critic than by that of the metacritic, or aesthetician, that is, the
researcher working within the Critical/Theoretic paradigm whose
approach leans more to the theoretic than the cri tical. This is
because the educational metacritic wouldview knowledgein terms, not
only of philosophy, but of sociology, psychology, and politics, and
would seek to apply insights from these fields to the substantive
problems of curriculum theory and practice.
2.6.4 Reflection on the Paradigms
In SUJmary, the three paradigmshave varying degrees of relevance for
the current research. '!be Empirical/Analytic paradigm is the least
relevant, for whilst the 'academic rationalism' associated with it is
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thought to underlie discipline-based curricullD research as a whole,
the static view of knowledgewhich rationalism often entails is
believed not to be applicable to this investigation. '!bis is because
the focus on the controversy over intention reveals a dynamicrather
than a static view of the discipline of aesthetics. Pearse's
Interpretive/Hermeneutic paradigmcontains ideas compatible with the
enquiry's 'emergent' approach to the 'data' of theoretical texts,
namely, contextuality and intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, it is
relevant only in part; for whilst hermeneutics in educational research
has been traditionally linked to textual interpretation, it has come
to be applied almost exclusively in recent research" to the direct,
experiential investigation of 'natural' settings, such as classroaos.
This change of emphasis is reflected in Pearse's characterization of
his third paradigm, the Critical/'1'heoretic, whichhe described as an
'extension' of the Interpretive/Hermeneutic. '!bis appears to have the
most relevance because it presupposes criticism to be a prototypic
model for research. Nevertheless, though there are different kinds
of art criticism in practice, not to mention canpeting stances on the
nature of aesthetic theory underlying such criticiSlD.!, it was thought
more appropriate in the present enquiry to stress the prototypic model
of metacriticism rather than criticism, especially in view of this
researcher's concern to explore the pedagogical implications of
controversy in philosophical aesthetics.
2.7 Metacriticism and Methodology
Reference was madeearlier to the aim of developing a 'pedagogyof
aesthetics and criticism' (Chap.2.2). '!bis might be moreaptly stated
as a 'pedagogy of the aesthetics 2! criticism', since the focus of
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this research is on exploring the pedagogical implications of
controversy in aesthetics, and, as with any examination of
controversy, this entails the scrutiny of theories (i. e., canpeting
theories) underlying the practice of criticism. The research emphasis
in this respect is less on what critics do than on what aestheticians
say that critics do. While this mayappear to be a fine distinction,
it does have an important bearing on the level of specificity of
research outCCJDeSand rec<lilDeCdations.A research enquiry into the
aesthetics of criticism is likely to be rather less specific in its
rec~dations for art educators than one in whichcritical activity
is investigated as a pedagogical focus. The latter is morelikely to
lead to prescription than the former.
The aesthetics of criticism is 'essentially metacriticism' because it
involves exploring theories beneath the practice of criticism
(BeardsleyJ op. ci t •, p. 3; see Chap. 2.3) • Moreover, Pearse's
Critical/Theoretic paradigm has been shownto imply the application of
a metacritic-as-researcher model when the research approach is
envisaged as leaning more to the theoretic than the cri tical (see
Chap. 2.6.3). 'lhis linking of metacriticism with research has clear
precedents in research literature, for not only has the idea been put
forward in recent years that critical strategies can be applied,
analogously, to the interpretation and evaluation of school curricula,
hence the term 'curriculum criticism' (Willis, 1978; Eisner, 1985),
but also a lUIIIber of theorists have proposed the aesthetician, or
metacritic, as an appropriate model from which to derive strategies
for art education research (Wilson, 1974; Geahigan, 1980, 1983;
Hamblen, 1985, 1987). Wilson (ibid., p.6), in particular, has
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distinguished between art education researchers who ' ••• deal with
more empirical matters' and those who '... deal with more theoretical
issues' • He likened the former to art critics because they are
involved in ' ••• assessing the immediateand specific'; the latter he
likened to aestheticians.
Hence, 'metacriticism' as a model for methodappears applicable not
only to the field of aesthetics, but also to both pedagogy (teaching
the aesthetics of criticism) and research (investigating the
relationship of aesthetic theory and educational theory with reference
to underlying conceptual standpoints). 'Metacriticism' therefore
appears to supply an appropriate model for investigating the relation
of theory to method in terms of both the subject matter and the
function of the present enquiry, as outlined in the Introduction to
this chapter.
Nevertheless, whether metacriticism is viewed in the context of
aesthetics, teaching, or research, it is a term which admits of some
degree of flexibility. As far as pedagogical method is concerned,
metacriticism might be conceived of as a strategy for analyzing
competing stances on criticism with a view to seeking a resolution of
the conceptual problems involved. Alternatively, it might be
conceived of as a strategy aimed at clarifying the points of
disagreement between CClllpetingstances, but in the belief that a
resolution of conceptual problems is largely unattainable. 'lbe former
conception would lead to a choice being made between competing
stances, albeit as a result of fair and objective analysis; the latter
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would be more inclined to a pluralistic position in which the aim
would be to achieve balance and representativeness rather than an
order of preference. '!be implication is that 'metacriticism' can
accommodateat least these two definitions and can lead, accordingly,
to rather different approaches.
'Metacriticism' has been defined in subtly different ways by theorists
within the discourse of art education theory. In his analysis of the
concept, the Americanart educator Geahigan (1980) has distinguished
between, on the one hand, 'reportive definitions' which aim to present
a consensus view of the meaning of a term in a specific area of
discourse and, on the other, 'stipulative definitions' which a writer
••• presents for use only in the context in which it is
presented ••• in order to facilitate the discussion at hand.
(p.55)
He pointed out that difficulties in cOlllllUDicationoccur when
••• within the same context of discussion, a writer
surreptitiously shifts between the stipulated meaning and the
ordinary meaningof the term being defined. (p.56)
Geahigan has sought consciously to avoid this logical error by
consistently applying a stipulative definition: he baa stated,
unequivocally, that
• •• inquiry into art criticism, or 'metacritica1 inquiry' aa I
shall label it, would seem to be an important part of--aii
ongoing research of the field' (of art education). (p.54,
emphasis added).
, Inquiry into' or ' theorizing about' art critici_ differs from
Ecker's (1973) definition of the term in his seminal article Analyzing
Children's Talk about Art. Ecker identified five levels of erquiry:
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If we count art production and appreciation as the first level
of inquiry, we find children (1) creating and appreciating art,
(2) criticizing it, and (3) challenging or supporting the
judgement of others, whether adult or children. Moreover, we
find them (4) theorizing about the nature of art and criticism,
and (5) analyzing theories and arguments. (p.70)
WhatGeahigan defined as metacriticism, Ecker here defined as theory
(level 4) and metatheory (level 5).
A further example drawn from the discourse of literary criticism
(Rodway, 1982) defines metacriticism in social, psychological, and
political terms:
••• criticism is concernedwith what the work is, metacriticism
with what it is (usually unwittingly) a sign of, and scholarship
with information about it. To establish the correct text of a
Shakespeare play WOUld be scholarship. To use the playas a
guide to the refinements of Elizabethan modes of feeling,
thinking or dressing, or to the personality of Shakespeare; or,
as manyMarxist critics would, to assess it in terms of its
likely political effects - all these would be metacritical
activities. To establish the meaning and qualities of the play
itself and assess their literary value wouldbe criticism. (p.2,
emphasesin orig.)
Given such divergent views, arriving at a reportive definition of the
term metacriticism appears almost an impossible task. Hence, a
stipulative definition, namely, Geah1gan's (op. cit.) 'inquiry into'
or 'theorizing about' art criticism, is proposed as broadly applicable
to this eIKllliry's emphasis on the controversy over intention and the
competing theoretical positions related to it.
However,before the research strategy for the present enquiry can be
classed as metacriticism, a more general philosophical term,
'methodology', must be considered. Methodologyconveys the sense of
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enquiring into theoretical stances (on criticism) through an analysis
of method. For example, in his Dictionary of Philosophy, Flew (1979)
defined methodologyas:
The study of method, usually covering the procedures and aims of
a particular discipline, and enquiry into the way in which that
discipline is organized. (p.230)
lDtz (1972) has supplied an evenmoresuccinct definition:
The scientific investigation of the problems concerned with
methodis called 'methodology'. (pp.249-250)
The term methodologyis sauetimes used interchangeably with method,
but this is an incorrect usage, since in both the above sources it is
clearly identified as the activity of studying methodand the theory
that lies beneath it. They indicate that it readily accommodates8
reportive definition. Kaelin (1964), writing in the context of
literature education, has indicated also that the methodology of
(literary) criticism is equatable with philosophical aesthetics.
First he claimed that:
The program (sic) for instruction in any field of intellectual
endeavor (sic) depends upon methods, and any discourse upon
methods to be employed in the solution of an intellectual
problemis rightfully termed 'methodology'. (p.289)
Next he identified the two essential elements of a successful
programne for teaching criticism as: (L) ' ••• the laying downof a
workable method of analysis' that is itself based on '... a
methodologi.cally sound aesthetic theory', and (ii) '... "travaux
pratiques" in the use of the method laid down' (ibid. ) •
Methodological enquiry, as envisaged by Kaelin, supplies a framework
with which to examine the theoretical adequacyof the ' conceptual
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bases' (cf. McEr1ane,1974) underlying art curriculum content, thereby
ensuring that the relationship of theory and method is made both
coherent and consistent in pedagogical practice.
'!be term methodology is included in the discussion because it is
deemednecessary to head off the kind of criticism whichwoulddismiss
the enquiry as being sterile, bookish and over-theoretical. '!be
emphasis on methodology, that is, on exploring the inseparable link
between theory and method, is intended to provide a sound basis on
which to counter this objection. 'Ibe inseparability of theory and
methodhas been affirmed by Aspin (op. cit.), who stated that:
Fducation as a whole field is thought of as an area to which
philosophy maybe applied. (p.11)
Moreover, he claimed that research in the philosophy of education is
••• contributory to the informedunderstanding of it (education)
and the successful framing of soundly based theory in it.
(ibid. )
Carr (1986) has also repudiated an artificial distinction between
••• 'philosophical' questions about the nature of educational
theory and 'non-phi10sophica1' questions about how this theory
relates to practice ••• ideas about the nature of educational
theory are always ideas about the nature of educational practice
and always incorporate a latent con;?ttion of bow, in practice,
theory should be used. (p.l77, empbU s added)
It is proposed that the clarification of theory in its relationship to
method is an essential prerequisite for improving practice. 'l'he
distinction between method and practice is a central premise of the
present research enterprise: methodis logically derived from theory;
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practice, on the other hand, is the totality of events and experiences
that impinge on a particular sphere of purposive hUlDllllaction - as
such, practice includes method. Geahigan (op, cit.) has made this
distinction clearly in regard to art criticism (p.l8). Methodis said
to arise from the philosophical analysis of language: that is, the
'... sort of inquiry (which) attempts to isolate and identify the
rules underlying our ability to use the term "criticism"'. On the
other hand, he has defined practice as 'a polymorphousactivity' which
includes not only acts that are primarily related to the concept
'criticism' (i.e., critical methods), but others also that are
indirectly or even tenuously related. For example, when cri tics
produce an interpretation or evaluation of an artwork's properties we
are justified in describing their activity as a moreor less conscious
application of critical method- it is a core activity. On the other
hand, whencritics attend social events connected with the launch of
an exhibition this is best described as a part, albeit an important
part, of their critical practice.
2.8 Dialectical Procedure
At an early stage of the research, the guiding principle of
'emergence' was located in the interpretive tradition of educational
research and aligned with Pearse's Critical/Theoretic paradigm
(Chap.2.6.3 above). This alignment was madeon the assumption that
criticism, or more pertinently the aesthetics of criticism, is
paradigmatic not only of classroom procedures but also research
method. ~re specifically, the concept of 'methodology' could be
identified as the most appropriate description of the research
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approach because it involves exploration of the links between concepts
and methods through focusing on the latter.
A further related term 'dialectical procedure' could also be
considered relevant to the developnent of a research method. It
originates in reviews of a key philosophical text used in the current
research (Margolis, 1980a) in which 'dialectical' is used to designate
the author's general approach of analyzing the views of others
adversatively in order to achieve, by means of syntheSis, a
sophisticated formulation of theory. However,reservations about this
approach were expressed by reviewers, for example, what they alleged
to be the near impossibility of achieving depth of treatment in a
wide-ranging, theory-dominated study. Similar criticisms that the
author's argumentation was obscure in places and overbalanced with
detail (Walton, Ope cit.; Schaper, OPe cit.), or that it dealt
SUI1IIl8I'ilywith the views of other theorists (Jones. 1983. p.129),
could be taken as indirect warnings of the kind of dangers confronting
the present research in the event of adopting this approach.
It would seem that these disadvantages of 'dialectical procedure' 88 a
research model can be avoided only by seeking to do 'full justice' to
all the viewpoints under consideration. According to Ross and Hannay
(1986). 'dialectical reasoning', which they described as ' ••• moving
back and forth between opposing points of view' IIIJ8t be balanced by
'dialogical reasoning', namely, ••• thinking critically and
reciprocally within opposing points of view' (pp.lO-U, emphases
added). In this connection, the cultural anthropologist Geertz (1975,
p.lO) has also written of the need for researchers faced with a ' •••
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multiplicity of conceptual structures' to weave back and forth in
order gradually, though by no meansexhaustively or definitively, to
makeintelligible sense of the interpretive contexts they are seeking
to investigate. Geertz' s reconmendationthat researchers working in
his discipline should' ••• contrive somehowfirst to grasp and then to
render (ibid., emphases added) the disparate materials they face
affords a useful parallel in somerespects with the general approach
characteristic of the present research. This involves seeking first
to analyze concepts used in separate kinds of theory with a view to
achieving a private 'clarification' of issues, and then synthesizing
arguments arising from the analyses in the form of a public
'cOlllllUIlication' of principles pertinent to art education. The
relevance of 'dialectical procedure' and other perspectives on
research method identified in this enquiry will be reflected upon in
the final chapter of the thesis.
2.9 Sunmary
'111enquiry which forms the basis of this chapter has considered the
factors involved in devising a research strategy for exploring the
pedagogical implications of aesthetic controversy. 'lb1s has proved
difficul t because the aims and anticipated approach of the er¥IUirydid
not at first appear to fit existing parameters of educational
research. Research strategies in the philosophy of education in the
U.K. were found to be of limited usefulness, though recent
transatlantic studies, especially those influenced by Continental or
Continentally-inspired theorizing, proved helpful as a buis for an
emergent strategy corresponding with the exploratory nature of the
enquiry as a whole. The critical/theoretic category of art education
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research (Pearse) has been identified as the IDOstappropriate model
because it involves the application of interpretive research methods
to the analysis of textual material.
The link between content and methods of art criticism was shownto be
exceedingly complex and it was concluded that clarification of this
problematic area could only be achieved by modelling the research
strategy on methods of enquiry in aesthetics, namely, 'metacriticism'.
However, the term 'methodology' was shown to fit the needs of the
present research equally as well as 'metacriticism' but with a subtle
difference: whereas the latter (on one definition) designates the task
of theorizing about the content of criticism in relation to method,
the former conveys the sense of clarifying this relationship by
focusing on method.
To summarize: Critical/theoretic, Hetacritica1 and Methodological have
been identified as suitable descriptors of the research strategy used .
10 the enquiry as a whole. The term 'methodology' conveys the
enquiry's emphasis on investigating the implications for pedagogical
method of aesthetic controversy, such as that associated with
intention. However, 'dialectical procedure' was thought to coincide
closely with the kind of approach needed in the research overall. It
appeared to be conducive to the investigation of opposing viewpoints
and the synthesizing of argtDents drawn from disparate sources. In
the following chapter, an attempt will be made to identify different
conceptions of critical method found 10 art education theory.
Although existing approaches may be geared IDOre to developing
learners' direct appreciation of art than their grasp of philosophical
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argument, precedents may well be fOlDld to exist for teaching not just
one but a range of critical methods. Hence, the enquiry in the
following chapter will take the form of an analytical review of art
education texts with the aim of determining the current baSiS, if any,
for teaching metacriticism in schools.
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CHAPrER 3
METHODS OF CRITICISM AND METACRITICISM IN ART EDUCATION
3.1 Introduction
Given the aim of this research, which is to explore the pedagogical
tmplications of aesthetic controversy, it is necessary first to review
the current state of theorizing about criticism and metacriticism 1n
art education. Art criticism in the classroom can proceed without
explicit reference to aesthetics, whereas metacriticism entails that
learners engage in philosophical speculation about the respective
merits of different critical approaches. Though criticism and
metacriticism are distinct areas of pedagogical concern, the latter is
an extension of the fotTOer;hence, the development of metacritical
strategies in the present research depends on first achieving a sound
grasp of principles and procedures of criticism available in art
education texts. A distinction is also needed between teaching
metacriticism and teaching aesthetics. Aesthetics is a broader term
than metacriticism: it designates a range of philosophical issues
concerned with the characteristics of 'beauty' as found not only in
art and other aspects of the huDan-madeenv1rornent. but also in
nature (Burn & Ramsden,1972, pp.23-24; Nwocio,1984, pp.196-197). In
this research, however, the term 'aesthetic controversy' refers
specifically to philosophical issues concerned with the relationship
between the ontology of art and methods of criticism.
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'!be review is conducted primarily with reference to articles in art
education journals and anthologies, although dissertations and teacher
education texts are also consulted. However,the textual sources are
not limited to art education: reference is also madeto other k1Ixisof
theoretical writing, notably those relating to aesthetics and the
history of art. Certain North Americanstudies of seminal importance
are examined in some detail (Smith, 1968; MacGregor,1971; Feldman,
1973; Chapnan, 1978). Recent studies connected with the Discipline
BasedArt Fducation (DBAE)'mvement' are also consulted because these
represent a reappraisal of the links between the 'productive' modein
art learning and various 'response' modes - art history, art
criticism, and &esthetics (e.g., Greer, 1984; Hamblen, 1987, 1988).
the DBAEprotocols identify aesthetics as one of four 'components' of
art education content, although it has been described by Hamblen
(1987, p, 71) as the 'least developed' area of art content in DBAE,
both in terms of identifying alternative theories and methods of art
cri ticism and applying them to classroom practice. If Hamblen's
assessment is correct, a need exists for art educators on both sides
of the Atlantic to try to make good pedagogical sense of philosophical
&esthetics in conjunction with established practices in other aspects
of art education. 'lbis need is particularly pressing in the U.K.,
given what to date has been a marked lack of involvement in
1metacritical enquiry among British art educators.
In brief, the review has two objectives: (i) to identify concepts and
methods associated with teaching critical diversity, and (1i) to
explore the links between theories of criticism generated by
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aestheticiana and those that art education theorists have derived from
aesthetics.
3.2 'Art Historian' and 'Art Critic' 8S Role MOdels:Distinctions and
Interrelations
Given the stated aim of 'ccmnun1cating' with a British audience (Chap.
1.2), it is important first to address the issue of teaching critical
pluralism in the context of the history of art, because this is the
2
dominantperspective on the 'study' of art in schools in the U.K., at
least to examination levels. In professional art scholarship a
distinction can be drawnbetween, on the one hand, the history of art,
which involves questions such as: how, when, where, why, by whom, and
for whom, individual works were produced; and, on the other, the
criticism of art, which involves questions more concerned with the
nature of aesthetic value, especially in regard to a work's capacity
for engaging the attention of viewers in a direct experience with the
object. However,the distinction betweenart historian and art critic
can easily be overstated. 'Ihe interrelatedness of these two
professional spheres also needs to be taken into account if a
simplistic and thus distorted view of the kinds of activities involved
is to be avoided. It is only partly correct to distinguish between,
on the one hand, the art historian as an individual concernedwith the
cirCUlDStancesof production of an artwork, and on the other. the art
critic as one who views the work as a self-contained repository of
aesthetic experience. Without further qualification this distinction
can misleadingly imply that art critics have little interest in the
historical contexts of artworks.
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In the first place, there are critics (and critical theorists) who
refuse to venerate the artwork by declining to view it as being in any
sense a self-contained object which uniquely embodies the personal
vision of the artist/author (Wolff, 1981). On the contrary, such
scholars view the artwork as part of a wider process to which many
individuals and institutional groups contribute. In this respect,
Wolff (ibid., pp. 32f & 118-119) stressed that the individuality of
artistic production is an illusory notion: the romanticist mythof the
artist as an unfettered creator pursuing his or her task free from
worldly impingementsentails acceptance of a view of artistic creation
which sets up the artist as the sole agent or mediator of that
creation. Against this position, she emphasized that artistic
activity is a collaborative enterprise, not only in the obvious cases
of film production, ballet, opera, and the like, but also in the arts
of painting, sculpture, poetry and novel writing. Art activity, even
in its IDOstesoteric and private manifestations, is parasitic on
institutionalized practices, including those that relate to the
distribution and reception of artistic forms (cf. Becker, 1982;
Walker, 1983)• Scholars who view art in this way also view as
problematic any attempt clearly to define what is internal, and what
external, to the artwork.
'l1le polarisation of viewpoints among theorists and practitioners of
art criticism appears to be closely paralleled in the sphere of the
history of art. In this respect, Kleinbauer (op. cit., p.37f) has
distinguished between ' intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' approaches in art
scholarship. He defined intrinsic approaches 88 those in which
scholars focused primarily on the physical, formal and aesthetic
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properties of particular works. External factors, such as the
cultural context in which a work is produced, or information about an
artist's life, are viewedby such scholars as of secondary importance.
Kleinbauer identified several 'genres of modern scholarship' which
fall within an ' intrinsic' perspective: these include (1) the
teclmical analysis of artworks, for example, the use of X-rays and
photanicrographs, and 'chemical tests of pi~ts' (pp.38-40); (ii)
cormoisseurship, described as an 'empirical method' which uses the
teclmiques of archaeology and philology to investigate 'questions of
authenticity and attribution' (pp.43-48); (iii) stylistic analysis, a
method promulgated by Wolffltn, in which the attempt is made to
classify artworks chronologically according to formalist principles;
and (iv) iconographic analysis, a method largely associated with the
writings of Panofsky, in which the imagery of an artwork is first
examinedin its details in order to uncover conventional meanings, and
then analysed at a deeper level (iconology) to '... discover and
interpret symbolic values' (p.55) that reflect the work's cultural
ambience.
Kleinbauer (p.67f.) defined 'extrinsic' approaches to the study of art
as 'more broadly based' than intrinsic ones. He claimed that
scholarship of this type tends not to concentrate on the specificity
of the artwork, that is, as a tmique object embodying symbolic and
formal elements; instead it attends principally to external data and
utilizes the paradigms and methods of the social sciences for art
historical research. He identified several 'genres of modem
scholarship' which fall within an 'extrinsic' perspective: these
include, (i) artistic biography (pp. 67-70); (ii) the study of
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·.. psychological and psychoanalytic aspects of artistic creation'
(p.70f.); (iii) various sociological explanations of art by Marxists
and others, for example, 'causal' or deterministic explanations (p.77)
in which artworks are viewed as the inevitable products of social,
political, and economic factors; and 'expressive' explanations in
which it is maintained that art be viewed as a reflection of society
(p.78); and (iv) 'cultural history' (p.89f.), a panoramic conception,
in which the visual arts are studied as part of a larger project to
enhance understanding of the development of patterns of general
culture, including the history of ideas (Geistesgeschichte).
Kleinbauer's intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, although hedged about
with caveats and qualifications, can easily be pressed too far: its
validity and appeal largely depend on whether one accepts his
conmitmentto the primacy of intrinsic methods. By contrast, scholars
whosework is (on Kleinbauer's definition) 'extrinsic' typically act
on the assumption that what is internal, and what external, to the
artwork cannot be clearly demarcated. Kleinbauer's personal stance in
regard to this issue is revealed particularly by his account of
sociological explanations: in this connection, he stressed that non-
Marxist scholars tended to investigate the interconnections between
specific artworks and the cultural contexts of those works without
seeking, as in the case of Marxists, to engage in a critique of social
structures from the standpoint of an overriding theory of culture. He
Cited, as an example, the subject of patronage as providing a rich
source of material for scholars who in this way attempted to
investigate the dynamicsof art and society (p.82). In the nearly two
decades since Kleinbauer' s book was first published the (mainly
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Marxist) sociological analysis of art as ideology has III18hroomed
(Taylor, 1984, p. 77): writers in this tradition have sought not merely
to cast light on the links between art and general culture, but have
mounted a trenchant critique of the assumptions underlying the
mechanisms by which the history of art is both created and
disseminated.
A principal tenet of the sociological critique is that the term
'history of art' is problematic: this indicates that it is both
misleading and naively uncritical to accept it for consideration
without recognizing that, as in the case of the term 'literature', it
conceals a web of Wlexamined ideological 88SUllptions (Wolff, 1983,
pp.13-1S). Specifically, traditional history of art has been
criticized for serving the interests of elitist social groups (Berger,
1972; Wolff, 1981, pp.28-29; 1983, p.17), for perpetuating discredited
notions such as ' the artist as genius' and 'the art work as life-
enhancing object' (Clark, 1974, p.S62; Pollock, 1982, p.4; Garb, 1984,
pp.347-348), and for purveying a restrictive, Westernized view of
'high art' which effectively downgradesso-called popular, folk, and
non-Western art forms (Sloan, 1972, p.lll). It is claimed that the
central failing of much traditional history of art is that it is
largely an 'ahistorical' enterprise (Wolff, 1981, pp.lO-12; Pollock,
OPe cit., pp.6-7) which, in contrast to the academic discipline of
history, attaches little importance to philosophical reflectiveness
(Sloan, ope cit., p.l07). Consequently, art historians need a
'second-order discourse' (Baldwin, Harrison, & Ramsden, 1981, pp.450-
453) in order that they might free themselves from the circularity of
their ownlanguage.
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In this connection, Walker (1983) distinguished between 'art history'
and 'the history of art' and criticized the tendency among scholars to
employsuch term8 interchangeably. Accordingto Walker, 'Art history
is the nameof an intellectual, theoretical discipline whoseobject of
study is the history of art'. This 'discipline' produces 'multiple
histories •••• of art' (p.73, emphasesin orig.) through analyses of
the causal cormectiona between the production, distribution, and
reception of specific works, styles, genres, or schools of artists.
'lbe notion of art as a realm of purely ,aesthetic' concern is thus
replaced by one which emphasizes process and the interplay of
aesthetic and non-aesthetic factors. Walkeralso pointed out that art
historians as a professional body are not sufficiently aware of the
'problems of history-writing' and are not, therefore, sufficiently
critical of their own productions (ibid.).
The sociological critique, which recently has been labelled 'the New
Art History' (Rees & Borzello, 1986), is characteristically concerned
wi th analyzing the social aspects of art in relation to the
theoretical underpinnings of practice. This tendency is equivalent to
metacriticiam, for just as the diversity of theory and practice in
criticism is the focus of metacritical enquiry. so the diversity of
theory and practice in the history of art is the focus of ''!be New Art
History'. 'Dlis diversity. which is cOlllDOnto both domains, reveals a
polarisation between 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' approaches, which it
is claimed are fundamentally linked to divergent conceptions of the
nature and limits of the artwork and the kinds of evidence required to
settle interpretive disputes. Briefly, art critiCism and the history
of art equally manifest a range of approaches which, at a deeper
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level, are a reflection of different theoretical assumptions about the
nature of art and, indeed, life itself.
Having established that methodological diversity is a chief charac-
teristic of the disciplines of art scholarship, further investigation
is necessary to ascertain whether art education theorists have
explored its implications for teaching. Given the links already
described between art criticism and the history of art, the question
arises as to whether pedagogical insights in this area might provide
someclues as to howto teach criticism from a theoretical (that is, a
metacritical) standpoint.
3.3 TeaChinga Rangeof Approachesto the History ard Criticism of Art
Since the early 1970s strenuous attempts have been made by art
education theorists in both the U.S.A. and the U.K. to broaden the
base of art studies under the banner of 'aesthetic education'. Major
3
developments such as CEMRELand the Journal of Aesthetic Education
have signalled a burgeoning interest in the pluralistic
intercormectedness of the arts.- In this respect, Feldman (1981,
p.149) has indicated that the move towards aesthetic education was
based on a 'comprehensive theory of art' and that it had arisen in
response to an 'overemphasis on the teaching of technique'; he also
maintained (ibid •• cf. p.143) that the anthropological perspective of
aesthetic education gave it greater potential than a linear,
chronological approach to teaching the history of art.
Acomprehensiveconception of art lies behind influential moves in the
U.S.A. and U.K. (Eisner, 1972; Allison, 1982) aimed at broadening the
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scope and effectiveness of art teaching through emphasizing the
importance of historical and critical modesof art experience and the
dynamicinterrelatedness whichobtains between such activities and the
productive aspects of art learning.
Allison's (1982) curriculum model is currently influential both in the
U.K. and in several countries overseas. Allison identified four
domainsof art experience: the Expressive/Productive, the Perceptual,
the Analytical/Critical, and the Historical/CUltural. He particularly
stressed that the four domains, although theoretically
distinguishable, are practically inseparable:
In reality all the four domains are unavoidably interdependent
and interactive with each other. However,any art or design
object, activity, source, purpose, reaction or response can be
considered by giving emphasis to or concentration on one of the
domains as well as in terms of the relationship of that domain
to the others. Nevertheless, even if emphasis is given to any
one domain, its relationship to and effects fromor on the other
domainsis unavoidable. (p.62).
Allison's main purpose in publishing his model was to make art
educators more aware of the interrelations between the different
domains of art experience in order that they might be encouraged to
link them more explicitly in their teaching. For example, the
existence of art critics, their function in relation to art and
society, and the methods and procedures they employ, provide an
essential model for pedagogy. ~ this argment, a teacher who does
not engage young people in critically appraising artworks is
presenting a seriously distorted image of the subject 'art'. It vu
Allison's hope that classroom teachers who terxled unwittingly to
concentrate on one or two of the domains to the exclusion of the
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others might be challenged to provide a more balanced learning
4experience for their pupils.
Allison is a leading contributor to what has become'... a significant
body of opinion seeking to broaden the base' (Price, 1989, p.113) of
art in schools. According to Price it has arisen partly under the
influence of literature and media studies, and partly out of a growing
awareness of the artistic importance of non-&1ropean cultural
products. She concluded that:
An ' Art History and Critical Studies' progranme needs to
establish the conditions in which the principle of pluralism in
visual representation can be recognised ana valued.
(p.120, emphasis added).
'nle 'principle. of pluralism' which Price advocated was made in
response to the 'formal diversity' of world art (p.12l). The present
enquiry is more concerned, however, with makingpedagogical sense of
critical diversity in respect of artworks as a genus or class of
entities. Such an approach implies both an application of and a
reflection on critical methods: it suggests that it would be
introduced to learners through exercises in practical critiCism, with
the object of developing their understanding of the link between
concepts and methods of criticism, whilst concurrently enhancing and
enriching their aesthetic appreciation of individual works. 'Formal
diversity' and 'critical diversity' are not easy to differentiate
because different kinds of art giye rise to corresponding kinds of
criticism, and this implies that critical concepts may be
inappropriately applied in given cases. For example, a &1ropean art
critical text in which the formal qualities of an African woodcarving
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are compared with 'the flying buttresses of a Gothic Cathedral'
(Redfield, 1959, pp. 40-42). If such inappropriateness results from
ignorance, insensitivity, Euro-ethnocentrism, and the like, then it is
clearly misguided and should form no part of an education in critical
diversity. Nevertheless, a case can be made for deliberately creating
a mismatch of artwork and critical mode with the object of producing
livelier criticism (Booth, 1979, p.253). (At stake here is the issue
of whether artworks, as a class of entities, are repositories of fixed
meanings, which in principle are accessible to interpretation; or,
whether they are objects which can legitimately support rival
interpretations not bound to the intentions of the artist nor to the
intentional structures of the artistic cODmmdty to which he or she
belongs.)
In sunmary, the preceding discussion of the distinctions and
interrelations between art criticism and the history of art reveals a
range of conflicting stances which can be broadly grouped as
,intrinsic' and ' extrinsic' conceptions of the nature of art and
concomitant methods of interpretation. Academic art historians have,
in recent years, shown an increasing tendency to subject their
discipline to theoretical analysis and reflection. Art education
theorists have similarly come to recognize the diverse character of
art historical studies and, as a consequence, have sought to broaden
the scope of such studies in schools. Nevertheless, in spite of this
growing awareness of the need to teach artistic pluralism, little
evidence has been found to indicate that methodological diversity per
se has been developed as a pedagogical focus. Moreover, no evidence
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is forthcoming of attempts to link theoretical stances with compatible
modes of instruction.
3.4 'Aesthetician' as Role Model: Alternative Critical Stances
MacGregor's (1971) doctoral study provides the main point of reference
for the following discussion concerning the need to identify competing
stances on the nature of criticism, with a view to considering ways in
which critical concepts can be translated into pedagogical methods in
art education theory and practice. Analyzing MacGregor's ideas is
thought to be a helpful preparation for exploring the pedagogical
implications of controversy in aesthetics because she not only
identified different conceptions of criticism in art education theory,
but also compared them with parallel conceptions in the field of
aesthetics. Moreover, her discussion of the views of art education
theorists and aestheticians supplies a useful focus for addressing the
question of the extent to which talk about theory and talk about
practice overlaps. The stated purpose of MacGregor's research was to
design and test a '... unit of instruction for the education of
prospective art teachers' (ibid., Chap.IV) which would incorporate
alternative philosophical stances on the nature of art criticism. She
demonstrated that teachers who were so instructed significantly
developed their ability to engage in critical discourse and were thus
better equipped to involve children in the same process. Her main
reconmendation was that trainee art teachers should be given clear
guidance about alternative conceptions of art criticism and the
variety of methods that arise fran them.
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3.4.1 Componentsof Critical Activity: AComparisonof Models
MacGregor (ibid., Chap. II) examined first the views of three
prominent art education theorists - Ecker (1973), Feldman(1973), and
Smith (1968) - whom she considered to be representative of distinct,
though in some respects canplementary, approaches to teaching art
criticism. In MacGregor'sview, Ecker's and Feldman's approaches were
comparable because both writers considered the art critic to be the
most fruitful model for pedagogical practice, whereas Smith favoured
the model of aesthetician. For present purposes, however, attention
will be paid to her cOlJlDentson Feldmanand Smith.
Feldman devised his schemeon the basis of critical practice. He
employed 'the critic as model' in much the same way as an earlier
generation had used 'the artist as model' as a justification for
developing children's expressive potential through the production of
art. The schemefirst appeared in 1967 in his book Art as Imageand
Idea and, with slight modifications, was included in his Becoming
HUman ThroughArt (1970) and in the revision of his 1967 work under
its newtitle Varieties of Visual Experience (1972), and since then in
several journal articles. In a response to criticisms by Geahigan
(1983, pp.2O-21) that his scheme was rigid and not fully
representative of the riclmess and variety of critical practice.
Feldman(1984) madethe following conmentabout his original purpose:
When I wrote about 'the form' of criticism in 1967. I was urging
a reasonable method in place of no method at all ••••• my
earliest writing on the subject - in the 1960's - came at a time
when art educators hardly aCknowledgedthe role of criticism in
teaching. (p,79).
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The practical orientation of Feldman's schemewas readily admitted by
him:
A further word about theory and practice as regards art
criticism. My own theoretical contributions, such as they are,
followed considerable practical experience in doing art
criticism. I do not argue that doing art criticism guarantees
the soundnessof one's theoretical views, but I wouldbe wary of
theoretical pronounceeenta that are not based on a fairly
substantial body of cri tical practice, both in teaching and in
published form. It is praxis that enables us to modify our
theoretical views fran time to time, and it is a published
record of criticism that provides a certain assurance of
reliability to our students and readers. (ibid.).
Feldman,with his emphasis on the critic rather than the philosopher
of criticism, advocated the use of his schemeas a model for learners
openly to pursue. 'Description' here becanes more than (merely) a
silent noting of the details of an artwork, but a consciously public
act, in which groups of learners are encouraged to take inventory of
the work as a deliberate shared strategy. In Feldman's scheme,
therefore, 'critical performance', namely, the critic's direct,
personal encounter with an artwork, becomesa prescribed teclmique:
the phases are followed sequentially; the learner-critic thinks out
loud.
MacGregordetected an important distinction between the views of
Feldmanand Smith: the former, as previously noted, based his position
on the art critic as model, whereas the latter derived his theoretical
justification from the philosophy of criticism. Nevertheless, she
judged them to be comparablebecause, despite the difference in their
theoretical sources, both had reached the same conclusion about the
structure of critical activity, namelyt that it consists of a sequence
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of logically distinct, though overlapping, stages of increasingly
complexthought.
Smith (1973, p.38f.), like Feldman,recognized the distinction between
private and public modesof critical activity. He described 'two
basic types of criticism', each of which 'performs a distinctive
function': Exploratory Aesthetic Criticism and ArgumentativeAesthetic
Criticism. 'll1e former is almost a parallel of Feldman's scheme in
that it consists of four 'overlapping phases':
3. Characterization,
in the sense of relatively straight-
forward noting of the more literal
aspects of objects;
whichattends carefully to the inter-
relations of sensuous elements noted
in description;
whichmarks the peculiar nature of a
work's aesthetic qualities; and





'!he verbs 'noting', 'attends', and 'marks' in Smith's presentation are
active componentsof the critic's·direct, personal experience of an
artwork. The phases occur in an ordered sequence that represents a
progression from the relatively straightforward activity of describing
the literal features of a work to that of interpreting its meaning.
'!hus conceived, the critic's task becomesan increasingly normative
procedure in which statements of 'fact' are superseded by judgements
of value. Smith's focus for determining the phases of Exploratory
Aesthetic Criticism is not, in the first instance, that of critical
practice: it is the logical relationship which obtainS between the
different phases. For example, Analysis (Phase 2) entails attending
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,carefully to the interrelations of sensuous elements noted in
description' (Phase 1). '!bus the relationship between these two
phases is a logical one: analysis presupposes that there is something
to analyze; that features susceptible of description are available for
analysis to focus upon. Smith's emphasis on the logicality of the
sequence of phases is needed because it does not follow in practice
that all critics in all cirC\lllStancesfollow in their thoughts the
actual progression of steps that he has outlined. Criticism is a
dynamicnot a mechanical activity. Seasonedcritics do not usually
begin the task of criticism by laying aside their prejudices in order
to makean inventory of all the straighforward!y descriptive features
of a workbefore proceeding to analyze the interrelations of parts.
Rather, professional critics, with their wide experience of the styles
and genres of art, and armedwith a prodigious array of perceptual
categories, are able to dispense with the descriptive 'phase',
beginning instead with a mainly interpretive hunch fran which to work
backwards, as it were deductively, to see if the evidence in a work
supports it. Hence, in critical practice, there is an oscillation
between the different phases in the logical sequence: the cri tic's
attention movesback and forth, fo~ a hypothesis, noting details,
analyzing the relationship between the details, perhaps on a formal
level and then perhaps with reference to biographical evidence,
looking again more closely to discover further details, perhaps
revising the original hypotheSiS, and so on. The process is not
strictly sequential: it is messy, variable, and as diverse in
character as the critics who engage in it. In brief, Exploratory
Aesthetic Criticism precedes public performanceand is essential to
it; however, it is, on Smith's definition, primarily a private act.
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The second type of criticism that Smith identified was Argumentative
Aesthetic Criticism. 'lbis, as the word 'argumentative' suggests,
refers to critical activity in the arena of public discussion and
debate. It is a retrospective or synoptic version of the critic's
private encounter with an artwork and is couched in language that aims
to persuade and even to cajole an audience to accept the critic's
conclusions. At least, that is the case with 'journalistic' and
'popular' types of criticism (Feldman, 1972, pp.454-456). In
'scholarly' ard 'pedagogical' criticism, however, conclusions may be
more open-ended and may serve instead to guide readers into a deeper
experience of a work that ultimately requires them to finish the task
themselves by reaching their ownassessments (ibid.).
Feldman's and Smith's concern for teaching method and technique was
the outcaoe of more than simple necessity. '!here is very good reason
for proceeding in the ways they suggest that has as DIlchto do with
theoretical considerations as it has with bringing a sense of order to
what Ecker (1973, p.71) has described as '... the intellectual
exci tement of spontaneous and freewheeling discussions in the art
room'• It is that aesthetic judgements ought to be - as far as
possible - objective, and true to the 'facta' of observation.
Feldman (1973) has stressed the need for critics to atrive for
objectivity as follows:
One of the things we have to learn in functioning as critics -
whether we are adults or youngsters - is to resist the tendency
to reach a premature closure of our aesthetic experience.
(p.51).
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The point of having a plan or procedure on which to model ycn.mg
people's approaches to criticism is to head off the tendencywhich the
unskilled invariably exhibit of jumpingin with their prejudices. Any
schemethat encourages youngpeople to take a detached look, to hold
back the first impulse to pass summary judgementon an artwork is to
be welcaned. In this cmmection, Feldman(op. cit.) has described the
difference between the approaches of the layperson and the
professional art critic as that between haphazard and ill-informed
,talk about art' and that which is ' structured' and 'organized '
according to 'sane kind of plan'. He has argued that art teachers (as
indeed all teachers) have a responsibility to provide a clear and
sequential framework within which learning experiences can be
organized and learning outcomes evaluated. This DIlch is certainly
provided by his scheme,which advantageouslypermits art criticism in
the classroom at least to get under way. Accepting the criticisms of
Geahigan, mentioned earlier, that his schemewas too rigid, Feldman
conceded that, a8 young people grow in appreciative skill, they may
eventually discard such obvious critical teclmiques in favour of a
more open approach. The principle here is that, in any learning
situation, the more experienced a practitioner becomes, the less need
there is for a conscious application of fundamentalsteps.
Smith's distinction between Exploratory Aesthetic Criticism and
ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism is especially helpful in showingthe
relationship between the logical and operational components of
criticism. The differences in critical method which MacGregor
detected between Feldmanand Smith appear on further analysis to be
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either differences in the reccmnendedorder in which the operations
are to be 'performed', or differences of emphasis in regard to
particular components.
3.4.2 ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism in Action
The complexcharacter of ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism, especially
the relationship of the different componentsor 'phases', is further
brought to light by analyzing an exampledrawn from the writings of
the art historian T.J. Clark (1973, pp.80-83), namely, his critical
appraisal of Courbet's 'Burial at Omans' (Appendix II).
Clark's opening paragraph points directly to the ambivalence of
meaning in the painting and the problemswhich this raises for the
task of interpretation. In the first sentence he described the
painting as 'bizarre' j he then identified this sense of strangeness as
a dissociation in the painting between an event of deep social and
religious import (the funeral) and the participants' general air of
apparent emotional indifference. Clark referred to this strangeness
with ccmnents like 'collective distraction' and 'the careful,
ambiguousblankness of a public face'; he also stressed the innovative
character of the work by contrasting it with examples of the less
equivocal depictions of ritual scenes by earlier artists. By these
means, Clark directed his readers' attention, in the first instance,
to the feeling tone of the work, which, paradoxically, presents both
the major area of difficulty for interpretation and the wayof entry
into its meaning and significance.
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In the second through to the sixth paragraphs, Clark examinedthe
formal properties of the painting in relation to Courbet's sources.
In the fourth paragraph, he placed particular emphasison the artist's
intentions, maintaining that Courbet had exerted a bigh degree of
control in order to unify such 'disparate materials'. Clark described
the picture in somedetail, but only to support bis analysiS of its
underlying structure; indeed, his method of approach is entirely
consistent with the observation at the start of the fourth paragraph
that, in the 'Burial at Omans', '... structure is what counta, not
detail'.
In the seventh through to the tenth paragraphs, Clark returned to the
problem of interpretation. His conments focused on the sense of
dissociation between the event and its portrayal, as noted in his
openingparagraph, but this time he raised several questions about the
work's meaning, whichhe directed to specific points arising fran the
intervening analysis of paragraphs two to six. For instance, bis
earlier reference to the dramatic neutrality of the picture is made
more explicit by pointing out that the canposition lacks a focal
point; that the attention of the figures is drawnin all directions,
least of all to the priest and the opengrave. He further pointed out
that, with one exception, ''!here is no exchangeof gaze or glance'
between the participants and that their facial expressions are, for
the most part, devoid of emotion (9th para.). Furthermore, he noted
that the formal arrangement of the painting effectively avoids
dramatic emphasis by an even treatment and distribution of the
figures.
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'Burial at Omans', along with Courbet's two other major works of the
same period, the 'Stonebreakers' and the 'Peasants of Flagey', both
perplexed and angered the critics and public whoattended the Paris
Salon of 1851. Accordingto Clark, it was the deadpanquality of the
picture, ' ••• precisely its lack of open declared significance which
offended most of all' (10th para., emphasis in orig.). Beyondthis
point in his argument, Clark investigated the nature of that elusive
significance in the light of the complexpolitical ethos of French
provinCial society in 1848-1851, and of Courbet's and his family's
position within it. Detailed historical evidence was thus brought to
bear on the problems of interpretation and interposed with evidence
gleaned from the formal analysis. The resulting appraisal sensitively
resolves many of the difficulties presented by this period of
Courbet's work.
Further BlmDarY of Clark's assessment of the 'Burial at Omans' is
unnecessary; suffice to say that it supplies an illuminating example
of ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism and serves to highlight the main
features of such criticism. As noted earlier, it is charac-
teristica1ly pervaded with a concern for evaluation. In Clark's
(
assessment, however, there is no specific 'stage' in whichhe offers a
judgementof the work: rather, his whole endeavour is animated by the
belief that Courbet's workmerits the highest level of interest and
investigation. The very context and parameters of his enquiry imply
as much. Approbatory coomentsbreak through in only one or two
places: in the sixth paragraph, Clark concluded his analysis by
stating that, in contrast to the relative straightforwardness of his
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source material, Courbet's work is ••• carefully and subtly
constructed' and reveals evidence of '... what kind of intelligence
has been at work'. Thus, he concludedthat the subtlety, complexity,
and equivocation of the 'Burial at Omans' marks it out as a painting
of outstanding artistic merit.
'!be relationship in Clark's criticism betweendescription, analysis,
and interpretation is particularly illuminating. As already noted,
the excerpt begins with an identification of the major difficulty for
interpretation, proceeds to an analysis of the way in which the
details of the picture are structured, and then concludes by raising
again, more explicitly, the question of interpretation. '!be logical
relationship betweenthe different 'stages' of criticism seemsto hold
true despite fluctuations either in the order in which they occur, or
in the relative importanceassigned to each one. Clark's observation
concerning the 'Burial at Omans', that ' ••• structure is what cmmts,
not detail' (4th para.), implies the opposite notion that some
artworks emphasise detail and have a less obvious sense of formal
structure: for example, the paintings of GustavKlimt. The principle
to be drawnfran this comparisonis that different artworks call for
corresponding differences in critical emphasis: with someworks it is
appropriate to attend more to description than to formal analYSis,
with others the converse holds true.
Clark's criticism of the 'Burial at Omans' also highlights the
relationship between formal analysis and interpretation. Elsewhere
(ibid., p. 11) he suggested that the languageof formal analysis is
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subtly value-laden in a way which belies its appearance of
objectivity. Smith (1968, p.415) has also noted the tendency of
analytical statements to 'shade over' into the interpretive phase.
Hence, statements which attempt to describe the interrelations of
elements within a work (e.g., 'unified', 'balanced', 'dissociated'),
and statements which characterize the work's aesthetic qualities
(e.g., 'bizarre', 'solemn', 'vibrant') are partly constitutive of its
meaning. In this sense, analytical statements can be said to be
normative in character because they both anticipate the interpretive
stage and provide pointers to the critic's eventual appraisal of the
worth and significance of the artwork.
Smith has maintained that the task of criticism involves a gradual
separation of subject matter and content in the artwork. Description
attends initially to the overt surface meaning, that is, the subject
matter of the work; analysis, as it shades into interpretation,
searches beneath the work's surface for its underlying content. In a
passage which could well be applied to the 'Burial at Omans' and to
Clark's assessment of it, he observed that:
Content ••• is a kind of distillation, abstraction, or
compaction of whatever is depicted or portrayed. And often it
is in the more significant works that striking discrepancies are
fOUIXibetween what the work ostensibly represents and what it i8
interpreted to be, or what it is said to be a metaphor or image
of. (p.416).
In 8\lIIID8I'y, a broad distinction can be made between private and public
modes of critiCism, that is, between exploratory and argumentative
approaches to understanding the artwork, respectively. 'llle distinct
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'operations', 'stages', or 'phases' which are commonto all forms of
criticism bear a logical relationship to each other. The relationship
is also a causal one. Fonnal analysis presupposes description: it
cannot take place at all except on the basis of some degree of
observation, even if this amountsto only a cursory scan of the visual
'facts'. Similarly, the interpretive phase of criticism presupposes
the phases of description and analYSis, however scant, biased, or
incomplete these may be: simply to ask 'What does the work mean?'
implies the observation of at least somedetails and the recognition
that those details are related in such a wayas to present a problem.
In practice, however, the critic does not follow this procedure, at
least not in a rigid, self-conscious marmer: formal analysis is not
usually delayed until all the features of an artwork have been
observed and classified; indeed, the very act of classifying assumes
that sets of relationships exist within the work. In this respect,
the term 'inventory', which is saDetimes used for the descriptive
stage, is a little misleading (Feldman, 1972, p.467; Mittler, 1973,
p.19): the listing of descriptive features is not arbitraryj instead,
a nascent form of analysis takes place, in which sub-lists of such
features are differentiated within the artwork. In the process of
Exploratory Aesthetic CritiCism, the viewermovesthrough the critical
'stages' in an oscillatory rather than a linear or strictly sequential
fashion. '!be degree to which this oscillation takes place varies
according to the viewer, the artwork, and the conditions under which
the work is perceived. For some viewers, the range of critical
options maynarrow all too quickly; for others, the descriptive and
analytical stages maybe passed over altogether (that is, as far as
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the viewers are aware). nus process (Elcploratory Aesthetic
Criticism), and the logical relationship between the mental operations
involved, is brought into sharper focus as the critiC, acting in his
or her professional capacity, then makespublic a personal appraisal
of the work (ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism).
It is suggested, therefore, that the differences which MacGregor
detected between the theories of art educators such as Feldmanand
Smith are resolved by holding in mind Smith's distinction between
exploratory and argumentative modes of criticism. Their separate
accounts of critical activity are best understood as providing
complementaryapproaches to teaching art criticism.
3.4.3 'nle Relevance for Art Fducation of Aestheticians' Views On
Criticism
As a consequence of analyzing art education theorists' views on
criticism, MacGregor(op. cit., Chap. II) concluded that such views
were inadequate because they amountedto generalised notions about the
nature of critical response and thus fell short of formulating
strategies for teaching different approaches to criticism. Hence, in
Chapter III, she sought to identify a range of approaches by meansof
a further analysis of critical concepts located in the writings of
aestheticians, namely, Sibley (1959), Stevenson (1950), and Weitz
(1972).
Her choice of aestheticians was guided by the criteria of 'coherence',
'relevance', and 'variety' (p.34f.). To achieve 'coherence' she chose
'ordinary-language philosophers' rather than writers from Continental
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traditions such as phenaDellOlogyand hermeneutics. She considered her
choice to have 'relevance' because she thought that her aim of
extending the critical vocabulary of trainee art teachers would be
best served by philosophers whoderived their theories of criticism
from the analysis of language. She believed her choice to represent
'variety' because it demonstrated the coexistence of radically
different standpoints within analytical philosophy.
For present purposes, brief coomentson MacGregor'scomparisonof the
views of Sibley and Stevenson are sufficient to show the kind of
direct link she was seeking to makebetweenaestheticians' theories of
criticism and critical studies in art education. Sibley's main
concern was said to be with analyzing the types of remarks madeabout
artworks. He defined aesthetic terms as consisting partly of words
which are unequivocally aesthetic in character and partly of words
which are nonaesthetic in origin but have been recruited for aesthetic
purposes, for example, metaphorical and quasi-metaphorical terms like
'dynamic' , 'melancholy', 'balanced', etc. Sibley exap1ined the
different ways in which critics use the terminology of criticism and
suggested that, in order to develop learners' responsiveness to art,
teaching strategies should be modelled on the structure of critical
language. He further suggested that nonaestbetic terms be used to
direct learners' attention to the literal features of artworks.
Nonaesthetic terms could also serve to point out aesthetic features.
U!arners might then be encouraged to cOlllDUIlicatetheir responses to
formal qualities by requiring them to employ simple metaphors, thus
enabling them to transfer terms in everyday usage in order to talk
about art. 'lbis ability could then be extended to include the mastery
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of metaphorical terms more usually associated with a specialist
knowledgeof art theory and the history of art.
Stevenson's main point of focus was said to be the persuasive function
of professional criticism. Unlike the lay critic, the professional is
able to drawon a rich fund of lmowled.geand experience of altemative
critical strategies in order to make a 'decision' about how a
particular work is to be perceived. Stevenson considered this
decision to be crucial because it subsequently channels the critic's
perceptions in a particular direction, leading him or her to emphasise
certain aspects of the work and to play down others. In the
professional capacity of a persuader, the critic's private decision
about how to view the workbecomesa public 'imperative' which points
the reader along the same path. Statements which the critic
subsequently makesabout the work's properties serve to support to his
or her initial 'decision'.
MacGregor considered that Stevenson's conception of critical
performance implies a different set of strategies for teaching than
that of Sibley. Rather than stressing the mastery of critical
language by meansof a progression fromsimple to complexterminology,
the teacher would encourage learners to work deductively; this would
entail first the generating of hypotheses about howa work was to be
viewed and then the ' testing' of those hypotheses on the basis of
observed properties in the artwork.
An obvious point that can be madeabout Sibley and Stevenson is that
the difference in their positions is the same as that detected in
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Chapter 2.3.1 above, with regard to Feldmanand Smith. Sibley, with
his emphasis on building vocabulary through close observation of the
artwork, can be said to be dealing with Exploratory Aesthetic
Criticism (Smith, OPe cit., p.39), that is, the development of
aesthetic perception through an interplay of increasingly
sophisticated language and observational skills. Stevenson, on the
other hand, concentrates his attention more on the model of skilled
performance; he therefore concerns himself with the activities of the
seasoned critic who, by means of ArgumentativeAesthetic Criticism
(ibid. ) , brings all his or her powers to bear on the task of
persuading others to accept a personal viewpoint.
MacGregor'sinsistence that the aestheticians selected for her study
'propose alternatives, not variations, about howcritics use critical
language' (p.37) is open to challenge; it is, however,more important
to reflect on the use she has madeof the aestheticians' (putatively)
distinct approaches to criticism. PrinCipally, she incorporated the
three approaches in a 'unit of instruction' (Chap. IV) with a view to
developing the ability of trainee art teachers to engage in critical
discourse. A' trial stooy' (Chap. V) was conducted, in which an
experimental groupwere first taught about the aestheticians' theories
and then 'tested' regarding the ability to apply each approach in
appraising selected artworks. MacGregorfinally presented evidence to
showthat the participants not only improvedtheir grasp of critical
terminology but also developed a greater awareness of alternative
critical strategies and the theories that lie beneath them (Chap.VI).
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The question of linking aesthetic theory and the teaching of critical
method has also been explored by the Americanart educator Chapoan
(1978, pp.~90) in a study of alternative approaches to general art
teaching, in which she listed four 'methods of criticizing art •••
Inductive, Deductive, Empathic, and Interactive' and discussed the
pedagogical implications of each one with reference to a single
'artwork', the architect Frank Lloyd Wright's 'KaufmannHouse'.
Chapoan's position affords an interesting compariSon, for, whilst
MacGregor's study is an attempt to introduce trainee teachers to a
range of approaches to criticism within the parameters of analytical
philosophy, Chapoan's is an attempt to introduce teachers to a
comprehensive range of critical approaches. A canparison of the
approaches identified by these two theorists reveals sane points of
similari ty • For example, the emphasis in Stevenson's viewpoint on the
critic's initial 'decision' and its determinative effect on
interpretation can be readily aligned with the procedure of Chapoan's
'deductive method', the stages of which are listed as follows:
1. Decide on the criteria you will use.
2. Examinethe work to identify evidence that specific features
do or do not meet the criteria.
3. Decide on the degree to which the criteria have been met.
(p.83).
Some similarity can also be detected between the emphasis in Sibley's
viewpoint on the learner's need to acquire critical vocabulary and
Chapoan's description of the ' empathic method' as the use of ' •••
analogies and metaphors to relate what you see to what you feel'
(ibid., p.8S).
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However,it is thought that this alignment of the views of individual
aestheticians with 'orientations' in aesthetic theory is only partly
successful, because the former cannot be fully representative of
positions which, characteristically, are distillations of theory
involving, with varying degrees of relevance, the views of any number
of theorists. The chief difference between MacGregor's basis of
critical pluralism and that of Chapnan is thus one of scope: the
former facilitates in-depth study but sacrifices breadth of treatment,
whereas the latter encompassesa wider range of critical options but
does not allow for an intensive investigation of artworks with
reference to the approaches of particular theorists.
An implication which arises fran comparingMacGregor'sand Chapnan' s
positions is that critical studies in art education wouldbe enhanced
by developing curricula which incorporated a range of approaches drawn
from both individual theorists and 'schools' of theorists. The former
would highlight the importance of the personal viewpoint, the latter
would help to facilitate a theoretical grasp of criticism as a whole
field.
3.5 Metacriticism in Recent Art Fducation 'l1leorizing
!bst of the art education texts examined in the preceding sections are
a little dated, but the central issues they raise have continuing
relevance and, in general terms, have not been superseded.
Nevertheless, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, a new wave
of interest in criticism and metacriticism has emergedsince the mid-
1980s in connection with the Discipline-Based Art Fducation (DBAE)
'movement' in the U.S.A. Certain editions of key journals have been
74
devoted to DBAEissues (Studies in Art &ruc., Suomer, 1987j Art &ruc.,
Sept. 1987, March 1988), including the relevance of philosophical
aesthetics for the develoJXDl!Iltof content and methodsof art teaching.
Principally, DBAE,as promulgatedby the Getty Institute for Educators
on the Visual Arts, represents an attempt to promote the educational
value of art by systematizing the content and processes of art
education with reference to the 'four parent disciplines of art,'
namely, aesthetics, studio production, art history, and art criticism
(Greer, 1984, p.213f). Moreover,DBAEinvolves the develoJXDl!Iltof a
detailed programoe, in which the characteristics of art and art
learning are systematically aligned with aspects of general curriculun
theory regarding sequence, pedagogical method and the developuental
capacities of learners. Predictably, critics of DBAEhave warnedof a
possible tendency towards standardisation and uniformity (e.g.,
Hamblen,1987).
The status of philosophical aesthetics within the fourfold schemeof
DBAE(art production, art history, art critiCism, aesthetics) has been
challenged on the grOUl'¥is that it is fundamental to the other three
componentsand thus hardly justifies separate trea~t (Gray, 1987).
Moreover, its inclusion as a distinct focus bas been described as
probably unworkablein view of the complexphilosophy it involves, the
preponderance of poor quality aesthetics in philosophical writingS,
and the difficulty of educating arts teachers to grasp philosophical
content and methods (Redfern, 1988). Some level of training in
general philosophy is said to be necessary if arts teachers are to
teach ' aesthetics' adequately. However,the level of such training
depends on the kind of approach to teaching aesthetics that is
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envisaged. Hamblen(1988) has identified four such approaches,
namely, (i) Historical Philosophical Aesthetics, which involves
studying the history of ideas in aesthetics with reference to
individual theorists and groups of theorists; (ii) Aesthetic
Perception and Experience, in whichstress is placed on the 'activity'
of experiencing 'the aesthetic in art' (p.83), that is, by seeking to
deepen learners' understanding of problems as these arise in
situations of live criticism; (iii) Aesthetic Inquiry, which
' ••• focuses on the rationalistic and logical examinationof statements
about art' (p.86); and (Iv) Aesthetics for Critical Social
Consciousness, in which critical statements are not merely examined
from a logical or rationalistic standpoint, but are viewed in ' •••
relationship to their larger social consciousness shaping
~lications' (p.87).
Hamblen's identification of approaches to teaching aesthetics raises
the question of whether or not a systematic groundingin philosophy is
a necessary prerequisite for understanding the controversial aspects
of aesthetics, or indeed any discipline (cf. Faton, 1984). Systematic
instruction i8 certainly needed for Historical Philosophical
Aesthetics (see (L) above), but, in varying degrees, it seems less
appropriate to the other approaches. In Hamblen'sview, the ' actual
ambiguities' or 'contested concepts' of aesthetics should not be
deferred by teachers until leamers reach an advanced level of
philosophical urderstanding; rather, they should be treated as foci
for direct engagementswith central conceptual problems. Hence, the
capacity for thinking philosophically is to be learned in response to
problem situations in criticism. In this cormection, Hagaman (1988)
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has reported the success of a project aimed at introducing
philosophical aesthetics to art teachers through the use of 'puzzle
cases ' involving examples of artworks, critical extracts, and! or
fictional 'situations' which encapsulate ftmdamental problems in
intriguing ways (cf. Battin, 1986; Battin, Fisher, Moore, & Silvers,
1989). 'lbis issue-centred approach represents a dynamic view of
philosophical aesthetics in which enquiry is not ' theory driven' but
'driven to theory' by confrontation with controversial content (ibid.,
p.14).
'Dle issue-centred approach to teaching aesthetics advocatedby Hamblen
(and others) represents a vital alternative to those of teaching from
one critical standpoint, or teaching about a range of stances, or
perhaps presenting a potted history of ideas in aesthetics. It does
not depend on a prior level of sophistication and training of the
participants; instead, it draws upon the incipient philosophical
reasoning of which, according to ECker(1973), even young pupils are
capable. In essence, an issue-centred approach to teaching aesthetics
is canparable with established strategies used for the teaching of
moral or ethical problems in which a 'reflective equ1librilD' is
sought between '. •• theoretical claims and judgements in specific
concrete cases', (Battin, ope cit., p.14).
Nevertheless, an approach in which learners are 'driven to theory'
through an engagementwith philosophically puzzling cases is not an
easy option for the art teacher. Unless the teacher has a reasonably
SOlDldgrasp of the theoretical field of aesthetics, and of significant
points of divergence within it, he or she will be unable to capitalise
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on the didactic opportunities likely to arise from the freewheeling
speculations of classroom discussion.
A major source of theoretical divergence, largely overlooked in DBAE
writings, is the fundamental clash between Anglo-Americanaesthetics
and the Continental and Continentally-inspired tradition(s) of
phenomenology,hermeneutics, Marxism,deconstruction, etc. It will be
recalled that MacGregor (op. cit. p.34f.) deliberately avoided
Continental theorists when choosing aestheticians for her research
because she judged that Continental and analytical aesthetics were,
conceptually, too dissimilar to permit meaningful methodological
comparisons. Kaelin (1990) recently expressed the opposite view that
phenomenological methods of criticism can be successfully caobined
with 'ordinary-language' methods within the same progr8lllDe of
instruction. Moreover, Anderson (1991, p.17) suggested that the
dominance of analytical aesthetics has been challenged by Continental
thinking to such an extent over recent years that the case for a
comprehensive combination of methods in teaching aesthetic criticism
is inescapable. In this connection, however, the gap between theory
and practice remains wide, even in the U.S.A. Whilst Dorn (1990,
p.26) may claim, though perhaps with scmeexaggeration, that ' ••• the
dominant art education theory of our time has beccme the pursuit of
metacriticism,' Hamblen(1991, p.20) has pointed out that the teaching
of critical methods in Americanschools is still dan1nated by ' ••• the
art criticism format and its specific steps,' as exemplified by
Feldman's ' critical performance' and Broudy's 'aesthetic scanning.'
nus falls a long way short of achieving a pedagogyof metacriticism.
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As a consequence of analysing recent art education texts in this
section, the conclusion is reached that there is a need to develop a
strategy for teaching the criticism of divergent concepts and methods
of criticism (or metacriticism) that (1) canbines analytical and
Continental traditions of philosophical aesthetics, and (ii) aligns
the essentially problematic content of aesthetics with a compatible
theory of instruction.
3.6 Sunmary
The aims of this analytical review of art education theory and
practice were as follows: (f ) to identify concepts and methods
associated with the teaching of critical diversitYi and (ii) to
explore the relationship between theories of criticism generated by
aestheticians and those that art education theorists have derived fran
aesthetics.
The review has led to the identification of different ways in which
competing views on the nature of criticism can be categorized for
educational purposes. The distinctions between ' intrinsic' and
'extrinsic' approaches to art scholarship (Clap. 3.2 above)• and
between ' exploratory' and ' argtJDentative' types of critici8ID (01ap.
3.4 above) have proved to be especially pertinent: the former ~
it underlines the importanceof linking theories concerning the nature
of artworks with compatible methodsof criticism; the latter because
it highlights the difference between the private and public
functioning of all critics. ~reover. certain implications regarding
the status of aesthetics as a canponent of art teaching progr8llllles
have been explored. It is posited that a systematic training in
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general philosophy is not essential for a competent engagement in
metacritical enquiry on the part of teachers and learners; rather, the
broad cultural base of aesthetics, which is ,reflected in recent art
education texts, particularly connected with DBAE, necessitates an
eclectic stance towards a range of contributing disciplines. 'Dle
intellectual skills which this implies need to be first elaborated and
then implemented as part of an overall strategy for teaching
criticism/metacriticism in the U.K.
Two issues in particular have arisen which, on reflection, appear to
necessitate a revision, or rather refinement, of the research problem
identified in Chapter 1.
First, the analysis of MacGregor's (op, cit.) doctoral study has
highlighted the importance of modelling the teaching of critical
methods on the theories of aestheticians. However, in the light of
observations made earlier concerning the growing impact of 'extrinsic'
approaches on art scholarship over the past two decades and the recent
influence of DBAE-inspired writings, it is suggested that MacGregor's
basis for developing a programne of critical pluralism should be
extended to include theories of not only ,ordinary language
philosophers,' but others in the analytical tradition, as well as
Continental (and Continentally-inspired) thinkers.
Second, the analytical review as a whole has found little evidence of
attempts by art educators to seek alignments between aesthetic theory
and instructional theory. Hence, the writers referred to in this
chapter are of no direct ,help as far as the problem of how to present
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the multi-dimensionality of criticism to learners by means of a
coherent pedagogical strategy. However, as a consequence of
reflecting on their contributions, a pedagogy of metacriticism is
thought to depend on achieving compatibility between the working
strategies of critics (as defined by aestheticians) and critical
strategies for use in the classroom. Given the stated aim of this
enquiry to explore the pedagogical implications of controversy in
aesthetics, this will entail not merely the alignment of particular
stances on criticism with theories of instruction, but the alignment
of a broad spectrumof divergent stances with an overarching theory of
instruction, namely, one which focuses on the contestability, not just
the plurality, of criticism. What is needed is a rationale for
teaching about controversy which can be directly applied to the
teaching of aesthetics and criticism in art education.
In this chapter, a range of concepts and methodsof art criticism have
been considered. The purpose of the following chapter will be to
examinemore closely the philosophical theories underlying different
conceptions of criticism on the assumption that controversy in
aesthetics is a manifestation of controversy on a more fundamental
philosophical level. It is further assumedthat this examination is
an essential prerequisite for developing a pedagogy of metacritlcism




STANDARD OPPOSITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY AND AESTHETICS
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was concluded that art education theorists
had not fully appreciated the link between metacriticism and
controversy in aesthetics; or rather, had not explored the
ramifications of that link as a coherent educational policy
(Chap.3.4). Metacriticism is the activity of judging between
competing critical claims 10 respect of particular artworks. It
entails sane degree of philosophical erquiry into the normative
principles underlying such claims. 'lbere is, though, a subtle
distinction betweenmetacriticism and metatheory (Ecker, 1973, pp.7(}-
71) which depends on whether the enquirer's purpose is to evaluate
critical disputes or to explore underlying theoretical issues for
their philosophical interest. For present purposes, metacriticiam is
the moreappropriate term because it reflects this researcher's motive
for exploring philosophical aesthetics, namely, to clarify conceptual
issues with a view to illuminating and possibly reforming art
education theory and practice in the analytical/critical domain.
Hence, the term metacriticism is being used in an exclusive sense 10
an attempt to strike a balance between the special concema of art
criticism and those of philosophical aesthetics. Probably the best
cri ticism is grounded in saoe understanding of the conceptual issues
raised by critical practice; conversely, the best theorizing in
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aesthetics is that Whichexplores the implications of such issues in
the context of actual criticism.
The present enquiry has not arisen directly in the context of this
researcher's teaching and cannot therefore be described as field-
generated; nevertheless, it has important links with the kinds of
'first-order' interpretive puzzles regarding the nature and limits of
the artwork which emergedin an earlier study of irony in the visual
arts (Rawding,1984). In recognition of the danger of over-theorizing
and a possible charge of educational irrelevance (Ecker & Kaelin,
1972, p.282), actual examples of artworks and issues connected with
interpreting and evaluating them in the school art class will be
considered in somedetail later (see Chaps. 6 & 8).
4.2 Research Sources and Criteria for ChoosingThem
Criteria for choosing source texts for the present enquiry into
philosophical aesthetics may be identified 88 follows. (i)
Comprehensiveness:sources will be critical conmentaries or surveys
rather than seminal works; (ii) Relevance: they will include
consideration of the recent impact of Conttnental thought on
aesthetics, branches of philosophy other than aesthetics, and related
cultural disciplines; (iii) Accessibility: they will be works by
Anglo-Americanauthors which attempt to elucidate the unfamiliar
discourse of Continental thought from the standpoint of the analytic:al
tradition; Controversiality: they will be characterized by an emphasis
on discussing the stardard oppositions of philosophical theory with
reference to the links between theoretical frameworks, ' schools' of
theory, and the conceptual issues whichengender disputes.
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First, it is thought likely that this enquiry will be best served by
analysing texts that provide a historical overview of problems in
contemporary aesthetics and in philosophy generally. This means
seeking reliable guides to theories of seminal philosophers such as
Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein rather than attempting to
consult such sources directly. lbere is a danger that ideas gained
second-handmay, by the time they are filtered yet again, be rendered
less than reliable. This danger can be minimised, however, by
comparing and cross-referencing several sources with a view to
identifying commonterminology in which recurrent problems are stated
and considering the kinds of explanations or solutions offered with
regard to such problems.
Aparticularly important consideration influencing the choice of texts
is that they should not be limited to the field of philosophical
aesthetics. Fundamental issues concerning the nature or being of
artworks and the interpretive activity of perCipients also invite
comparison with studies in other branches of philosophy, such as
philosophy of mind, (Shiner, 1982), philosophy of language (Geahigan,
1983), and philosophy of science (Margolis, 198Ob). Hence, it is
necessary to choose texts whichattempt to elucidate the main ideas of
Continental thought by stressing points of both similarity and
dissimilarity with the more familiar discourse (i.e., for British art
educators) of analytical philosophy.
A further consideration rests on the earlier finding that the broad
tradition of Continental philosophy has begun to make an impact on
(art) education research (Chap. 2.6.2) and the discipline of the
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history of art (Chap. 3.2.1), as well as influencing a range of
related disciplines such as literature studies, sociology, psychology,
and anthropology. The task of communicatingthe ideas of Continental
philosophers to a British audience faces the potential problem of
overcoming resistance to what is a novel and largely inaccessible
style of discourse. For whilst the works of writers such as Gadamer,
Merleau-Ponty, and Dufrenne are gaining an audience amongst art
educators in the U.S.A. and Canada, there is little evidence of
similar progress in the U.K. (Mason, 1982; Lankford, 1984; Webb,
1987).
Several key texts whichmeet the above criteria will be referred to at
some length (Margolis, 198Oa, 198Ob;Rorty, 1980; Bernstein, 1983).
'!bese can be viewed as fl.D1ction1ngas primary sources. Other texts
will also be cited, notably, Palmer (1969) and Spiegelberg (1971) on
the leading themes of Continental philosophy, Walker (1984) on the
impact of such themes on British philosophy as a whole, and Giddens
(1976) on their implications for sociology.
4.3 'lbe Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction in Aesthetics with Reference
to Meta-philosophical Controversy
'!be enquiry in this chapter is an attempt to explore links between
controversy at the level of art critical disputes and controversy at
the level of aesthetic theory. A major focus encompassing both
practical criticism and philosophy of criticism has been identified,
namely, that concerning the aesthetic relevance of 'external
influences on the artist' (Hospers, OPe cit., cf. Chap.l.1 above).
'Ibis issue concerns whether or not, or to what extent, so-called
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external influences are 'part' of the artwork. On the one hand, there
are theorists of art and criticism who make a clear distinction
between what is intrinsic and what extrinsic to the artwork, and, on
the other, are those whoseview of the production and reception of art
leads them to blur or negate any such distinction (ibid.).
The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in contemporaryaesthetics will be
1
examinedwith reference to standard oppositions in philosophy because
it is representative of fundamental controversy (Chap. 1.1). nus
research enquiry is grounded on the aS8UDptionthat aesthetics,
equally with the history, criticism and production of art, is an
essential element of the discipline 'art.' Hence, it is also assumed
that whatever is fundamentally important to this discipline should be
made a central feature of the way it is taught and that the
ramifications of the content specified ought also to be workedout in
a manner consistent with theoretical considerations concerning the
level and sequence of curriculum content.
4.3.1 Analytical and Continental: OpposingTraditions?
A helpful starting point in this regard is Walker's (1984) topical
joumalistic review of the state of British philosophy: first, because
his account of the intellectual perturbations of the post-war period
was written for a lay (i.e., non-philosoph1cal) audience and is thus
relatively easy to grasp; second, because his coaments on the impact
of Continental thinkers on Anglo-American analytical philosophy
reveals a polarisation between (mainly American)philosophers in the
analytical tradition who are broadly sympathetic: with the c:entral
preoccupations of Continental thought, and those (mainly British)
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philosophers who have remained resistant toward such influence.
Walker observed that where analytical philosophers had reached
conclusions similar to those of Continental thinkers, they had done so
independently within their own intellectual tradition.
This point is confirmed by the American philosopher Margolis's (l98Ob)
analysis of contemporary aesthetics. Like Walker, he has recognized
that though analytical and Continental traditions of thought have
developed independently, the emergence in both traditions of a
philosophical interest in the 'intentional' strongly suggests the need
for a 'rapprochement' (p.4). In this connection, he has detected a
distinction within analytical aesthetics of '••• two entirely opposed
strands of work,' namely, between a dominant '••• empiricist, sensory-
centered (sic), perceptually restricted orientation' (p.3) and a
recent trend, in line with his own sympathies, according to which' •••
artworks possess attributes essential to their ontic analysis and
aesthetic appreciation that are not themselves perceptually
accessible' (p.4). Hence, it appears simplistic to describe the major
opposition of aesthetic theory as that between analytical and
Continental traditions; more accurately, according to Margolis, it is
an opposition between empiricism, foundationalism and methodological
reductionism on the one hand, and pragmatism, historicism and non-
reductive materialism on the other (pp.3-7).
An implication of Margolis's analysis of aesthetic theory is that the
idea of 'standard oppositions' ought to be considered on two levels.
First with reference to philosophical 'traditions,' 'paradigms,' or
,schools' of thought (in this enquiry the less ambiguous term
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'theoretical frameworks' will be used); second, with reference to the
conceptual characteristics of the different frameworks, generally
expressed in the philosophical literature by technical terms such as
historicism, realism, relativism, etc. But what do such terms mean
and what is their significance for art education? In answering these
questions, it is necessary to examine their use both in aesthetics and
philosophy as a whole. Margolis's declared aim of linking problems in
the philosophy of art with wider concerns (ibid., p.3) suggests that
his analysis of 'oppositions' in aesthetics can profitably be compared
with the analyses of philosophers who, like him, believe in the value
of Continental philosophy, but whose focus of concern lies beyond the
realm of aesthetics.
For example, the American philosopher Bernstein (1983, p.7f.), has
spoken of a '.•• long-standing divide between the Continental and
English-language traditions.' However, he has also insisted that '•••
the central cultural opposition of our time' is between 'objectivism'
and 'relativism.' This is not to suggest that in his discussion of
the oppositional nature of philosophy Bernstein makes a simple
correspondence of the 'Fnglish-1anguage' traditions(s) with
objectivism and the Continental tradition(s) with relativism; on the
contrary, his discussion is sophisticated and, like that of Margolis,
reveals analytical philosophy in particular to be comprised of a range
of positions between these extremes. Once more, though, the
distinction between theoretical frameworks ('Continental and Eng1ish-
language traditions') and conceptual characteristics ('objectivism and
relativism') is prominent.
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Similarly, the Americanphilosopher Rorty (1980, p.341f.) has referred
to a '... distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics' within
philosophy. 'n1e former is used by him as an umbrella term for
mainstream analytical philosophy which, prior to the impact of
Wittgenstein's later work, is said to have been largely characterized
by a ' ••• quest for certainty, structure, and rigor (sic) and from the
attempt to constitute itself a tribunal of reason' (p.166). According
to Rorty, this quest was motivated by the conviction that philosophy
is ' ••• an architectonic and encompassingdiscipline' (p.266) that is
capable of providing theoretical guidance and sustenance to the whole
realm of human·knowledge. 'lhis view of the purpose of philosophy
presupposed that empirical and rational ~ry could ultimately
achieve a scheme of representation that would accurately mirror
reality. On the other hand, Rorty's use of the term 'hermeneutics' is
not limited to 'interpretation theory' (cf. Palmer, 1969), but
incorporates all varieties of Continental and Continentally-inspired
theorizing (phenomenological, existentialist, semiotic. Marxist,
etc.). 'n1ese philosophies are profoundly historicist (Rorty. ope
cit., pp.166-168) in that they reject the positivist assumption that
knowledgecan be eternalised or conceived separately from the socia-
historical conditions that brought it into being. 'l'hey are also
implicitly or explicitly critical of the subject/object and fact/value
distinctions that typify mainstream philosophy and they espouse a
pragmatic as opposed to an essentialist view of language.
Moreover, Rorty has included under the rubric of 'hermeneutic' the
work of analytical philosophers in the post-Wittgenateinian tradition,
whoby their insistence on the validity of ' ••• an infinity of ways of
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mowing' (p.367) have questioned whether it is legitimate to go on
characterising philosophy as a battleground of competingviews. Such
theorists are said to have argued for a realignment of the fundamental
purpose of philosophy away fran the pursuit of ineluctable truth
through 'confrontation' towards a newemphasison the contribution it
can maketo what Oakeshott has called the continuing 'conversation of
Mankirxl' (ibid., p.389f.), the implication being that philosophy no
longer has special status as a foundational discipline.
All three philosophers (Margolis, 'Bemstein, Rorty) consider aspects
of theory drawn fran both analytical and Continental 'traditions.'
They each discuss the oppositional nature of contemporaryphilosophy,
although they use different terminology. In the process, they
challenge a rather stardard as8\lllPtion that 'analytical' and
'Continental' refer to 1ncanpatible discourses which, for example,
cannot be included in the same curriculum progr8Dllle(see MacGregor.
1971, p.34f.). On the contrary, such terms denote broad, historically
independent traditions which, in recent decades and over certain
aspects of theory, have nevertheless shown important points of
convergence. Rence, it would be misguided to draw too close a
parallel between the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in aesthetics and
the distinction betweenanalytical am Continental conceptions of the
ontology of art. The situation is far more canplicated than this.
First, because the opposition these philosophers have identified
(which cuts across the supposed analytical/Continental divide) is less
a 'hard and fast' distinction than a heuristic fixing of extremes
posited on the tmderstanding that ' true' positions are adjacent to
them. A second and more important consideration is that they each
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appear to advocate a 'third way' or alternative to the largely
confrontational state of their discipline.
An implication that arises from these writers' analyses 1s that art
educators whowish to teach about different stances in aesthetics and
criticism ought to take account of howthese stances relate to major
orientations in contemporaryphilosophy as a whole. Analytical and
Continental traditions represent a major divergence of viewpoints at
the meta-philosophical level and the differences between themought to
form a part of any such teaching prograrmne. However,in order to gain
a more cauplete picture of the theoretical scene, it is also necessary
to take account of recent developmentswithin analytical philosophy
that have proved congenial to certain central themes of Continental
theorizing. This implies that though the intrinaic/extrinsic
distinction is a key focus for identifying different stances in
aesthetics and criticism, it needs to be carefully qualified if its
full pedagogical potential is to be realised. To the best of this
researcher's knowledge, no attempt has yet been made to trace these
various theoretical connections with a view to discussing their
relevance for art education theory and practice in the U.K.
4.4 Distinctions between 'lbeoretical Frameworkswith Referenee to
Conceptual Characteristics
Given that 'analytical' and 'Continental' are not wholly incompatible
discourses, certain questions need to be asked: What are the major
differences between them? At which points of theory can they be said
to converge? What are the implications of the various theoretical
stances for the teaching of art criticism? In seeking answers to
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these questions it is necessary to examine moreclosely the conceptual
characteristics of the theoretical frameworks. Twoin particular --
reductionism and relativism - occur repeatedly in the primary source
texts and will be commentedupon in somedetail below.
4.4.1 Empiricismin Aesthetics and the Problemof Reduction
Continental and mainstream analytical philosophy differ because of
their separate provenances: historical, geographical, and language
factors have ensured their largely independent developments \mtil
quite recently. But is this all that separates these discourses? At
first glance, it would appear so; for as the French philosopher
Ricoeur (Chamberlin, 1974) has observed, the Continental tradition of
••• phenomenologycontinues the transcendental of Kant, the
originary (sic) of Hume, and the doubt and cogito of
Descartes. In no waydoes it represent a sharp I1Iltation in
philosophy. (p.126).
Likewise, Rorty (op, cit.) has insisted that
••• the difference between ' analytic' and other sorts of
philosophy is relatively unimportant -- a matter of style
and tradition rather than a difference of 'method' or of
first principles. (p.a).
And, in the context of aesthetics, Margolis (198Ob) has contrasted
the spare style and mode of explication favored (sic) in the•••
analytic' with the philosophically 'florid'
Continental traditions' (p.5, emphasis added).
style of ••• the
ntese citations imply that Walker's conment on the resistance of
British analytical philosophers to all shades of Continental thought
as '... a confrontation of two intellectual traditions' (op. ctt ,;
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emphasis added), can be understood as referring to a philosophical
conservatism rather than a fW1damentaldisagreement about the nature
and purpose of philosophical enquiry. Nevertheless, how far is it
justifiable to describe the difference between analytic and
Continental aesthetics as a matter of style rather than substance?
Margolis's (and Rorty's) charge that mainstream analytic philosophy
encourages a reductionist view of the world, in contrast to the
expansive, ' florid' tendency of Continental thought, appears to
indicate a substantive divergence at the level of 'first principles'
with important implications for methodboth in professional criticism
and the teaching of critiCism in the classroom. According to
Margolis, the reductionist tendency in what he has called the
'empiricist strain' of analytic aesthetics results in '... strangely
thin ontologies' (ibid., p.6) of the artwork. &np1ricists, so-called,
would see things rather differently: they would surely maintain that
the purpose of art criticism is to avoid all (putatively)
idiosyncratic or contingent factors in order to arrive at what is
deemed essential or wrl.versally valid. '!be 'reduction' that such
criticism entails would thus be viewed as more a matter of distilling
information than disregarding it.
Phenomenologyis also 'empirical' in that it emphasizes the importance
of a direct experience of phenaDena; it places a high premiumon
investigating the wrl.queness of lived experience and encourages a
responsive rather than a manipulative approach to objective reality,
requiring an experiential opermess toward persOllSand events as well
as objects such as artworks. Accordingly, phenomenologyattacks what
it sees as the '. •• spurious narrowing imposed by the model of the
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natural sciences' (Gadamerquoted by Bernstein, ope cit., p.39) am
instead lays stress on preserving the authenticity of phenomena,
thereby ensuring a '... fuller and fairer hearing than tradi tiona1
empiricism has accorded them' (Spiegelberg, 1971. p.656). 'lh1s
involves a
••• determined effort to undo the effects of habitual
patterns of thought and ••• is perhaps the most teachable
part of the phenomenologicalmethod. (ibid.).
Spiegelberg's observation provides an important clue to the kind of
strategies for teaching metacriticism that might arise from an
analysis of theoretical frameworks. A critic's description of an
artwork is shaped by his or her expectations of what is there to be
seen: different sets of expectations lead to different descriptions.
The 'thin' descriptions of the 'empiricist strain' (Margolis, OPe
Cit., p.6) of analytical aesthetics are not just lacking in detail,
they are also qualitatively misleading. By contrast, the non-
reductive empiricism of phenomenologyforces the interpreter to avoid
, ••• rushing into description before having madesure of the thing to
be described' (Spiegelberg, Ope cit., p.672); it does so by drawing
attention to the 'pre-predicative experience' (ibid.) on which
description is based. Whatthis might meanfor teaching _tacriticism
can only be speculated upon at this point. At the very leut, it
would seem to entail challenging the confidence of learners regarding
critical objectivity by demonstrating the inescapably interpretive
character of even the most straightforward description. It would then
be possible to apply the same principle to actual experiences of
criticism in whichostensibly 'pure' descriptions of complexworkscan
be rendered problematic.
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As Barrett (1985) has demonstrated, an apparently blam photograph of
Parisian cafe life can be 'used' in a variety of media contexts to
convey a range of conflicting meanings, none of which are self-
evidently the result of describing 'what is there.' Whenfaced with
vastly moredifficult works, such as Courbet's 'Burial at Ornans' (see
above, Chap. 3.4.2) the idea of straightforward description is seen to
be even less tenable. 'lhe emphasis in empiricism on 'essential'
meaningseemsto shift critical attention awayfromkey qualities such
as artistic originality and the uniqueness of the aesthetic experience
that can be gained from consulting ir¥:lividual pieces. Mlreover,
seeking evidence of what is directly accessible to sense experience
may seriously Wlderestimate the extent to which 'external factors'
associated with the surrounding culture pervaSively, yet subtly,
influence human perceptions. Hence, empiriciSM in analytical
aesthetics is reductionist in so far as it entails an imposition of
categories that predetermines the spectator's representations of the
artwork. The alternative is not presupposition1ess enquiry, which is
an impossibility I it is for the spectator to allow direct aesthetic
experience with the artwork to challenge, and perhaps modify, his or
her conceptual categories.
A major difference, then, between the empiricism of analytical
aesthetics and the 'empiricism' of Continental aesthetics is that of
the relationship of 'objective reality' to the 'lcnow1.ng subject.' In
the former, observation takes place on the 888\111Ptionthat objectivity
is attainable through a process of acC\lllUl.atingrepresentations of
increasing accuracy. 'lhe emphasis is on the art 'object' and the
methodological instruments employedto investigate it rather than on
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the 'knowing subject.' Difficulties of interpretation are in
principle resolvable by attending more carefully to available
evidence, by gaining a better quality of evidence over time, or by
improving the methodological instruments. In Continental aesthetics,
by contrast, the subject/object relationship is considered
problematic. An observer's pre-conceived notions may result in a
distorted view of the artwork: hence the need to suppress such
notions, whilst at the same time adopting an attitude of receptivity
towards the artwork that is open to whatever it might convey. 'Dle
main idea is that understanding is always from the observer's point of
view: 'All understanding involves interpretation, and all
interpretation involves understanding' (Bernstein, OPe cit., p.l38).
4.4.2 Social Origin and Justification of KnowledgeClaims and the
Problemof Relativism
Abroad unity of purpose underlies the theoretical frameworksreferred
to above: it is that debates and controversies at the meta-
philosophical level have what Bernstein (ibid., p.2) has called ' ••• a
single concern and focus: to determine the nature and scope of human
rationality'. The issue at the heart of these debates concerns the
extent to which the investigation of phenomenaand the concomitant
increase in knowledge involves 'making' or 'discovering' reality.
'DUs is not an 'either/or.' According to Rorty (op. Cit., p.342), a
too sharp distinction between '... the "found" world of neutrons (and)
the "made"world of social relationships' rest on the unwarranted
assumption that social phenomenare inherently resistant to objective
explanation. '!he problemof distinguishing between finding and maldng
is commonto the investigation of all kinds of phenomena:people and
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their activities (including making and appreciating art) are generally
more difficult to understand than things, but, in Rorty' s view, there
is no reason to deny the problem of reductionism discussed in the
previous section. No master vocabulary exists for making sense of
phenaoena, but this does not preclude the developDelltover time of new
sophisticated, non-reductive vocabularies whiCh in, for example, the
realm of art criticism wouldhelp us to objectify what at present we
are content to leave as unexplainable.
According to Rorty (op, cit., p.170f.), snalytical philosophers in the
post-Wittgensteinian tradition have sought to explain the development
of knowledgenot as an accumulation of accurate representations of
reality, but with reference to what he has called '. •• the social
justification of belief'. He has aligned himself with philosophers
such as Davidson, Quine, and Taylor, describing his (and their)
position as a form of 'epistemological behaviourism' that is inimical
to the notion of 'privileged representations':
Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference
to what society lets us say, rather than the latter by the
former, is the essence of what I shall call 'epistemological
behaviourism', an attitude coamon to both Dewey and
Wittgenstein ••• if we understand the rules of a language-
game, we understand all that there is to urxierstand about
why movesin that language-game are made ••• (p.174).
Margolis, on the other hand, has linked his er¥IU1ries in &esthetics
with the work of theorists such as Dickie, Goodman, am Danto, whose
analyses are said to lay particular stress on the 'historical
contingencies' of aesthetic criticism. Both Rorty's and Margolis's
positions appear to be inescapably relativist, for as Flew (1979) has
pointed out:
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'!be relativist recognises: first, the importance of the
social environment in determining the content of beliefs
both about what is and what ought to be the case; and,
second, the possible diversity of such social environments.
(p.281).
HOwever,both Rorty and Margolis have been careful to qualify their
views on the social origin and justification of lmowledge claims
(Margolis, for example, has advocated a form of 'robust relativism',
19808, p.136) in order to distance themselves from an extreme
epistemological relativism. A prime manifestation of this extreme
position was the radical sociology of lmowledgeof the late 1960s and
early 1970s, as exemplified by the work of Berger am lAlckmann (1967)
in sociology and Young (1971) in the sociology of education. Its
proponents claimed not only that social envirornent is an important
factor in determining beliefs and practices, but that knowledgeis in
all respects a 'social construction'; a tenet that rules out any
possibility of achieving ultimate representations of reality. The
ubiquity of social bias which this position assumescan and should be
challenged by drawing attention to those aspects of knowledgewhich,
though inescapably social in origin, are nevertheless universally
applicable. nus does not mean that such knowledgemaynot exhibit
cultural variance to some degree, but it does mean that it will have a
non-reducible 'essential' core. The chief difference, then, between
the relativism espoused by philosophers such as Rorty and Margolis and
this more extreme version concerns the issue of whether, despite the
inevitably social origin of our knowledgeof the world, there are not
some aspects of lmowledgewhich transcend the influence of society.
In particular, the claim madeby SaDe sociologists that all knowledge.
however indirectly, is a means of serving the interests of dominant
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groups in society has been strenuously resisted by philosophers (e.g.,
Pring, 1976, esp. Chap.4).
At the heart of debates emanatingfran radical SOCiologyof knowledge
is what the British sociologist Giddens (1976, p.l8) has described as
the problem of how to ' ••• sustain a principle of relativity whilst
rejecting relativism.' '!his problem is highly relevant to art
education in light of the impact in recent years of radical sociology
of lmowledgeon aesthetics, art criticism, and the history of art (see
Chap. 3.2.1). For example, to claim that art can be accounted for
entirely with reference to ideological interests, or that critical
judgements may be interesting and infoDD8tive but can never be
authoritative, suggests clear implications for the teaching of
criticism: the formermight lead to a critique of art in the classroom
that was dominatedby a political agenda; the latter would entail a
subjective approach to looking at artworks that emphasizedexperience
and madescant reference to normsand criteria of evaluation. In the
context of teaching metacriticism, the extremism inherent in both
these approaches could be made the focus for exploring key issues
concernedwith the ontology of art. As the British philosopher Diffey
(1984, p.168) has observed ' ••• the critique of art as ideology' may
lead us to conclude that ' ••• art is always political (but) this does
not mean that it is only political.' Radical SOCiologyof art
supplies a valuable new perspective on the nature of art and crit1ci8lll
which brings to the fore questions about the 'irreducibility of
aesthetic value' (ibid.).
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4.4.3 'Ibe 'Inconmensurability '!besis' and the Problemof CODIIJJIlication
between FrameworkS
Arguments for and against relativism hinge on what is meant by
claiming that different belief systems, or theoretical frameworks,are
inconmensurable. !bre pointedly, it depends on what is meant by
incommensurable, that is, on howdifferent theorists understand and
apply the term (Bernstein, OPe cit., esp. p.79f.). 'lbe so-called
'incommensurability thesis' is central to contemporaryphilosophical
debates, particularly in the philosophy of science; however, the
issues at stake are not limited to the realm of science, for as
Bernstein has remarked:
••• just as it is essential to focus attention on the
effective criteria for evaluating rival theories and
research traditions in science, there is an analogous
problem when it comes to testing and evaluating rival
interpretations of texts, worksof art, and traditions.
(p.174).
Whatdoes the term incommensurability imply? First it does not imply
that different groups of theorists are so '. •• locked into their
conceptual frameworks' (ibid., pp.84-85) that they are unable to
coomunicatewith the proponents of rival theories - a position known
as the 'Myth of the Framework'(ibid., p. 84)• On the contrary, the
separate debates that take place, whether among philosophers of
SCience, aestheticlans, or art critics, bear witness to the fact that
some commonground for argumentation exists; such disputes could not
even begin, muchless be sustained, if this were not the case.
'!'he problem of extreme relativism, already noted in respect of the
SOCiologyof knowledge, has been endemic to debates since the early
1960s over what Bernstein has called the 'postemplricist philosophy of
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science' (p,71)• Radical thinkers in this field such as Kulm and
Feyerabend have been charged, Wlf'airly according to Bernstein, with
promoting a view of scientific theorizing that discounts the
possibility of achieving ••• fixed determinate rules for
distinguishing better fromworse interpretations of phenomena'(p,92)•
Bernstein's response to the charge of extreme relativism levelled
against these theorists was to point out that relativist judgementsin
philosophy of science (and, by extension, aesthetics) are not
necessarily irrational or ill-founded; for example, he affirmed that
••• to say that social practices are radically contingent does not
mean that they are arbitrary' (p.204; cf. p.L), Instead, he has
insisted that theoretical frameworksare inccmoensurablein the sense
that they camot be madeintelligible point by point with reference to
a higher generic set of concepts. By way of illustration, he cited
the anthropologist Geertz' s comparison of the radically different
concepts of self held by cultural groups in Bali, Java, and I-brocco.
']he 'philosophical ethnocentrism' which projects or imposes ' ••• well
entrenched beliefs, attitudes, standards, methods, and procedures'
(p.91) on phenomenais characteristic of each of these frameworks,as
is the attempt to make sense of them through a matrix of EUropean
anthropological theory (cf. Redfield, 1959, pp.40-42).
An extreme relativist in art terms would be one who insisted that
staOOards were arbitrary and that artistic value was a matter of
personal taste. As a role model for teaching metacriticism, extreme
relativism wouldbe somewhatlimited in scope, to say the least, and
probably a contradiction in terms. Unstructured talk about art in the
classroom might, however, lead to speculation about the respective
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merits of different artworks and methodsof criticism, even when this
reflects a profound scepticism on the teacher's part about the
existence of 1.D1i.versalstandards (cf. Bernstein, OPe cit., pp.11-12).
The analogy Bernstein has drawn between philosophy of science and
anthropology is instructive because it enables abstract philosophical
debates to be translated into concrete situations. 'lhis is especially
pertinent to art education as the developmentof pupils' appreciation
of art forms across cultures has in recent years becomean important
pedagogical focus (e.g. Taylor, 1986; Mason,1988). lnaSllllchas the
activity of appreciation dependson grasping the different concepts of
'art' of alien cultures, it is vital that art teachers who seek to
link critical studies to an understanding of cultural contexts ought
in tum to recognize that debates in philosophy over ' ••• the nature
and scope of human rationality' (Bernstein, Ope cit., p.2) are
foundational to this enterprise.
'!be 'incoomensurability thesis' lies at the heart of the problem of
••• how to account for the fact that we have knowledgeof a world
that is essentially conditioned by our understanding.' (ibid., pp.75-
76)• Because the world we encounter is constituted by our 1M1vidual
conceptual frameworks, there seems little justification in viewing
reality as a dichotomy of '... "objects" which exist an sich and
"subjects" that are detached from and stand over against them'
(p.166). Wemaybelieve, if we are philosophical realists, that ' •••
such objects exist independently of being perceived' (Flew,. 1979,
p.278), but in our knowledgeof the world we camot escape from the
determinative influence of our perceptions. However, these
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perceptions are not personal and idiosyncratic in an exclusively
subjectivist sense, rather they reflect the socio-cultural and
intellectual traditions to which we belong. This social bias in tum
implies that rationality is not supra-historical, but on the contrary,
' ••• essentially involves the notion of a community'(Bernstein, OPe
cit., pp.77-78) whichgenerates shared meanings, not on an exclusively
theoretical level by means of pure thought, but by a process of
applying practical wisdomin which advances in knowledgeare brought
about through testing and modifying theory in situations that are not
fully anticipated, or which call for judgements that set precedents.
In his discussion of relativism and hermeneutic analysiS, Giddens
(1976) also has addressed the problemof howcommunicationis possible
between inconmensurablediscourses. Fqually with Rorty and Bernstein,
he rejected the idea that the ' ••• premises of formal logic' (p.147)
provide a touchstone of rationality by which to test the validity
claims of divergent theoretical frameworks. As pointed out already,
there are cOlllDOtlassumptions between different frameworks - the
notions of identity and contradiction, for instance - that have a
degree of universality in that they provide the basic premises for
distinguishing that which is characteristic or true of a particular
framework. However, to grasp the incamoensurable, that is, the
distinctly 'other' of an unfamiliar discourse, alien culture, etc., it
is necessary to engage in the hermeneutic task of exploring the
meanings of that discourse within the context of its practical
outworking as a ' ... particular form of life' (p.148). Because this
seems to imply that the interpreter should be open to a novel way of
thinking, it raises the question of howit is possible to grasp the
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meanings of unfamiliar discourses whenwe have only the conceptual
modesof expression of our ownto drawupon.
On the one hand, projecting or imposing one's own conceptual
categories on an unfamiliar discourse will not preserve the integrity
of the latter and hence will fail to capture its essential quality.
On the other hand, it is entirely artificial to expect that one can
succeed in 'going native,' that is, fully to relinquish categories of
thought that are bound up with our personal histories. It is
axiaoatic of hermeneutic and phenomenologicaltheory that the meanings
of the 'things themselves' (Bernstein, OPe cit., p.137) directly
perceived can only be grasped as a result of a dialectical process in
which the 'horizon' of the 'object' is fused with the interpreter's
horizon, containing as it does all of the preconceptions or
'forestructures' gained fran traditions that are determinative, in
subtly different ways, of each person's view of the world.
lhe point here is that cODlDUIl.icationis possible between different
frameworksprecisely because they are not self-contained. '!be analogy
Giddens has drawn between universes of meaning and languages is
instructive and easy to grasp (ibid., p.145). New languages develop
out of existing ones: English, for example, is highly eclectic.
Languages are sophisticated conventional systems enabling hlIIIan
affairs to be conductedwith a high degree of prediction and control,
even though, in language translation, it is often impossible to arrive
at exact equivalents of word-meaning. The mediation that takes place
between different frameworksis analogous to language translation: a
basis exists for reaching a large measure of agreement, but there are
104
also residual areas of experience that resist attempts to achieve
precision. 'l1lis observation parallels the point made earlier that,
given the social origin and justification of lmowledgeclaims, the
search for a universal language of commensurationis futile.
The foregoing discussion of theory has revealed the existence of two
extreme positions, both of which maybe elaborated in some detail,
namely: (i) that theoretical frameworksare self-contained universes
of meaningand thus provide no basis for inter-coomunicationj and (ii)
that the divergencies that exist between theoretical frameworksare
temporary owing to the current state of knowledgeand that eventually
all discourses will be subsumedunder a neutral language or higher
generic set of terms. Aside from these extremes and their
ramifications is a balanced realisation that there exists betweeneven
the most alien of cultures a basic experience of being-in-the-world
that provides someground for developing III1tualunderstanding. This
appears to be the case whether one considers the problem of
interpreting the works and actions of the membersof alien cultures,
or 'listens in' on the 'conversations' of Westem philosophers.
Reference here to a commonality of human experience does not
necessarily imply that '. •• the world exists independently of being
perceived' (Flew, op. cit. ) j nor does it necessarily imply that
reality is socially constructed in the radical sense as8llD1!dby
conventionalists among philosophers and sociologists. Rather, the
recognition that 'mediation' between discourses is needed suggests
that the best hope is for a fruitful coexistence between divergent
poSitions, in which they draw closer together but never amalgamate.
Margolis's (l98Oc, p.228, emphasis in orig.) observation that ' •••
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there is ~ biological, nonconventional disposition underlying all
cultural conventions' indicates that both divergence and convergence
will continue to characterize the intellectual life of Mankind. 'nle
implication of this conclusion for art education, and the teaching of
metacriticism in particular, is that a full range of philosophical
positions bearing on the ontology of art ought to be presented to
learners and that this should include a 'polar contrast' of the kinds
of extreme positions identified above. Second, the attention of
learners should be focused on what is involved in combining the
insights, whilst avoiding the shortcanings, of such positions.
4.5 Sumnary
In this chapter, a major opposition in philosophical aesthetics has
been explored, namely, that between analytical and Continental
traditions. However,standard oppositions were found to exist at a
deeper level that ' cut across' a simple dichotomy of
analytical/Continental theorizing: hence, distinctions were made with
reference to underlying theoretical frameworksand their conceptual
characteristics. In particular, an examination of primary research
sources has indicated the existence of a substantive opposition within
Anglo-Americananalytical philosophy between a majority 'view' in
which episteDDlogy- the quest for universal cOlllllen8Urationthrough
rationalist and empirical investigation - is paraaount, and a more
radical 'view' in which the link between meaning and reality is
couched in terms of the coexistence of incaDDensurablediscourses.
'!he former, it has already been noted, involves convergence and
consequently risks a charge of reductionism. However, the latter,
because it involves accepting the viability of incommensurable
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discourses, risks the opposite charge of relativism. 'Ibis opposition
is paralleled in the aesthetics of criticism: 'the empiricist strain'
(Margolis, OPe cit.), of which Formalismis a prime example, lays
stress on determining the intrinsic properties of the artwork with
reference to general principles of formal organization; on the other
hand, Contextualism (in its many forms) emphasizes the aesthetic
relevance of socio-cul.tural factors to the production am reception of
art. Hence, the previously stated aim of exploring the notion of
'standard oppositions' in philosophy in order to cast light on the
intrinsic/extrinsic dispute in the aesthetics of criticism appears to
be justified.
A numberof pedagogical implications have arisen from the foregoing
analysis of theory. Certain key polarizations were identified as
important foci for teaching strategies, notably those associated with
reductionist tendencies in empiricist aesthetics and relativist
tendencies in hermeneutic and so-called postempiricist approaches to
the investigation of both natural and social phenomena. It is thought
likely that the difference between these positions, as regards
theories of critiCism, could be best exploited by engaging learners in
a discussion of extremist versions and then gradually introducing them
to a more sophisticated presentation of the ontological and
epistemological issues involved. Extremist poSitions identified in
the course of this chapter are presented below. '!he_ will form the
basis of moredetailed workin subsequent chapters aimedat exploring
the pedagogical implications of controversy in philosophical
aesthetics with reference to test cases of artworks am critical
writings.
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1. An extreme relativism which denies the possibility of achieving
ultimate representations of reality. In aesthetics this wouldentail
a denial of critical objectivity. Extreme relativism emerges in
positions such as radical sociology of lmowledge,which Giddens (op,
cit., p.143) has described as the classic error of assumingthat ' •••
the validity of scientific theories can be reduced to the interests
that might play a part in generating them' and radical sociology of
art which leads to the '. •• disappearance of art as anything but
ideology' (Wolff quoted by Diffey, OPe Cit., p.168).
2. The 'Myth of the Framework':a position in which it is assumed
that whenwe engage in the interpretation of either natural or social
phenomena,we are '. •• prisoners caught in the frameworkof our
theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language,
(Bernstein, OPe Cit., pp.84 & 91).
3. A naive historicism which assunes that interpreters are able to
project themselves into the spirit of an alien age or culture: ' ••• to
think with its ideas and its thoughts, not with our own, and tbus
advance towards historical objectivity' (Gadamerquoted by Bernstein,
OPe cit., p.l40).
4. A subjectivism which holds that judgementsabout art, or indeed
anything else, are a matter of personal preference and are thus not
subject to rational argument: a poSition countered by Bernstein on the
grounds that '... taste is cOIllDUIl8I,not idiosyncratic I (op, cit.,
p.119).
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5. A reductive empiricism which fails to take full account of the
values and interests of interpreters, whether of natural or social
phenomena, and which thus presupposes a false dichotomy between
subject and object. In aesthetics, this would result in 'thin
ontologies' of the artwork; in criticism, it would amount to a
'perceptually restricted' range of judgements(Margolis, 198Ob,p.6).
In this chapter, recognition of these extreme positions has emerged
from an analysis of meta-philosophica1 controversy. Links with
controversy in aesthetics have been speculated upon and tentative
suggestions madeabout strategies for metacriticism in art education.
In continuing this investigation of controversy in aesthetics, the
emphasis will shift from a consideration of ontological issues in
respect of perceived reality to the problems raised by the perception
of art. Hence, the research strategy in the following chapter will be
to explore key aspects of the aesthetics of art criticism which bear
on the problem of demarcating the boundaries of artworks and
distinguishing internal from external evidence. Concurrently,
parallels will be drawn, whereappropriate, with the extreme positions
already identified in this chapter. It is anticipated that this




ISSUES IN AESTHETIC CONIROVERSY
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter J an attempt will be made to explore the nature of
aesthetic controversy in the light of conclusions reached earlier
regarding standard oppositions of philosophy (Chap. 4.5). The atm is
to initiate propositions about the relation of art and criticism which
could provide a basis for future art education studies in the areas of
curriculum developmentand research.
In Chapter 3, an investigation was madeinto art education theory and
practice with a view to exploring current views about teaching
metacriticism in relation to the history and criticism of art. This
led to the conclusion that metacritical enquiry in the classroan
entails the teaching of a range of divergent views on the nature of
art, which should encompass Continental and Continentally-inspired
thought as well as the broad tradition of Anglo-Americananalytical
philosophy. In Chapter 4, an investigation was made into the nature
of controversy in aesthetics with reference to standard oppositions of
general philosophy; this was conducted to obtain a more caaplete
picture of the conceptual issues underlying metacritical disputes. In
brief, Chapter 4 was an attempt to set metacriticism in the context of
metaphilosophy. Consequently, standard oppositions of philosophical
theory were identified, with the aim of linking them to polarisations
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in aesthetics, thereby establishing a basis for developing
metacritical enquiry in art education. 'l1lesestandard oppositions
were found to be associated with theoretical frameworks that straddle
the distinction between Continental and analytical traditions;
moreover, they were defined with reference to a continuum between
extreme reductionist and relativist orientations regarding the nature
of perceived reality.
In this present chapter, the extreme positions achDnbrated in the
~ of Chapter 4 will be explored in more detail with reference to
key issues in contemporary philosophical aesthetics. (It is assumed
that teaching metacriticism entails making comparisons across the
widest range of critical options and that this range is best reflected
by the polar contrasts of aesthetic theory.) In particular, the
idealism/materialism distinction in philosophy will be compared with
the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in aesthetics and art criticism.
This will involve a synthesis of several different levels of theory,
namely, general philosophy, philosophical aesthetics, philosophy of
education in respect of curriculum orientations and procedures,
professional art criticism, and art criticism/metacriticlsm in the
classroom. A successful curriculum outcome depends on c~rdinat1ng
insights from each of these levels without at the same time blurring
their distinctive contributions.
'lbe enquiry which forms the basis of this chapter will focus on one of
the texts which functioned as primary sources for Chapter 4, namely,
Margolis's (19808) Art and Philosophy: Conceptual Issues in
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Aesthetics. ']he reason for this choice is that the author is
representative of a numberof philosophers in the analytical tradition
who, in recent years, have addressed a range of major issues in
philosophy whilst, at the same time, considering seriously the
contributions of Continental and Cont1nentall~inspired thinkers (see
Chaps. 4.1 & 4.2). On publication, the book's reviewers were largely
enthusiastic about its depth, comprehensiveness, and relevance to
contemporarydebates in philosophical aesthetics (WOlterstorff, 1981;
Matthews, 1982; Prior, 1982; Walton, 1982; Lamarque, 1983; Schaper,
1983; Janaway, 1984). It appears to be especially relevant to the
present research because it contains an in~pth study of the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in the aesthetics of criticism.
According to Wolterstorff:
'lbroughout his book, Margolis does battle with the rather
standard assumption that works of art are in some way
peculiarly perceptual. He wants to 'cast doubt on theories
that treat artworks exhaustively, essentially,
characteristically, or distinctively in terms of perceptual
qualities' (p.6). His contention is that artworks are
culturally emergent objects; being such, they have
nonperceptible, ' intentional, ' 'properties which are
aesthetically significant. 'lhe book is fundamentally an
explanation and elaboration of that thesis. (op. cit.,
p.455). .
Margolis's treatise is relevant to the aims of the present enquiry
because, unlike manyof the works in the samefield, it represents an
attempt to link conceptual issues in aesthetics to the problems of
criticism. As such, it appears to have good potential as a source of
ideas for developing metac:ritical erquiry in the classroom.
Nevertheless, the reviewers raised enough critic1sms over the
argumentation and style of the book to suggest that its author's
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claims should not be relied on too heavily. For example, Matthews's
CODJDeIltthat ' ••• surprisingly little attention is paid to the
critical and appreciative practice that is said to be the touchstone
of aesthetic theory' (op. cit., p.l09) could be taken to imply that
translating Margolis's ideas into classroom practice would require an
imaginative leap involving an amalgamation of aesthetic and
pedagogical theory with test cases of artworks and extracts from
critical writings. With this caution in mind, Art and Philosophy will
be approached in this chapter as an authoritative but by no means
infallible guide to current debates in contemporary aesthetic:s: it
will be used to stimulate questions from an art education standpoint
regarding the efficacy of such debates for curriculum development.
Several such debates are examined in the Margolis text. One in
particular, the controversy over artistic intention, was identified in
Chapter 1 of this thesis as a starting point for the current research.
It emerged as a key issue because it was thought to provide a focus
for raising questions about the ontological status of artworks and
exploring the aesthetic relevance of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence.
MOreespecially, it was assumed to be a representative dispute, one
that by means of conceptual analysis would reveal the int~
connectedness of many different aspects of aesthetic. controversy. In
the present chapter, several of these aspects found in the Margolis
text will be examined with a view to revealing points of connection
between them, whilst at the same time widening the scope of current
art education theorizing about metac:ritic1sm. However.disCU88ionof
the controversy over intention will be deferred lU'ltU Chapter 6 to
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enable the kinds of curricular implications emerging from the present
chapter to be explored in greater depth via a specific focus.
Margoiis first examinedproblemsconnectedwith philosophical attempts
to define 'The Workof Art' (Part 1) and then considered those arising
fran the practice of 'Criticism and Appreciation' (Part 2).
Accordingly, the problemsof the latter were said by him to be logical
extensions of the former:
Critics and historians of the arts readily confuse the
logical status of their own COlJlDentsbecause of their
confusion and prejudice about the nature of what they are
commentingupon. (p. 27).
A clear implication of this remark for professional art critics and
historians, as well as for teachers of art criticism and history, is
that sound practice is dependent on at least a workingknowledgeof
philosophical aesthetics. understanding the different ways in which
art is defined by aestheticians should lead to a richer experience of
critical alternatives. Moreover, as a curriculum strategy, the
attempt to discriminate the respective merits of different ontological
stances in relation to criticism would amount to 'doing
metacriticism. '
As noted above, Margolis's attempt to link philosoph:l.cal aesthetics
and art criticism is relevant to the present research because, by
drawing together these two levels of theory, he exemplified
metacriticism in action. More especially, his approach involved
identifying radical differences in theory concerning the ontology of
art and discussing them in relation to equally radical differences in
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critical practice. This polemical focus corresponds with the contrast
of extreme positions outlined in the summary of the previous chapter
(see Chap. 4.5): it therefore provides a model, and ensures
continuity, for the aim of translating ideas gained from that
chapter's analysis of standard oppositions in philosophy into art
education theory and practice.
5.2 The Concept 'Artwork' and the Problemof DefW tion
Margolis attempted to reach a theoretically convincing position on the
ontology of artworks by first attacking the 'extremes' of idealism and
materialism. He described these in the following terms as
••• an excessive idealism that finds nothing in the public
world that wouldcount as a workof art, and an excessive
(or reductive) materialism that denies that anything
exists that is not merely and entirely physical (p.27j cf.
pp.28-32)
Against the former poSition, it can be affirmed that critical
discourse typically proceeds on the assumption that artworks are
material objects. What is said about artworks cannot avoid making
reference to their materiality, to the fact that they are tnvartably
experienced through the senses, and that the properties ascribed to
them by critics are confirmable or refutable by meana of public
scrutiny and debate. 'lbe central feature of the idealist account is
that it posits a separation between the artwork (conceived as
transcendent reality) and its material form. It presents, therefore,
a dualistic definition of the nature of art that entails acceptance of
a bifurcation of works into 'inner' and 'outer' realms of existence.
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Against (reductive) materialism, Margolis maintained that what critics
say about artworks refers not only to their materiality, but through
it to attributes which are not reducible in terms of physical
properties alone. He argued that artworks differ from mere physical
objects because the critic, in ascribing non-perceptual properties to
a work, is necessarily presupposing the intentions of the artist.
Noting the '••• ready availability of specimens which cannot be sorted
in perceptual terms' (p.6), Margolis cited specific examples in order
to demonstrate the anomalous character of the materialist perspective.
For instance, the status of Duchamp's 'Bottlerack' as an artwork was
shown to be problematic from this standpoint. The bottlerack as it
came from the manufacturer (i.e., prior to Duchamp's choosing of it)
and the bottlerack which Duchamp exhibited, remain one and the same
material object. Nevertheless, the ontological status of the object
had changed: at a point in time it had come to be regarded in a
different way; to be ascribed properties which, in view of the absence
of any material change, could only be characterized in non-perceptual
terms.
Begirming with this admittedly extreme example of a Duchamp 'ready-
made', and other examples of objets trouvi!s, Margolis extended his
argument to include standard works. The problem for those who treat
art exclusively in terms of perceptual qualities was shown to be
particularly 'troublesome' in the case of '... appraisals based on the
interpretation of works of art' (p.46). Whilst recognizing that some
works present few if any problems for the interpreter (e.g., the
paintings of Grandma Moses), Margolis showed that in more complex
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instances (Matisse's ''n1e Piano Lesson' and Leonardo's ''n1e Last
Supper', cf. pp.121-122 and p.43) different critics may advance
radically divergent interpretations, thereby providing alternative
matrices through which hitherto unrecognized features of a work are
brought to critical attention. Interpretations serve, therefore, to
ascribe qualities which would otherwise lie undetected; but such
qualities cannot be said to be 'in' the work in quite the sameway as
features which are open to straightforward description.
Margolis's discussion of the distinction between artworks and mere
physica1·objects highlights an important characteristic of the former:
that they are dependent for their identification as such on a
culturally informed viewpoint. In this cormection, he proposed his
ownsolution of the ontological problemoutlined above by introducing
the concepts of 'physical embodiment'and 'cultural emergence'. 'lbese
were said to provide the necessary 'foci of any ontological proposal'
(p.39 f.) and thereby facilitate a meaningful discussion of artworks.
He claimed that the former avoids the main defect of the idealist
aCCO\.U1tbecause it'... provides a basis for speaking of emergence
without losing the advantages of reference am identity' (p.39).
Conversely, whilst embodimentserves thus to fix critical reference to
the physical properties of the artwork, it also preserves the
distinctive ontological status of the work. because '... to be
embodied in an object is not to be identical with it' (ibid.).
'Emergence' conveys the sense of an entity caning into view as the
result of critical enquiry, wherebythere is a resolution of what had
previously been unfocused and inchoate. However.in order to distance
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himself from the inevitable dualism which this implies, Margolis
pointed out that the properties of artworks and other cultural
phenomena
••• are emergent not in the sense that a novel substance
mysteriously evolved out of a physical substratum, but in the
sense that, in familiar contexts of discourse, we admit novel
particulars that possess properties essentially lacking in
purely physical objects. (p.48)
The phrase 'familiar contexts of discourse' refers to the concept of
cultural emergence. It indicates that emergent entities are defined
as suCh only within an appreciative tradition. Artworks are,
therefore, 'rule-govemed ••• and rule following' (p.46). Even
Conceptual Art, which questions and even denies the artifactuality of
the artwork, ' ••• camot but be parasitic on crafted work' (ibid •• cf.
p.83 f.); whichpresumablymeansthat without historical precedents to
react against, the prime objective of Conceptual Art would be
meaningless: indeed, it could not historically have taken place.
Aside from Margolis's critique of extreme versions of idealism and
materialism, his 'middle ground' conceptions of physical embodiment
and cultural emergencehave been challenged by other aestheticians
(Wolterstorff, Ope cit.; Matthews, OPe cit.; Prior, OPe cit.).
Wolterstorff, for example, in questioning the validity of the former,
cited counter-:-instances to showthat ' ••• it is neither necessary nor
sufficient that cultural objects be distinct from but embodied in
physical objects (or events)' (p.459). However, the details of
philosophical argumentover the ontology of art are of less immediate
significance to this enquiry than that Margolis's analysis provides a
working model for exploring a range of theoretical positions and the
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different approaches to art criticism that these imply. The concept
of cultural emergence could be used by art educators to focus
learners' attention on fundamental philosophical questions about
meaning and objectivity. Its main emphasis, namely, that artworks
possess properties that are not perceptually accessible, invites
comparisonwith the characteristic claim of hermeneutic theorists that
art objects do not possess meaningsseparate from the presuppositional
1
framework that interpreters bring to the task of criticism. What
Margolis has claimed for the concept of cultural emergencein respect
of defining art is closely paralleled by Gadamer's insistence that
, ••• meaning is always cominginto being through the "happening" of
tmderstand!ng' (in Bernstein, 19S3, p.139). Meaning is neither
contained within the art object, nor wholly projected by the
interpreter, but is forged by the dynamic and subtly shifting
interplay of 'horizons' within which critical activity takes place.
Debates in aesthetics over what is to count as evidence for critical
appraisal are, fundamentally, disagreements about the nature of
objectivity (Margolis, ope cit. , p.107f). '!bese in turn are a
reflection of debates in the 'postempiricist philosophy of science'
over the question of how to maintain that different systems of thought
are inconmensurablewithout denying that a basis exists for making
comparisonsbetween them (Bernstein, OPe cit., p. 7lf.; Giddens, 1976,
p.1S; see also Chap. 4.4.2 & Chap. 4.4.3). '!be nature of critical
objectivity is, perhaps, nowheremore closely scrutinized than in the
hermeneutic tradition; for as well as denying invariance of meaning to
the artwork, hermeneutics presents the critic as a far from detached
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agent. The intersubjectivity of artwork and percipient is brought out
most fully in terms of the so-called 'hermeneutic circle' whichHirsch
(1967) described as follows:
••• every interpreter labors (sic) under the handicap of an
inevitable circularity: all his internal evidence tends to
support his hypothesis because muchof it was constituted
by his hypothesis. (p.166).
Palmer (1969), in a chapter on Gadamer's hermeneutical aesthetics,
also recognized the historical character of the cri tic's viewpoint.
He pointed out that a need exists for critics to become more
critically aware of their own performances and of the effect of those
performances on their perceptions of the artwork:
Gadamer's approach, then, is closer to the dialectic of
Socrates than to modem manipulative and technological
thinking. Truth is not reached methodically but
dialectically; the dialectical approach to truth is seen as
the antithesis of method to pre-structure the individual's
wayof seeing. Strictly speaking, method is incapable of
revealing new truth; it only renders explicit the kind of
truth already implicit in the method. (p.165).
'lhese quotations demonstrate the inseparable link between theory of
art and methodsof art criticism. As with the search in epistemology
for a single all4mcompassing language of coamensuration (Bernstein,
ope cit. t p.172), attempts to reach a comprehensivedefinition of art
are faced with two difficulties: on the one hand, precision is hard to
achieve without unhelpfully restricting what is to count as art; on
the other, inclusiveness can lead all too easily to a situation in
Whichlittle basis exists for objectivity and the sharing of critical
judgements. In this cormection, the Americanaestbetician Stoln1tz
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(1960, p. 205f.) discussed the respective merits of four major theories
of art (imitation theories, formalism, emotionalist theory, and the
theory of aesthetic 'fineness' ) and concluded that (L) each
contributes something to our tmderstanding of art, and (ii) none is
successful as a comprehensivetheory. He stated that ' ••• each theory
asks different questions about the art object and throws light upon
different aspects of it.' This commentimplies that the artwork is a
complexentity that no single viewpoint can get into focus, just as
the six sides of a cube cannot be viewed simultaneously from one
position. Whatappears to be missing from this metaphor, though, is
a recognition that different theories of art do not just reveal
different aspects of the same, albeit complexobject, for if no single
theory can be said to account for the 'object,' then we are left with
a range of alternative ontological conceptions. Stolnitz (ibid.,
p.403) later conceded as much when he described as obsolete the
objectivist view that ' ••• aesthetic value exists in the work
independently of any relations between the work and the spectator.'
His insistence that the properties of artworks may be objectively
assessed '... in relational terms' (ibid.) invites comparisonwith
Rorty's (op. cit., p.170f.) rejection of 'privileged representations'
in favour of '... the social justification of belief' (see above,
Chap. 4.4.2).
In the previous chapter (Chap.4.4.3) reference was madeto Margolis's
(1980c, p.228) observation that '... there is 8CIII8 biological,
nonconventionaldisposition underlying all cultural conventions.' In
the light of the present enquiry into aesthetiC theory, this suggests
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that the existence of the material entities called artworks is not in
doubt, but because of the differing pre-judgements of critics, no one
can give an authoritative and exhaustive definition of art with which
to fix the boundaries of individual works. Hence 'culturally-:.informed
viewpoint' is a decisive element in the ontology of art. Whereasthe
determinative influence of the critic can be over~hasized as in the
case of extreme idealism and the mysticism that results fran it, the
object-nesa of the work can also be over~ized as in the case of
extreme materialism and the objectivism it encourages. Both are
' ••• suspect extremes ••• totally unhelpful in conceptual dealings with
art' (Schaper, OPe cit., p. 362)• On the other hand, the dual notions
of physical embodimentand cultural emergencecould provide the focus
for an approach to the teaching of criticism and metacriticism that
avoids such extremes and is thus more representative of the
complexities of interpretive activity.
In brief, the views of Margolis and the other theorists discussed in
this section indicate that criticism and the teaching of criticism can
all too easily be conducted without any reference to problems
connected with the definition and identification of art. Implications
arising from this section are (1) that exploring the ontological
presuppositions of various kinds of critical practice adds a rich
dimension to art criticism; and (ii) that the contrast of extreme
positions and discussion of alternatives involved in this strategy is




In this chapter to date, conceptual issues in the ontology of art have
been examinedwith a view to speculating about pedagogical strategies
for the analytical/critical domain. Theemphasishas been on problems
involved in identifying and defining artworks as a prerequisite of
critical appraisal, rather than on problemsarising from the critical
process per se. In the remainder of this chapter, key aspects of
aesthetic theory relating to actual criticism will be focused upon;
these were at least implicit in the previous chapter, for examplethe
relation of description to interpretation (see Chap. 4.4.1).
The distinctions already noted between idealism/materialism and
relativism/objectivism have a strong bearing on the relation of
description to interpretation. Writers on theory of art criticism who
incline towards an extremist position on the ontology of art either
••• collapse interpretation into description' or vice versa
(Lamarque,Opecit., pp.267~268). Radical relativists would seem to
belong to the first group in that they stress the interpretive
character of descriptive statements to the point where these lose
their otherwise distinctive character and becaue subsumedas part of
an overall interpretive dimension. Against this extreme position, it
could be maintained that artworks possess properties which are stable,
enumerable, and susceptible of a large measureof critical agreement.
Description is thus a relatively straightforward operation requiring
little special effort on the critic's part. Interpretation, on the
other hand, suggests 'a touch of virtuosity' and 'an inventive use of
the materials present'; it thereby illuminates relationships and
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interconnections between these materials in such a way as to resolve
what is puzzling or recondite in particular instances (pp.11O-l12).
The critic might therefore be said to synthesize or add to that which
is descriptively available in the work.
Aside fromradical relativists are those who adopt an objectivist view
of the artwork. These are drawn mainly from the tradition of
analytical aesthetic theory and include writers like Beardsley who,
according to MargoliS, hold that the critic's task is to ' •••eliminate
all interpretations but "the" correct one' (p.12a). In their efforts
to focus attention on the work itself, writers in this tradition are
said to underestimate the motivating powerbehind the critic's (and
the artist's) performance. The critic is assumedto be a moreor less
neutral agent who is capable of adopting a detached stance over
against the artwork; hence, in contrast to the emphasis of
phenomenologyand hermeneutics, for example, the historical character
of the critic's activity is not fully taken into account. By
contrast, 'phenomenologicaldescription' does not merely consist in
'taking inventory' of a work (Spiegelberg, 1971, pp.672~73; cf.
Feldman,1972, p.467). It' ••• begins in silence' by seeking first to
grasp the phenomenonintuitively: a process which involves a
willingness on the critic's part to reassess the perceptual categpries
on whichhis or her descriptions are based (Spiegelberg, ibid.).
The different senses of description examinedhere are methodologically
suggestive from the standpoint of art instruction. lBarners could be
taught to consider the selectivity entailed by 'description;' in
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particular, it could be shown that data obtained through the activity
of describing are subtly determined by the questions asked of the
phenomenon. It is not mere infonnation gathering. In the case of
complex entities such as (sane) artworks, it is not possible to
describe them exhaustively.
In this cormection, the view that artworks are culturally emergent
entities (which cannot be accounted for in strictly perceptual terms)
implies that a clear dividing line between description and
interpretation is impossible to achieve. Only in the more manifest
instances of critical discourse can the distinction be drawn with any
certatnty; and even then the relationship of the two levels of
operation remains an ambiguous one. Margolis outlined the problem as
follows:
Criticism is methodologically treated as interpretive in
the sense that any account will be viewed as plausible more
than as true, once what is indisputably descriptive has
been provided -- and always with a caution that the work
may be construed in alternative ways. There is absolutely
no need here to fix once and for all -- without attention
to the peculiarities of particular works -- what is
descriptively assignable to any set of artworks. There is
no minimal list. That is, the problem of interpretation is
precisely what it is because there is no formal demarcation
line between what is describably present in a work and what
may be interpretively imputed to it. But this is not to
say that we cannot specify what is (minimally)
descriptively true of a particular work and what is
(certainly) interpretively imputed to it. (p.127).
Nevertheless, though descriptive and interpretive statements cannot be
clearly demarcated, the distinction between them should be maintained
because on logical grounds there are clearly two kinds of activity,
each involving characteristic uses of critical language: statements
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which provide 'accurate', 'comprehensive', 'detailed', or •exact'
information about artworks are logically distinct from statements
which refer to aspects which are ' shocking' , ' startling' ,
'impressive', 'affected', or 'exaggerated' (ibid. p.lll). Of course,
the difficulty of distinguiShing between description and
interpretation is made apparent by terms which cannot be readily
assigned to either category, for example, 'harmonious', 'balanced',
and 'evocative.'
In the light of these observations, there appear to be two senses in
which the term 'interpretation' can be used, each with implications
for the teaching of metacriticism. First, the virtuosity which is
typically accorded to the interpreter maybe merely honorific if his
task consists in disclosing the hidden (yet describable) features of a
complexwork. Suchan act of disclosure is methodologically different
in degree, though not in kind, from that of straightforward
description. It is a heightened form of description: the sensitive
discrimination of cormoisseurship, as typified by the phenomenologist.
Second, interpretation maybe used to denote the action of the critic
in seeming to exceed what is readily available for inspection. Such
interpretation is methodologically different from the first sense of
the term, in that the critic might more justifiably be said to 'read
into' the workmeaningswhichare fugitive in character and which, at
best, can only be advanced on a basis of plausibility. '1h.e
distinction between these two senses of •interpretation' is
exceedingly difficult to make in particular instances. It is,
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however, the point at which disagreement arises over what is
descriptively in a workand what is interpretively imputedto it.
The different senses of description and interpretation examined in
this section have implications for teaching metacriticism beyondthose
discussed in Chapter 3.3. Art education theorists have tended to use
these terms with an objectivist bias, which in practical terms
encouragesan over~onfidence in the ability of the learner-critic to
make objective, empiricallr-based descriptions (e.g. Feldman, ope
cit., p.267). The examination of controversy in aesthetics in the
present chapter has revealed instead that the link betweendescription
and interpretation is problematic whenviewed philosophically in the
light of critical practice.
5.4 TheAcceptanceof Divergent Interpretations of GivenArtworks
In a chapter entitled 'The Logic of Interpretation' Margolis asserted
that, 'Philosophically, the most interesting feature of critical
interpretation is its tolerance of alternative and seeminglycontrary
hypotheses' (pp.15~l57). This tolerance of alternatives reflects an
ontological distinction between physical objects and artworks. The
former are fully susceptible of description; hence, the explanation of
such phenaDenais typically advancedin causal terms, that i8, on the
basis of a meiel of truth and falsity. On the other hand, because
artworks are entities of a culturally emergentkind, they require a
different type of explanation based instead on the (logically weaker)
modelof plausibility and implausibility.
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In this connection, Margolis comparedthe methodologiesof the natural
sciences and those employedin aesthetic criticism. After first
acknowledgingthat the natural sciences are centrally concerned with
achieVing causal explanations of phenomena, he proceeded to
demonstrate (by reference to hypotheses about the origin of the solar
system) the utility, indeed the propriety, of the plausibility/
implausibility model for scientific research. When scientists appeal
to grounds of plausibility in support of their hypotheses, they do so
(typically, in the case of cosmological hypotheses) '. •• because of
teclmical inability to gain the desired information' (p.l60). nus
inability is, however, a temporaryone: advances in technology permit
an increasing range of hypothesis~testing to be conductedon the basis
of a truth/falsity model. Therefore, even the seemingly unsolvable
problems of cosmologymayultimately yield to causal explanation.
By contrast with the methodologiesof the natural sciences, Margolis
asserted that •••• considerations of plausibility are more nearly
central to aesthetic criticism' (ibid.). The main difference between
the appeal to plausibility in the natural sciences and in aesthetic
criticism is that, in the latter case, the characteristic
indeterminateness of aesthetic objects makesit •••• quit~ impossible
to showthat interpretive judgements£!!l be true' (ibid. J emphasis in
orig. ). 'l11isindicates that artworks are not susceptible of eventual
explanation in causal terms. 'l11eir culturally emergent nature thus
renders themineligible, as a class of entities, fromever yielding to
explanation on the basis of a truth/falsity model.
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Beardsley (1970a) had previously taken issue with Margolis over this
understanding of the term 'plausibility' and especially his use of the
term to defend the acceptance of competinginterpretations of a single
work. Accordingto Beardsley:
Wedo not discover, according to Margolis's view, that
interpretations are true or false, but only that they are
'plausible' - and though two incompatible statements
cannot both be true, they can both be plausible. But
plausibility is at least an appearance of truth based upon
somerelevant evidence, and any statement that is plausible
must be in principle capable of being shownto be true or
false. (p.43, emphasis in orig.)
However, this all depends on whether or not the two incompatible
statements are madein the context of a commontheoretical framework.
'!be Freudian interpretation of Hamletwaspresumablyincompatible with
all that preceded it because it emanated from a different set of
premises and involved asking characteristically new questions of the
text (Margolis, 1980a, p.155). Discussion of plausibility in relation
to truth further reflects the problem examined in Chapter 4.4.3.
concerning the notion of incOlJlDeIlSUt'ability. It was noted with
reference to Bemstein' s and Giddens's analyses of research in the
sciences that to define 'truth' with reference to '... a permanent
ahistorical matrix or neutral descriptive language' (Bernstein, p.172)
was untenable, because it failed to take into account the rivalry of
theories and traditions underlying the ostensibly monolithic character
of scientific progress. Hence, in speaking of a truth/falsity model,
care must be taken to avoid naively presenting a single, universal
notion of truth. Beardsley's point that two incaopatible statements
cannot both be plausible appears, therefore, to be invalid if the
statements arise from incompatible frameworksof interpretation: what
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Margolis has called 'validating principles, ' or 'imaginative
schemata,' for example, the Freudian, the Marxist, and the Catholic
(op. cit., p.147f).
'!be idea of 'incompatibility,' like that of 'incOlIllleI1SUrability,'does
not necessarily imply total, irreconcilable opposition, either of
interpretive claims regarding a single artwork, or the frameworksfrom
which claims arise. Bernstein (op, cit., p.86), coomentingon Kulm's
philosophy of SCience, affirmed that paradigms that are logically
incompatible and incoomensurableare, nevertheless, comparable to a
greater or lesser degree. Margolis, too, suggested that critical
appraisals madeon the basis of different validating principles should
be designated 'incongruent' rather than 'incompatible' (p.16l). The
underlying point here is that critical appraisals of all kinds can and
should be compared. It is, perhaps, inappropriate to ask of a
painting, 'What does it mean?' Whereasto enquire in what ways its
meaningEm be construed suggests an openness to possibilities and
alternatives. The point is that 'We invoke plausibility only whenwe
cannot actually determine truth' (p.159)j therefore, the formulation
of hypotheses should be··circumscribedby the level of precision that
it is realistic to expect in given situations. th!sprinciple applies
equally to situations in which the determination of truth is, on
technical grounds, provisionally unattainable; and to those in which
it is inherently unattainable, as with interpretive claims in art
criticism.
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The distinction that has been drawnbetweena truth/falsity modeland
a plausibility/implausibility model appears to have the following
implications for both metacriticism and the teaching of metacriticism:
(i) that there is little justification for holding to an unequivocal
notion of artistic •truth;' (ii) that the logically weaker notion of
plausibility presupposes the existence of different belief systems,
each with a distinctive set of criteria for critical appraisal; (iii)
that in spite of these differences, there are sufficient points of
correspondenceor overlap betweenthe belief systems to justify making
comparisons between critical statements about particular works;
indeed, the history of debates involving different belief systems
presupposes ••• their joint intelligibility and testability'
(Margolis, OPe cit., p.162); (Lv) in the light of i-iii, learner-
critics could be taught to utilise, as appropriate, the critical
claims of any belief system fromamong the available alternatives.
Whatlinks can be drawnbetweenthese implications and the theoretical
positions outlined in the sunmary of Chapter 41 First, discussion
with learners about the notion of plausibility in relation to art
criticism could be utilised as a means of exposing the dubious
character of various extremist positions. For example, if the more
important things wewish to say about artworks can only be advancedon
a basis of plausibility, then it is inappropriate to seek a fully
recoverable meaning. Second, in situations where learners are faced
with a critical impasse, as is the case with most people' s initW
confrontation with Abst~act Expressionism, teachers need a strategy
for avoiding, on the one hand, • •• the extreme of DIltely
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contemplating something without any understanding' and, on the other,
'••• the extreme of too easily and faCilely projecting our own well~
entrenched beliefs ••• onto the alien phenomenon' (Bernstein, OPe
cit. ,.p.91)• This can be achieved by engaging learners in a non-
combative dialogue with artworks, which involves a willingness to
compare critical opinions from any quarter in the belief that no
single theoretical framework has a monopoly on truth. In seeking to
adopt a 'middle ground' between subjectivist and absolutist extremes,
Margolis proposed that aestheticians should be
••• hospitable to ideologically divergent views without
committing themselves, in the context of aesthetic concern,
to the correctness of any particular ideology - and without
precluding as a matter of personal commitment, a preference
for one ideology rather than another. (p.148).
Third, the notion of plausibility in respect of critical theories
could be illustrated with reference to examples from what might be
called the history of critical reception. The divergent 'readings' of
a particular work or class of works over a period of time would reveal
as much about the theoretical presuppositions of the critics as about
the works themselves. For example, a comparison of the critical
reception of Impressionism might be conducted with reference to their
rejection by the 19th century art establishment, their acceptance by
formalist critics of the early 20th century and the socio-political
analyses of Marxist critics of the mid to late 20th century.
Discussion of the vicissitudes of critical reception raises questions
about links between lmowledge and perceptual experience. Changes in
the intellectual climate of critical opinion are evidences of a
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dynamic process in which beliefs about art and life interrelate with
ways of depicting the world. In particular, the attempt to understand
the works of recent artists in the light of the tradition from which
they spring provides fresh perspectives on the work of earlier
periods. For example, perceptual categories formed as a result of
looking at Giotto's frescos can aid our appreciation of cezanne;
however, the creative vision of Gazanne can also enable us to approach
Giotto afresh (Tilghman, 1976, pp.84-85). The relevance of perceptual
theory to art criticism is explored in more detail in the following
section.
the
In a chapter entitled 'Characteristic Qualities of Works of Art',
Margolis examined the relationship between the artwork (as
incorporating perceptual and non-perceptual properties) and the nature
of perception. In so domg, whilst he expressly avoided making a
detailed critique of the psychology of perception (p. 196), he further
emphasized his earlier point that there is an inextricable link
between the different levels of theory associated with the aesthetic
realm. This point was also recognized by Machamer (1980), who
identified three levels of relevant theory:
It is impossible to hold a well developed or coherent theory
of art or art criticism without at the same time holding a
theory of perception. (p.lO).
The need to achieve consistency and theoretical soundness across all
three levels is a recurring motif in Margolis's thesis. If an
individual's theory is inadequate at one level, this inadequacy is
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bound to be reflected at other levels as well. On the relation of
perceptual theory to aesthetic criticism, he stated that
.•• there is a critical feature of perception curiously
overlooked in attempts to bring the relevant work of
psychology to bear on the discrimination of artworks,
namely, that the cognition of perceptual forms is informed
by, and depends upon, culturally contingent background
beliefs. (p.196).
As noted above, the view that artworks are 'culturally emergent
entities' entails a concurrent view of the percipient as one who is
culturally Situated. Perceptual theory, as it relates to aesthetic
criticism, involves adopting a position in respect of the distinction
between 'seeing' in the narrowsensory understanding of that term and
seeing in the sense of 'seeing as'. The former sense relates to
features which are taken to be descriptively in an artwork and the
latter to those which are interpretively imputed to it. Hence, the
distinctions already examined in respect of (L) internal/external
evidence, (ii) descriptive/interpretive statements, and (iii)
truth/plausibility arguments, find a further parallel in the context
of philosophical attempts to define the nature of aesthetic perception
with reference to perceptual theory as a whole.
Margolis attended, initially, to aspects of perception theory which
associate the 'aesthetic attitude' with affective rather than
cognitive faculties, clatming that a confusion exists over the
relationship betweenexpressive qualities of artworks and affective or
emotive states that are associated with percipients' responses (pp.
191-2(0). These two senses mayin fact coincide in cases where the
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expressive quality of a given work (e.g., sadness or gaiety) serves to
induce a similar feeling in an audience member. However, the
conflation of the two senses (typified in the Emotionalist Theory of
Art) fails to do justice to a large numberof paradigm cases: for
whilst it mayaccount for instances in which the qualities expressed
and the feelings evokedmayin somesense be considered congruent, the
same cannot be claimed for probably the great majority of cases. It
is a matter of practical experience that an artist may manipulate
materials (in either the pejorative or non-pejorative sense of
'manipulate') in order to produce an expressive quality which he or
she does not personally feel. Similarly, percipients may quite
readily recognize that a workexhibits a certain quality without their
necessarily experiencing a corresponding effect (cf. critiques of the
rmationalist '!beory of Art by Stolnitz, 1960, pp.158-l90 & Hospers,
1955)•
In his critique of perceptual theories, Margolis attempted (t) to
point out that aesthetic perception involves a combination of
intellectual and emotional levels of experience; (ii) to showthat the
term 'aesthetic attitude' (which he considered vacuous) misleadingly
suggests that persons are able to achieve an intuitive understanding
of artworks beyond the imDediacy of direct experience; and (iii) to
deny (against Arnhe1m, see pp.196-197) that there exist 'perceptual
forces' which underlie and direct our aesthetic perceptions: for
whilst there maybe compelling reasons for reaching certain perceptual
judgements in given cases, these are relative, not to the supposed
'innate organizational powers of the brain' (ibid.), but to powerful
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influences exerted within cultural contexts. This would seem to
affirm that perception in the fullest sense of the term involves a
complex of factors ranging from a basic physiognomic level to a
sophisticated level of cultural conditioning. Likewise, perception,
as it relates to aesthetic criticism, ' ••• need not be re~tricted to,
or even primarily focused on, what is accessible in someminimally
sensory sense' (p.l95). Instead, the widest possible range of
cultural factors should be seen as relevant to the perception of
artworks and to the judgementsthat are madeconcerning them.
This conclusion rules out too firm a distinction betweenaesthetic and
non-aesthetic terms in art criticism. It implies that metacritics
should steer a middle course between characterizing aesthetic
judgements in a mamler that.' sacrifices their distinctiveness and
artificially segregating themfrom other kinds of judgement(cf. 'the
reductionist empiricism which results in a perceptually restricted
range of judgements' in Chap. 4.5). Hence, a major implication of the
claim that artworks are culturally emergent entities is that the
distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic terms (like that
between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence) can lead to an attenuated
view of critical judgementthat woulddeny (by default) the aesthetic
relevance of moral, political, and otherwise ideological factors (op.
cit., p.232).
In particular, the distinction betweenmoral and aesthetic interests
appears problematic. ~ view of writers such as Hare (1952) and
Hampshire (1954) , ••• that moral judgements f\D'lction to "guide
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conduct" and that aesthetic judgementsnever do' (p.213) is said by
Margolis to be over-stated. On the contrary, moral issues may, in
certain circumstances, call for an appreciative rather than an active
resporise on the observer's part (see p.214): for example, readers of
literature may readily adopt an attitude of appreciation towards the
moral choices madeby fictional or historical characters without their
necessarily having to be faced with the same choices in their own
experience. 'lherefore, the consideration of moral issues need not
entail an ' ought' as far as the reader is concerned. '!he point is a
fair one, although it might be said with equal justification that to
'appreciate' the moral choice of a fictional or historical character
involves at least an aspiration to act accordingly in similar
circumstances.
On the other hand, it is also incorrect to insist too strongly that
aesthetic judgements are, by definition, morally neutral. Critical
statements, inasmuch as these fall short of expressing complete
approbation of a given work, involve, at least implicitly, a
reccmnendationabout howthe workmight otherwise have been produced
(allowing for the nature of the artistic problem and accepting the
constraints which the artist has set). In such instances, it is clear
that aesthetic judgementsare prescriptive (accepting an extenuatory
sense of 'prescriptive'), because the critic, by disclosing a
(supposed)weaknessin the artwork is assumingthat there is room, and
thus need, for improvement. Furthermore, the impossibility of
segregating moral and aesthetic interests can be demonstratedby terms
that jointly serve a moral and an aesthetic purpose. Hence, with
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regard to judging a person's character and conduct, 'kindly,'
'discreet,' 'foul,' 'heinous,' etc, may be employed in a purely
appreciative sense.
Whereas the link between moral and aesthetic judgements appears more
germane to literature than art, it nevertheless serves to show that
determining what is of aesthetic concern is problematic and that
pursuing arguments in the classroom is thus a further means of
focusing attention on conceptual issues surrounding the nature of art
and howit is perceived.
5.6 Sumnary
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify issues in
philosophical aesthetics that reflect the contested character of
philosophy as a whole (cf. Chap. 4) in order to devise a basis for
metacriticism in art education. '!bis was needed because existing art
education models (Chap. 3.6) failed to acconmodate the idea of
aesthetic r controversy as a focus for instruction. Hence, it was
thought necessary. in the first instance, to explicate the conceptual
links between aesthetic controversy and wider debates elsewhere in
philosoPhy concerning the relation of perceiver and perceived.
The notion of 'standard oppositions' in philosophy - the focus of
Chapter 4 - has been explored in the context of philosophical
aesthetics with primary reference to Margolis's Art and Philosophy.
Parallels have been drawn between the oppositional nature of
philosophy as a whole. particularly in regard to ontology and
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epistemology, and key aspects of controversy in aesthetics over the
relation of art and criticism. At the heart of these controversies is
a fundamental disagreement about the value for aesthetic purposes of
extrinsic evidence. This amotnlts to a dispute (or grounds for a
dispute) concerning the possibility, or otherwise, of defining the
boundaries of artworks, that is, demarcatingwhat is straightforwardly
'in' a work fromwhat is interpretively imputed to it. SUchdisputes
arise in the context of deciding where to draw the line between, for
example, description and interpretation, true claims and (merely)
plausible ones, and aesthetic as opposed to non-aesthetic terms.
These are presented elsewhere in the thesis as a set of propositions
(see Appendix III ).
The key disputes examined in this chapter have emergedas specific
foci for exploring the oppositional nature of philosophy in the
context of aesthetics. The linking of these levels of theory, namely,
general philosophy and philosophical aesthetics (see above, Chap.
5.1), has been conducted in a marmer that anticipates a need to
develop metacritical strategies with reference to pedagogical theory.
In this connection, exploration of the several aspects of controversy
examdned above has included some speculation about the likely
curricular implications of adopting themas foci for art instruction.
A more detailed attempt to explore the curricular implications of
aesthetic controversy will be conducted in the following chapter with
reference to the concept of artistic intention, which at the start of
the research was identified as a representative dispute. Discussion
of this concept will address issues connectedwith teaching aesthetic
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controversy, but in greater detail and, specifically, in the light of
existing metacritical strategies in areas outside art education -
particularly the field of English literature studies.
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CHAPrER 6.
INTENTION IN AESTHETICS AND LITERATURE EDUCATION
6.1. Introduction
'nle enquiry which forms the basis for this chapter focuses on a
specific issue concerning the link betweenart and criticism, namely,
the controversy over intention (See Chap. 1.1 above for a definition
of this controversy.) Intention is treated separately with a view to
facilitating a discussion in depth of curricular implications. Given
the association of intention with literary criticism, this involves an
analysis of diff~rent kinds of theory drawn from aesthetics,
literature education and art education sources. It also constitutes a
shift of emphasisawayfrom (merely) speculating about pedagogyon the
basis of an analysis of philosophical aesthetics towards identifying
and conmenting upon existing strategies for teaching a range of
critical stances.
There are two main reasons for focusing on intention. First, in the
opinion of prominent aestheticians (e.g., HOspers,1975, p.42.) it has
strategic philosophical importance because it is 'representative' of
fundamental controversy in aesthetics and in philosophy as a whole.
The expectation is that it can be used to bring the ontological and
epistemological issues of aesthetic controversy into sharper relief
than was possible in Chapter 5. In this connection, it is assumed
that intention is closer to what is said about art in actual criticism
than is, for example, the distinction between description and
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interpretation (Chap. 5.3) or the discrimination of aesthetic and non-
aesthetic terms (Chap. 5.5), although direct critical speculations 'on
the spot' about 'what the artist is trying to say' lead, logically
speaking, to a consideration of these other, supposedlyless concrete,
issues. Second, not only are texts on the pros and cons of
intentionalist criticism available in the field of English literature
education, but this source of theory was shownin a previous study to
have methodological relevance for the analytical/critical danain of
art education (Rawding, 1984). '!be expectation is that literature
education theory will aid the current research by providing a basis
for developing principles and procedures for teaching metacriticism
that can be applied to the art education sphere.
'nle current enquiry is conductedwith reference to books, articles and
papers on the issue of artistic intention in the theory of aesthetics,
literature education and art education. As in Chapter 5, Margolis's
Art and Philosophyprovides a reference point for exploring different
positions regarding the philosophical underpinnings of intention. '!be
education texts referred to either relate specifically to the teaChing
of literary intention or, more generally, to the teaching of a range
of methods in literary criticism. rus dual focus represents an
attempt to investigate further an issue which emergedearlier fran the
critical review of art education theory and practice (Chap. 3),
namely, that art educators had largely failed to address the problem
of howto present the multi-dimensionality of criticism to learners by
means of a coherent pedagogical strategy. It is assumed that a
discipl~based pedagogyought to ac:hievean alignment of two ld.nds
of theory, namely, that which relates to the content and methods of
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the discipline or field of study in question, and that which relates
to the principles and procedures of instruction.
Given the stated aim of proceeding in this chapter to a closer
scrutiny of teaching methods, it is thought essential to consider
first what is involved in combiningaesthetic theory and educational
theory. Moreover,it is necessary to anticipate the points at which
an analysis of intention is likely to be a continuation of, and a
developmentfrom, the discussion of issues in aesthetics in Chapter 5.
'lbis should involve speculation about ways in which the current shift
to literature adds a newdimension to prior considerations about the
nature of art and concomitantmethodsof criticism.
To this end, analysis of the issue of intention is preceded by a
discussion of the links betweenontology and critical methodin regard
to both literature and art. lhe intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in
art scholarship is pivotal to this discussion. The distinction (see
Chaps. 3.2 and 4.3) is between the work of theorists whostress the
primacy of a direct encounter with art and those who seek to define
and interpret specific works by reference to external influences on
the artist. 'lhis has emerged as the central theme of aesthetic
controversy over the relationship between critical statements about
artworks and competingviews of the perception of (artistic) reality.
To prepare the grOlmd for the analysis of intention, the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is briefly examined in the light of
perceptual theory and certain positions regarding the perception of
art and literature are linked to pedagogical stances on the teaching
of criticism. Subsequently, the analysis of intention in aesthetics
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and literature education seeks to drawcormections betweenontological
conceptions, methods of criticism, and teaching strategies. The
overall purpose is to ascertain whether methodological alignments
identified by meansof this analysis can be applied to the field of
art education.
6.2 Aesthetic 'lb.eoryand FrlucationTheory
'lbe derivation of pedagogical strategies from the model of
metacritical enquiry in aesthetics dependson achieving compatibility
betweenaesthetic and educational theory. ntese two fields of theory
represent separate discourses emanating from different historical
circumstances; it cannot be assumed, therefore, that material
existing on one level can simply be transferred intact to the other.
'Translation' rather than 'transference' might be a better term for
the relationship between them. Beardsley's (197Ob, p.7) notion of
'interfield illumination' is relevant to this point. His suggestion
is that 'aesthetic theory' represents a potential source fromwhich to
derive both content for and methodsof instruction in the arts. He
maintained that this source could be tapped by reflecting on the
essentially pedagogical character of art criticism and metacritical
approaches to Wlderlying theory.
First, his recoamendedapproach reveals new aspects of content:
according to Beardsley, aesthetic concepts may be '. • • taken over
directly into instructional theory after having been clarified in
1aesthetics'. In other words, they becaDepart of 'what' is taught.
(The task of clarifying aesthetic concepts is performed, initially, by
the aesthetician, first for his/her personal benefit and then for an
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audience of other philosophers. The educator - i. e. , researcher,
curriculmn theorist, teacher - consults the aesthetician's writings
and attempts, by derivation, to do the same for his/her ownsphere.)
Second, it facilitates the modelling of pedagogical method: Beardsley
stated that:
'... if we (come to) understand an important aspect of our
relationship to works of art, and try looking at instruction
with its help, wemayfind that certain features of instruction
becomeplainer or sharper from this poiilt of view. i (ibid. ,
emphasisadded)
Hence, the content clarified by the aesthetician, and derivatively
clarified by the educational theorist, can be viewed not just as a
part of 'what' is taught but 'how' it is to be taught as well.
Kaelin (1989, p. 109) has also written of the need to ' •••merge
aesthetic and pedagogical concerns•••at the level of methodology' to
achieve a ' ••• single discipline.' He claimed that this can be brought
about by ' •••• relating philosophy to aesthetics and aesthetics to art
experiences' in a detailed and systematic marmerwhich reveals the
interconnections between these different levels. the analysis in the
following pages will seek for evidence of these interconnections in
literature education texts.
6.2.1. Controversy in Aesthetics and the Relevance of Literature
Education Lory
It was suggested in Chapter 1.3 that the field of literature education
might be an important source of theory both in respect of the
controversy over intention and the contestability of aesthetics as a
whole. Aestheticians in general, and Margolis in particular, discuss
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the problems of intentionalist criticism chiefly in the context of
literary works. (Wimsatt and Beardsley's 'Ibe Intentional Fallacy,
which is seminal, refers primarily to the interpretation of poetry.)
'l11e reason why 'intention' more often than not equals literary
intention in the writings of aestheticians is chiefly because
intentionalist criticism appeals to verbal evidence or states its case
in discursive or polemical terms. As Muecke(1982, p.5) succinctly
stated: 'Literature, with language as its medimn, is inescapably
ideational' • Moreover, after preliminary investigation it was found
that the field of literature education theory was the only source of
arguments for and against the teaching of intentionalist criticism
(see Chap. 6.4.1).
'!be decision to examine literature studies was partly influenced by
the fact that writers on art education have recommendedoing so on
the grOWlds that literature educators have a better understanding than
art specialists of the concepts and methods of criticism and the
aesthetic theories that 1.mderlie them. For example, Feldman(1973,
p.53), with reference to art education in the U.S.A., maintained that
''!be model of criticism in the curriculum is literature' and that
' ••• teachers of literature are several light years ahead of us in
their use of theoretical materials'. In the British context, Reid
(1980, p.13) has contrasted the art teacher's lack of training in
critical methods with that of t ••• the fully trained teacher of
Fnglish whohas been steeped in itt. Onions (1979, p.2) and Dyson
(1981, p.20) have iIxlicated also that English literature (and general
history) are richer and more developed areas of the curricullDDand
that art educators have much to gain fromconsulting them.
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6.2.2. Controversy in Aesthetics and the Relevance of Perceptual
'!beory
The point was made in Chapter 5.5 that studies in perception were an
important theoretical source for exploring the links between the
ontology of art and critical method. The relevance of perceptual
theory to the enquiry as a whole is madeapparent by the tendency of
writers in this field to discuss problems of aesthetic perception in
the context of both literature and fine art (e.g., Fisher, 1980).
Despite significant differences between the mediumof words on the one
hand and the mediumof visual imagery on the other, sufficient grounds
exist for drawing parallels regarding the ontological status of
artworks and the marmerin which they are perceived. According to
Fisher (ibid., p.8) literature theorists were in the forefront of a
' ••• significant empirical revolution in aesthetics at mid-century'
which led to a re-examination of the problems of perception through
caubining lmowledge arising from experimental psychology and
philosophical aesthetics. The questions raised proved relevant to
, ••• not only the traditional epistemological issues concerning the
information conveyed in perception, but also crucial ontological
concerns' (ibid., p.9). Arnheim (1980, p.169) also referred to the
emergenceof a ' ••• a broad definition of perception (which) allows us
to realize that the quality of perceptual dynamics is shared by all
mental happenings': i.e., those perceived imaginatively (as in the
case of literary works) as well as those perceived sensuously, as in
the cases of painting and music (art forms which rely on one or more
of the five senses as a direct meansof expression or production) (cf.
Mitias, 1982, p.42).
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Drawingparallels between, on the one hand, the perception of literary
works and, on the other, the perception of visual art forms assumes
that the 'crucial ontological concerns' noted by Fisber (op, cit.) are
in saine sense conmonto literature and art. Recognition of COlJlDOn
concerns does not mean ignoring the fact that literature and art are
ontologically distinct media, as in Goodman's (1976, p.113 f)
distinction between a1lographic and autographic arts, nor that the two
fields of criticism are subtly different on that account. Rather,
parallels between literary and art criticism are justifiable, in this
researcher's opinion, on the grounds that the controversy over
intention raises questions about the ontological status of artworks in
both fields. Hence, despite differences between, on the one hand, the
mediumof language and, on tbe other, the 'medium' of visual imagery,
each field of criticism exhibits a range of 'critical modes' (Booth,
1979, Chap. 1), or schools of criticism, whichmaybe discriminated in
terms of the relative importance attached to 'intrinsic' as opposed to
'extrinsic' evidence (or vice versa) in given cases. 'Ibis distinction
was earlier described as the central underpinning of controversy in
aesthetics (Chap. 6.1). '!be point of disagreement, tacit or
otherwise, concerns the problem of determining the boundaries of
artworks (see Appendix III, esp. Proposition 3). '!he ontological
presuppositions of the different critical DXies lead to different
ld.nds of approaches to criticism: ontology and critical method, the
'what' and the 'how' of critiCism, are thus inseparably linked.
If the ontological status of works of literature and art is a matter
of dispute in aesthetic theory, epistemological concerns, namely, the
derivation of knowledge about such works and the establishment of
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criteria for validating critical claims, are equally problematic.
Problems associated with the perception of artworks are essentially
problems in which considerations of ontology and epistemology
converge.
6.2.3. '!be' Intrinsic/Extrinsic' Polarity: Pedagogical Implications
the connection between ontological/epistemological considerations and
critical methods, that is, between the beliefs (tacit or otherwise) of
critics and their characteristic actions, has implications for the
teaching of criticism. nus connection has been described (Miller,
1984) in terms of a polarity of pedagogical strategies:
••• an artwork does not primarily refer to a meaning 'out
there' in the world but rather presents its import 'in here'
within its own dimension ••• A teacher whoholds this point of
view.concerning artistic meaningwill want to teach artworks as
self-subsistent objects of attention rather than dependent
objects of reference. (p.96)
The implication for teaching criticism is that teachers ought to be
cOlllDitted,on ideological grounds, to one or other of these positions.
But is this the only choice available, or is there an alternative
possibility? ('l'he question is decisive, for in teaching
metacriticism, or the 'criticism of criticism' J it i. of first
importance to determine the range of critical options.) In seeking to
answer this question, attention w1ll be directed first to the fields
of literature studies and perceptual theory in a general sense for
reasons already stated; this will be followed by a disc:u.ssionof the
controversy over intention as a pedagogical focus.
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According to Booth (op cit., p.237), literary criticism over the past
four decades has been markedby a '... polemical opposition between
intrinsic questions and extrinsic questions' whichhas revealed itself
most noticeably and typically in the controversy over artistic
intention. Nevertheless, Booth warned against a too willing
acceptance of 'the metaphor of inside~rsus~tside' (ibid.) on the
grounds that it fails to do justice to the complexity and variety of
literary works and the correspondingly varied ways in which readers
encOmlter them.
For example, Abrams(1953), in what has remaineda classic formulation
of literary theory, distinguished between, on the one hand, objective
theories of criticism which view the work as a 'heteroc:osm', (i.e.,
the sole source of critical attention) and, on the other, three
categories of theory which view the artwork as dependent on an
'external' point of reference: namely, the Universe (as in mimetic
theories), the Audience (as in pragmatic theories) and the Artist (as
in Expressive theories). Booth (op cit., pp.54~57), in his couments
on Abrams's scheme, expanded his Audience and Artist categories to
include 'response' or rhetorical' criticism am 'biographical '
criticism, respectively; moreover, he added a fourth category:
'historical' or 'scholarly' criticism inwhich the work is interpreted
as a sign or product of socio-politic:al forces.
A rather different kind of 'opposition' has emerged in recent
literature education theory 1n the shape of what Bradbury (Weldhen,
1986) has called 'two essential versions of English studies' namely,
'the moral!humanistic' (or Leavisite tradition) and 'the linguistic'
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(or structuralist and post-structuralist traditions). 'l'hese two
'versions' do not neatly parallel the intrinsic/extrinsic oppoSition
in art and literature identified by Miller (op cit.). For example,
structuralist methodologyis noted for 'bracketing' the text from
exterior considerations, but its overall project can hardly be
characterized as indifferent to the work's socia-political context
(Eagleton, 1983, Chap. 3).
Briefly, literary criticism encompassesa plurality of critical modes.
Eachmodepresupposes a particular view of the ontological status of
the literary work, that is, 'what sort of thing' (it) '"really" is'
(ibid., p.54). 'Ibe difficulties attending the attempt to sort
critical modeson an internal/external axis are linked to the problem
of fixing the boundaries of works of literature and art. For this
reason Margolis (1975, p.88) viewed the internal/external issue
underlying critical practice to be conceptual rather than ideological.
'!he problemof distinguishing that which is descriptively present in a
workfrom that whichis interpretively imputedto it (see above, Chap.
5.3) led him to conclude that 'diverse sChools of criticism' cannot
help partaking to saDe degree of both internal and external arguments,
despite their ideological coamitments.
'l11e conceptual difficulties associated with the intrinsic/extrinsic
polarity and its application to literature also invite comparisonwith
the 'crucial ontological concerns' (Fisher, op cit. ) raised by
perceptual theory (see Chap. 6.3.2). Hagen (1980), for example,
distinguished between ecological theories in which perception is
viewedas synonymous with sensation and conventionalist theories which
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acccunt for the relationship between physical reality and ways of
picturing or imaging in terms of a ' ••• socially shared but arbitrary
componentcode' (ibid., p.108). On the other hand, Machamer(1980,
p.17) who first insisted that 'Theories of art or art criticism
presuppose a theory of perception', identified three theoretical
alignments. He contrasted 'theories that emphasize what is .!!! the
work of art' (ibid., p.14, emphasis added) with two kinds of extrinsic
theory: first, those that concentrate on the effect which works
produce in audience membersand, second, those that emphasizewhat the
spectator (or, by attribution, the artist) contributes to the work
' ••• over and above what is literally in the work itself' (ibid.).
















Machamer's phrase 'over and above what is literally in the work
itself' accurately conveys the point of conflict between the different
schools of perceptual theory: namely, that of determining the
'object' of perception. Margolis's (198Oc) position with regard to
orientations in perceptual theory was to steer a middle course between
the conventionalist (Cognitivist/Constructivist) position of Goodman
and the ecological (Direct Informati~based) position of Gibson.
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Against the former, he maintained that ' ••• there is !!2!!!! biological,
nonconventional disposition underlying all cultural conventions'
(ibid., p.228, emphasis in orig.). Against the latter, he affirmed
that aesthetic perception, as in the case of ordinary perception, is
dependent on a cognizing subject having learned the conventions and
underlying rules for applying these conventions to the interpretation
of artworks.
'l1le implication of the position of Margolis (and others) is that
Miller's (op cit.) characterization of the teaching of art criticism
as an ideological choice between ' internal' or 'external' approaches
is overstated. Although the 'internal/external' polarity is helpful
as a pedagogical focus in that it fixes theoretical extremes, this
researcher believes that it needs to be carefully qualified before it
can serve as a representative focus for the teaching of metacritical
enquiry in art education.
6.3 Controversyover Intention in Aesthetics
Interpreting an artwork with reference to its producer's intentions
implies a number of critical strategies. these include, (i)
speculating about the artist's psychological state in the light of
evidence arising frClllboth an analysis of the work itself and general
biographical information, (H) deducing artistic meaning in terms of
the cultural provenance within which the work was produced, (iii)
drawing conclusions on the basis of direct statements made by an
artist with regard to the work, and (iv) focusing on the work itself
as a functional whole which exhibits intentional properties that
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transcend the artist's control. As noted in Chapter 1.1, the question
of the legitimacy of intentionalist criticism in its various
manifestations has, ' •••promptedthe principal controversy in the mid~
20th century' in the field of philosophical aesthetics. (Hospers,
op.cit.).
Margolis's analysis of the controversy over intention is a logical
extension of his mre fundamentalanalysis of the ontological status
of artworks. Givenhis claim that' •••one's account of the nature of
criticism and of the nature of an artwork is conceptually linked in
the most intimate way' (1980a, p.27), divergent strategies, such as
those listed above, can be seen to reflect equally divergent
philosophical stances over the link between humanknowledgeand the
nature of perceived reality. This theoretical divergence was
identified earlier (Chap. 4) in respect of the notion of 'staOOard
oppositions' and subsequently reiterated in the context of aesthetic
controversy with particular reference to perceptual theory (Chap. 5;
cf. Chaps. 6.2.2 & 6.2.3). Accordingto Nathan (1982), intentionalist
criticism is markedlysplit betweenthose for and those opposedto the
use of intention as a standard for interpreting works of literature
and art:
Proponents of intentionali_ claim that information about the
artist's mtivations and intentions in creating a work of art
is relevant. to a proper understanding and appraisal. of the
work. Anti-intentionalists, on the other band, deny that facts
about the particular (and. personal) histories of works are
relevant to correct art-critical analyses of the works.
(p.245).
'lbis opposition represents a difference in attitude regarding the
aesthetic relevance of that which is deemedto be 'external' to the
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artwork. Intentionalists, so-called, readily accommodate such
evidence, whereas anti-intentionalists emphasize the 'autonomy' of the
artwork and consider 'the complete text' to be ' ••• the sole source of
evidence in interpretation' (ibid.). '!be point of disagreement
between the two positions represents more than simply a difference of
opinion about the relevance of 'external' evidence. Rather, it hinges
on the question of whether it is possible clearly to demarcate the
'internal' from the 'external' features of the artwork.
Intentionalists, if they are consistent, can only view the
internal/external dichotomy as a problematic concept; whereas anti-
intentionalists, by discotmting evidence 'from outside the work', are
thereby committed to viewing the artwork as a self-subsistent object
2of critical attention.
However, the expectation arising fran the analysis of theoretical
oppositions in the current research (reductive empiricism/relativism,
materialism/idealism, ecological/conventionalist theories of
perception) is that such fundamental disagreements give rise to
sophisticated, middle-ground positions brought about by attempts to
resolve, or rather re-cast, the conceptual problems involved.
Margolis t s analysis of intention fulfils this expectation. Underlying
his critique of theories is his view of artworks as 'eul.tura1ly
emergent entities', which means that '•••in effect, artworks possess
attributes essential to their antic analysis and aesthetic
appreciation that are themselves not perceptually accessible' (198Ob.,
p.4). His emphasis on the eul.turalprovenance of art and criticism
represents a challenge to the dominant 'empiricist' strain of Anglo-
American aesthetics in which the ontology of art is conceived
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exclusively in terms of sensory or perceptual properties and critical
method as, concomitantly, the formal analysis of such properties. In
contrast to 'empiricist' aesthetics, Margolis argued that to concede
the culturally emergent character of artworks is to admit the possible
aesthetic relevance of all types of information concerning them.
Therefore, in the context of aesthetic judgment, no type of evidence
should be antecedently discounted.
In Chapter 4.4.1 above, the conclusion was reached that empiricist
aesthetics in the analytical tradition leads to reductive ontologies
of the artwork because it is based on an inadequate view of the
observer/critic as a relatively detached agent who is able to make
accurate, objective representations of (artistic) reality. By
contrast, the anti-foundationalism of Continental aesthetics was said
to problematize the subject/object relationship through stressing that
criticism is a form of dialogue in which perceiver and perceived are
mutually engaged. This contrast is brought out by challenging the
empiricist aesthetics of Wimsatt and Beardsley (1954). These two
writers attempted to legitimize the use of intentionalist arguments by
rescuing the concept of intention from the excesses of proponents and
opponents alike. To this end. they sought to discriminate between
legitimate and illegitimate uses of intention by distinguishing
between three types of evidence which are used in criticism to
determine the meaning of a text (their thesis is presented primarily
in the context of literature). 'l'hey claim that only two types of
evidence (1 and 3 in their sCheme of things) are admissible: type 1
designates the internal evidence of a work. Le, t its perceptual
properties (technical. formal. expressive. etc.) mediated through
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public conventions relating to the 'language' of art; type 3
designates external evidence arising from the tradition of ideas and
practices in which the artist stands. Type 3 evidence is not specific
to actual artworks: it restricts the critic to inferential reasoning
about an artist's intended meaning in given cases and is, therefore,
3of indirect relevance.
A third type of evidence (type 2) is deemed by Wimsatt and Beardsley
to be inadmissible. This type which they describe as 'external' and
'private or idiosyncratic' (p.353), is biographical in character but,
in contrast to type 3, has a direct bearing on the artist's purposes
in respect of particular works. Such evidence usually 'consists of
revelations (in journals•••letters or reported conversations) •••'
(ibid.) which plainly disclose information either about the reasons
underlying a given work or the methods employed in its production. In
the light of these distinctions, Wimsatt and Beardsley contrast two
very different approaches to the task of criticism:
•••a critic who is concerned with evidence of type (1) and
moderately with that of type (3) will in the long run produce a
different sort of conment from that of the critic who is
concerned with (2) and with (3) where it shades into (2)•
(ibid.)
they conclude that critics who favour the latter approach are apt to
ccmnit the Intentional Fallacy: that is, to emphasize tmduly the
dependability of direct biographical evidence and to assert its
superiority over other considerations.
157
The crux of the Intentional Fallacy debate was well SUIJIIledup by
Margolis:
It. is possible that the only quarrelsome use of the artist's
intention concerns appealing to ~ndent evidence of his
intention in order to reduce the n~ of otherwise eligible
interpretations. (p.l70, emphasesin orig.).
'!be issue is not that direct biographical evidence may be used to
corroborate an existing line of enquiry (a legitimate usage according
to Wimsattand Beardsley), but that it maybe used to initiate a line
of enquiry in situations where the observer/critic has reached an
impasse or is unable even to take the first step. Onceit is conceded
that the effect of direct biographical evidence is to channel the
critic's perceptions, then it becomes difficult to see how such
information can be classed as 'outside' the Work:
If we construe artworks as culturally and historically emergent
phenomena, then it is quite impossible to specify the
'internal' features of a work without attention to the
,external' culture which supplies the very context in which an
artwork exists. (ibid., p.175).
The notion of 'cultural emergence' presupposes that artworks have non-
perceptible, that is to say 'intentional' properties. But what does
this expandedsense of intentional imply for the conduct of criticism?
And how can this assist the classroom teacher whenconfronting complex
works of literature or art? It is helpful at this point to seek
answers to the first question that might anticipate how to answer the
second. 'lbe notion of 'cultural emergence' and its bearing on
metacritical et¥lUiry was speculated on in the previous chapter; in
this respect, the controversy over intention can now be seen as a
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particularly apt focus for exploring ' ••• fundamental phi1osopbical
questions about meaningand objectivity' (see Chap. 5.2).
In the first place, the notion of author/artist is rendered
problematic by what Nicholson (1984, pp. 223"225) has called the
'problem of access' to intentional states, that is, ' ••• either through
the text at hand or otherwise'. His argument is that the
author/artist's consciousness is not directly accessible; rather,
interpretation in art and literature is a ' ••• textual procedure, not a
psychological one' and is attainable only in and through the mediumof
language (p.255). This problem of distinguishing the author/artist
over against the tradition in whichhe or she stands is highlighted by
Margolis's discussion of theory emanating from the hermeneutical
tradition wherein he cited Di1they's distinction between the
' •••psychologica1 and hermeneutic conceptions of intentions' as
providing a useful analogue of the distinction already noted in
respect of, on the one hand, biographical evidence about the artist's
purpose in producing a given work and, on the other, that which is
relevant in an indirect sense (op cit. p. 175). 'Dle 'hermeneutic'
conception of intentions entails that cultural phenomena(artworks,
human actions, institutions, etc.) embodythe ' •••pub1ic intentional
structures of a historical cOlllJlUD.ity'(ibid.) and are therefore
susceptible of interpretation insofar as these exhibit suCh publicly
discernible properties. the 'psychological' conception of intentions
refers instead to ' •••putatively private, inchoate, or inaccessible
psyChological states of particular persons' (ibid.). HOwever,direct
biographical evidence of an artist's intention (for example, a letter
to a friend explaining why a specific work had been produced) is
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hardly 'inaccessible' or 'utterly private'. Such disclosures ensure
that private feelings and motives are brought into the public domain.
In brief, it is impossible for an individual to engage in private
(Le. ~ non-cOlJlDUIlicable)language: the idea is contradictory;
moreover, all forms of biographical evidence are culturally defined
and thus relevant for aesthetic purposes. ('nlese points do not
obviate the fact that the personally stated intentions of an artist
mayactually mislead a critic in any numberof ways.) 'nle value of
the distinction between the hermeneutic and psychological conceptions
of intention is that it brings the problem of defining the
author/artist to critical attention. lbe implication for method is
that the problematic identity of the author/artist could be
demonstrated by, for example, comparingstrategies for interpreting
different kinds of evidence of intention (Nicholson, OPe cit. esp.
p.223). 'nle different senses of author/artist that underlie these
strategies raise questions about humanconsciousness in relation to
what we knowand what we see. 'nle problem of access to intentions
could be demonstrated by, for example, comparing the task of
interpreting an undocumentedworkby an anonymousauthor/artist with a
well-documentedwork.
'nle linking of 'cultural emergence' with 'intentional' problematizes
not only the concepts 'artwork' and 'author/artist' J but also that of
the 'reader/critic'. The point is that the intentions of the latter
are interpretively significant. Here there is a different emphasis to
the empiricism that assumes the reader/critic to be a relatively
neutral agent who is able to objectify (artistic) reality and make
analytically dependable judgments. 'lbe difference is between a
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restricted viewof intention as a state of consciousness embodiedin a
particular work, and a pervasive view in which individual intentions
are causally related to a 'network' of socially determinedbeliefs and
volitions to which all persons, including author/artists and
reader/critics, participate (Searle, 1983, p.65f.). In this
comection, Wartofsky (1980) has affirmed the need to take full
account of the determinative influence of the observer/critic's values
and expectations whenhe stated that
••• the human eye is not a recording camera, but part of a live
creature whose seeing is shot through with intentiona1it1es.
(p.35).
Moreover,Booth (op cit.) has pointed out that a dialogical approach
to textual criticism
••• supposes a text that exists, wheninterpreted, at least as
muchin the reader and the reader's culture as in the author
and the author's culture, and it also supposesa reader who, as
he interprets, is at least as muchin the text and in the
author's culture as in his own culture. (p.237, emphasesin
orig.). --
The dynamicinterplay of artwork (text), artist (author) and critic
(reader) identified by these writers suggests that the search for
'truth' that typifies interpretation should include reflexivity of
thought on the critic's part regarding the consciousness shaping
implications of his or her ownconceptual categories. Searle (op,
cit., p.54f) has supplied some intriguing examples of the
interrelation of beliefs and perceptual 'objects' in respect of
intention.
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In summary, it is concluded that consideration of the controversy over
the aesthetic relevance of the artist's intentions must be set in the
context of the more fundamental debate in philosophy over the relation
of lmowledge, language and perception involved in theories of human
intentionality (Searle, OPe cit.). It remains now to consider the
kinds of strategies employed in English literature education with
regard to intention. Attention will be paid to links between types of
interpretive evidence, methods of approach, and the
ontological/epistemological presuppositions that underlie such
approaches.
6.4. Controversy over Intention and Teaching Literature
A search of relevant texts revealed that discussion of the concept of
intention by educational theorists is largely confined to the field of
English literature. A number of studies have explored ways in which
the concept of intention may be used as a focus for literary
instruction (Neumeyer, 1970; Gage, 1978; Wilson, 1981 contra Gribble,
1981); others have included it in a wider discussion of the teaching
of literary criticism (Crosman, 1975; Ruthven, 1979; Schafer, 1979;
Rodway, 1982; de Beaugrande, 1984) • Neumeyer (op. cit.), in
particular, recognized that diverse views of the concept of intention
are held by teachers of literature and that these reflect equally
diverse views concerning the ontological status of the literary work:
'!be kinds of questions one asks of or about a work of
literature depend on one's assumptions about the matter of
intention or, stated more dramatically, they depend on one's
notions of the mode of existence of a work of literature. So
does the sort of classroom one conducts. So does the textbook
one uses. (p.336)
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The conclusions he reached with respect to pedagogywill be examined
below in the light of conmentsalready madeconcerning the limitations
of the intrinsic/extrinsic polarity as a focus for metacriticism.
Neumeyeridentified three broad approaches to teaching criticism
arising from his discussion of intention. First, he identified an
extreme anti -intentionalist approach in which the teacher eschews
formal instruction and its main objective, the discovery of a
(putatively) correct, or preferred, reading. This type of 'teacher'
seeks to expose learners to literature by involving them in, for
example, free-wheeling group discussions in which subjective
experience takes precedence over argumentation based on evidence.
Central to this approach is the assumption that a work's meaning can
never be fully comprehendedby anyone interpreter; neither can that
which is comprehendedbe adequately expressed in words. Such teaching
wouldconsider the search for intended meaningto be a futile one and
could hardly be expected to ~ the concept of intention at all.
Second, Neumeyer identified a more moderate anti-intentionalist
approach which views the text as a self-contained entity that
encompasses all data relevant for interpretation. This approach,
which is associated with the position of the ChicagoNew Critics (the
tradition to whichWimsattand Beardsley belong), restricts the search
for literary meaning to a close analytical scrutiny of 'the words on
the page' and discounts any attempt to infer about an author's
intentions on the basis of extra-textual material, for example,
biographical evidence. Even to speculate about intention on the basis
of textual evidence misses the point because this school of thought
places emphasisnot on the author but on the work itself as an entity
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that transcends even the author's control. The appropriate strategy
in this case is to ask 'how' and not 'what' a text means. Hence, in
teaching of this type, the concept of intention is accorded at best
only a limited usefulness; limited that is by adherence to the
doctrine of textual autonomy. A third approach, which Neumeyer
described as the dominantone in English literature education, accepts
that ' ••• all sorts of information outside the work are part of the
work, making it what it is' (ibid., p.336). He specified three kinds
of outside information: backgrounddata on the broad socio-historical
context in which a workwas produced, psychological speculation about
an author's state of mind at the time of production including an
assessment of artistic 'sincerity', and explanations of all references
in a work (usually footnotes in textbooks) including an attempted
decoding of its ambivalencesand allusions.
Neumeyeradmitted that the three approaches he identified mayoverlap
to someextent in practical criticism. He declined to take sides on
the intentionalist issue and pointed out the drawbacks for those who
do. Anti-intentionalists, whether extreme or moderate, were said to
be far too sanguine about defining what is 'outside' the artwork. He
gave examples to show that 'pure' readings. namely, those
uncontaminatedby backgroundknowledge, are unattainable. A further
criticism of anti-intentionalist approaches to the teaching of
literature was proposed by Gage, (op cit.) who pointed out that a
clear contradiction exists in current practice between, on the one
hand, teaching the activity of reading on the assumption that
authorial intent cannot be known, and, on the other, teaching the
activity of essay writing which, because it is essentially rhetorical,
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requires that students' ownintentions be madeclear. Henceintention
is a necessary point of reference for one whoengages in the process
of composition. Thosewhopursue an anti-intentionalist line are also
open to the charge which Kelly (1986, pp.1l6-121) levelled at the
'pedagogic partisanship' of teachers who '. •• fail to inform their
students about the complexity and diversity of perspectives on
relevant issues'. Such a 'one-sided presentation' has, he suggested,
the effect of curtailing intellectual freedom and weakening the
learners' ability to choose wisely in matters of controversy. It
springs from the belief that either a particular issue (in this case,
intention) is unproblematic, or that it is one's duty vigorously to
opposewhat one sees as an erroneous viewpoint.
The difficulties associated with anti-intentionalist approaches to
teaching criticism are coextensive with those whichMargolis examined
at the level of aesthetic theory (see above Chap. 6.3). The concept
of artistic intention is, as Margolis and Neumeyer separately
indicated, a paradigm instance of the relationship of ontology and
critical method. EXploringthe concept across the fields of aesthetic
and educational theory brings to the fore the necessity of modelling a
pedagogyof art criticism on the functions of both the critic and the
aesthetician. According to Margolis. professional critics are often
ignorant or neglectful of philosophical insights; however. in view of
the logical interdependence of these two functions the case becomesa
compelling one for ensuring that they are treated in practice as
complementaryaspects of art experience in the analytical/critical
domain. MacGregor(1971). Ecker (1973), and Hamblen(1985, 1987)
among others in the field of art education in the U.S.A. have argued
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in this way as have a number of educators in the field of English
studies (e.g., Ruthven 1979, Schafer 1979, Rodway1982, Eaton 1984).
Amajor point arising from these studies is that not only the artwork
but also the process of understanding the artwork is a legitimate,
indeed necessary, object of enquiry.
It remains to consider the third approach to the teaching of criticism
which Neumeyeridentified, namely, that of the intentionalist who
seeks out all manner of information beyond that conveyed by the
imnediate impact of the artwork. As indicated above, the Intentional
Fallacy debate calls into question the view that outside information,
especially the direct biographical kind, is absolutely essential if
interpretation is to succeed. However,as Margolis's analysis makes
clear, intentionalism can take different forms: hence a willingness
to seek out all manner of outside information need not necessarily
imply indiscriminate acceptance. Neumeyerfirst took issue with the
unthinldng, unbridled intentionalism of certain authors of English
literature textbooks whooperate on the assumption that ' ••• anything
that may be hooked, pasted, wired, or footnoted onto a work is
relevant, appropriate, and to be taken in by the student if the work
is to be "learned"' (op cit., p.354). Such information-mongering
encourages a sterile, bookish, second-hand knowledgeof literature;
it mayindeed nullify the potential which certain complexworks (e.g.,
Kafka's The Castle) possess of challenging preconceptions and
deepening self-awareness on the reader's part. Neumeyer's disquiet
finds an apt parallel in the shape of Kleinbauer's (1971) verdict on
Iextrinsic' methodsin the history of art, namely, those which attend
to external data and utilize the paradigms and teclmiques of social
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science for art historical research (cf. Chap. 3.2.). Whilst
conceding that extrinsic approaches mayprovide useful and sometimes
illuminating contributions to an overall understanding of art, he
insisted that such methodscan only yield partial interpretations and
are thus '. •• unable to provide satisfactory explanations for the
inherent formal qualities, or style (in the narrow sense), of works of
art' (ibid., p.8l).
Reference to extrinsic methods in art scholarship brings forward the
question of how art criticism relates to art history from the
standpoint of method. TIledominantemphasis in art teaching is on the
history of art Whereas, in literary studies, the dominantemphasis ls
on criticism. Kleinbauer's view that the best art scholarship is that
Which achieves a synthesis of the results of both intrinsic and
extrinsic methods underlines the pererm1al problem faced alike by
teachers of literature and the history of art, namely, that of
deciding on the balance to be struck between breadth and specificity
of treatment Whenstudying artworks in the classroom (Alexander, 1980;
wbbock, 1984; Univ. of Essex, 1985). This problem is highlighted,
thoughnot relieved, by the recent tendency among art educators in the
U.K. to attack what they see 88 the narrow parochialism and
conservatism of traditional art history and to advocate instead both
the developnent of critical thinking after the example of English
studies and the introduction of materials to enable artworks to be
placed in their broadest cultural context (Dyson, 1981, 1984; wbbock,
1983, 1984; univ. of Essex, 1985; Brazier, 1985; Taylor, 1986). It is
stated that the problemis not relieved, because the term 'context' in
use is massively vague and often little more than a 'catch-all' for
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aspects of theory and practice that do not fit a strictly formalist
aesthetic. To study art in context adequately is to have grasped
beforehand the complex nature of theory bearing on the concept of
culture. For example, it involves taking account of different
theoretical positions regarding the interaction of art and culture.
Is the former determinately shaped by the latter, or is a two-way
process 'involved in which artworks challenge and even subvert
4
prevailing norms? '!be upshot of this is that the teaching of art in
context requires the teacher to make choices and these choices are
only possible if the teacher is well informed.
Whilst extreme forms of intentionalism in literature and art lead to
an over-reliance on auxiliary data, a more balanced approach is
possible in which, for example, students might first attempt to
experience a work on its own terms; then in the light of their
impressions they might generate hypotheses about the original
intention of the author/artist; finally, they could seek beyond their
first direct impressions for data which either confirm or disconfirm
their hypotheses (Schafer, op cit.; Chapnan, 1978, pp.88-90).
As in the case of extreme intentionalism, a more balanced approach
would showa readiness to accept evidence irrespective of sourcej but,
unlike the extreme version, it would not give priority to direct,
independent statements madeby the author/artist, nor would its first
instinct be to look in that direction. It would not, however, be
averse to using such material if it helps to corroborate, and even in
somecases to initiate, a promising line of enquiry. Amore balanced
approach to intentionalist criticism, such as that advocated by
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Neumeyerin respect of literature, is thus a practical consequenceof
Margolis's repudiation of the internal/external dichotomy of
traditional aesthetics.
In this chapter, certain implications of the concept of intention for
the teaching of literature have been explored with the needs of art
education in mind. However, linking the teaching of literary
criticism with the teaching of art criticism is not without its
problems. Neumeyerstated that the maincharacteristic of literature,
as opposedto other arts, is that the author ' ••• assumesa persona',
which means ' ••• it is often his intention to speak with a voice other
than his daily, identifiable one' (p.357, emphasis in orig.). Does
not this statement and the paucity of art educational discussion of
intention indicate its unsuitability as a standard for interpreting
and evaluating the visual arts? Not necessarily. It is clear that
important differences exist between literature and art which must be
taken into account in any attempt to apply the principles and
procedures of an education in the former to an education in the
latter. Nevertheless, Margolis's critique of theory is made with
reference to the arts generally, despite his emphasis on literary
intention; and Neumeyer'scommentson the literary artist's persona
invite comparisonswith certain aspects of the visual arts in which
the appeal to intention seemsparticularly apt, for example, narrative
art, irony and satire, and art forgeries. It is this researcher's
view, however, that the concept of intention, as examined in this
chapter, can support critical and metacritical enquiry in art
education beyond a limited range of artworks that are comparable in
somesense with literature.
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The chief implication arising from Neumeyer'sdiscussion of the pros
and cons of intentionalist criticism is that the stances he identified
are not merely alternative methods of literary criticism, but are
representative of divergent conceptions of the literary workwhich, in
turn, spring from divergent philosophical positions concerning the
relationship of knowledgeJ languageand perception. The term 'stance'
here does not necessarily imply that all teachers of literature are
ideologically coomitted in one direction or another; nor does the term
'philosophical position' necessarily imply that such individuals have
a well-developed understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of
their practice. Viewedcollectively, the different stances identified
by Neumeyerreveal the problematic relationship of literature and
criticism. His repudiation of extreme forms of intentionalism and
anti-intentionalism invites comparisonwith Margolis's repudiation of
the intrinsic/extrinsic polarization of aesthetic criticism as a
whole. His discussion of moremoderateversions of intentional ism and
anti-intentionalism suggests that defining the nature and limits of
the artwork, literary or otherwise, is an important first step in
seeking to understand the critical stances that underlie critical
interpretations and evaluations in given cases. In brief, the ideas
of Neumeyer and others examined in this chapter strongly iMicate that
the controversy over intention is, potentially, the key focus for
teaching metacriticism in literature (and, by implication, art)
education.
It was earlier posited that literature studies would, through a
process of 'interfield illumination', assist clarification of the link
between content in aesthetics and principles of teaching
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metacriticism, (Chap. 6.2). In the event, the help gained from this
source was found to be limited; for whilst Neumeyer'sseminal study of
competingstances provedhighly relevant to the teaching of individual
approaches to criticism, his discussion of 'pedagogical' implications
was conducted procedurally rather than in terms of instructional
principles relative to broader educational aims. His discussion
implied that 'taking sides' on intentionalism is to be avoided by
teachers; but this begs the question: What basis exists in
educational theory for teaching about the respective values of
different sides of a given controversy? It has been argued in this
chapter that teaching about controversy in aesthetics is synonymous
with teaching metacriticism and is, therefore, decidedly pluralistic.
However, in the light of Beardsley's (op. cit.) statement that
aesthetic theory represents a potential source from which to derive
both content for and methodsof instruction in the arts, there is a
need to clarify what kind of pedagogical pluralism is implied by the
controversy over intention.
6. 5• Sunmary
This comparisonof literature and art education was conducted with a
view not merely to exploring the curricular implications of teaching
critical controversies, such as that pranpted by intention, but also
to discovering principles in literature education for combining
metacritical content with instructional theory. In this connection,
the analysis revealed little attempt on the part of Neumeyer, or other
writers consulted, to convert their understanding of intention at the
level of literary theory into anything more than procedural
coomonsenseat the level of instruction. Although the key theorist
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Neumeyer(see Chap. 6.4) usefully identified various critical stances
associated with intention, his discussion of implications tended to
bypass educational theory; in brief, his pedagogywas practically
rather than theoretically weighted. Whatappeared to be missing was
any attempt to explore the connections between diverse critical
stances and equally diverse stances in the field of education theory.
It was posited in Chapter 6.2 that a pedagogyof criticism dependson
achieving compatibility between particular stances in respect of
aesthetic and instructional theory, whereas a pedagogy of
metacriticism dependson aChievinga rationale for teaching a range of
critical stances. However, the analysis of literature education
theory has focused on pedagogical implications of the controversy over
intention as representative of controversy in aesthetics. In so
doing, it revealed that the teaching of metacriticism requires a
rationale not merely for presenting a range of critical stances to
learners, but for presenting them in such a way that the respective
values of different stances are also madea focus for instruction. In
the absence of a rationale for metacriticism in Fnglish literature
education, the following chapter will explore the pedagogical basis in
general education theory for teaching a range of controversial issues.
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CHAPTER 7
CONIROVERSY IN GENERAL EDUCATION THEDRY
7.1 Introduction
'Ibe analysis of aesthetic theory and literature education theory
reported in the previous chapter constituted an attempt to explore
pedagogical implications of the different ontological viewpoints
underlying aesthetic controversy. 'Ibis focused on a prime exampleof
such controversy, namely, the issue of artistic intention.
Earlier analyses of aesthetics in relation to general philosophy
(Chaps. 4 & 5) had revealed that controversies relevant to
metacriticism are essentially concerned with the ontological problem
of demarcating the boundaries of artworks and distinguishing internal
from external evidence. A range of poSitions boundedby the extremes
of reductionism and relativism (Chap. 4) was found to characterize
general philosophy and aesthetics and to imply certain methodological
stances for art criticism over issues such as the link between
description and interpretation (Chap. 5)• Artistic intention was
chosen as an exploratory focus (Chap. 6) because in the opinion of
prominent aestheticians (e.g. Hospers, 1975, p.42) it is a fundamental
issue representative of disputes elsewhere in aesthetics and in
philosophy as a whole. Also, a precedent was found for teaching about
intention in an established field of pedagogy, namely, English
literature. 'Ibe expectation was that the principles and procedures of
intentionalist criticism would help to inform the current research
173
effort to formulate a pedagogy of metacriticism in art education.
Subsequent investigation revealed that methodological stances in
aesthetic criticism (Chap. 6) are reflected in divergent approaches to
literary intention. Nevertheless, literature education sources
provided little help regarding the development of a general strategy
for critically comparing and contrasting divergent approaches in the
classroom.
'!be enquiry into intention reported in Chapter 6 was an attempt to
discover a basis for co-ordinating aesthetic theory and (art)
education theory. '!be co-ordination of aesthetic and pedagogical
concerns also characterizes the enquiry on which the present chapter
is based, but with an important difference. Whereas in the previous
chapter a particular controversy was examined with reference to a
particular field of pedagogy, the present enquiry focuses on the
concept of 'controversy' as it applies to the content of teaching
across the curriculum. It is thus assumed that, from an art education
standpoint, pedagogical principles associated with teaching
controversial issues per se are of direct relevance to teaching about
controversy in the field of aesthetics.
'!be present enquiry has three main concerns. First, an attempt is
made to explore further the pedagogical potential of aesthetic
controversy by comparing insights gained from the study of art and
literature education theory reported in Chapters 3 and 6 with recent
texts in which the teaching of controversy is a primary focus of
instruction, namely, in humanities and social studies education. The
textual materials consulted are mainly journal articles and include
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two influential anthologies on controversial issues across the
curriculum (Stradling, Noctor & Baines, 1984; Wellington, 1986).
Second, the enquiry aims to ascertain what is involved when teachers
translate discipline-based knowledge into pedagogical content and
methods. To this end, books and articles on the epistemological
foundatdons of the curriculum are consulted. 'lhl.rd,an attempt is
made to synthesize insights drawn from this and previous analyses in
order to define a 'pedagogy of metacriticism', not only in terms of an
alignment of aesthetic content and instructional methods, but also
with reference to the role and character of the teacher.
7.2 Distinction between Subject-based and Community-based Controversy
The previous analyses of art education and literature education theory
located only one study (Efland, 1979) which had sought to establish a
range of alignments between separate fields of theory (in this case,
psychology). Efland aligned Abrams's four categories of aesthetic
criticism (see Chap. 6.3.3) with four orientations in psychological
theory (Behaviourist, Cognitive, Psychoanalytic, Gestalt) and linked
these pairings with four 'conceptions of teaching in the arts'. His
study demonstrates that methodological consistency can be achieved
across fields of theory and through into practice; indeed it supplies,
lmWittingly, an example of what it might mean to implement Beardsley's
notion of 'interfield illumination' (see Chap. 6.2).
At the beginning of this enquiry into general educational theory, it
is proposed that an aligment of stances on both intentionalist
criticism and art instruction would ensure the basis for a consistent
pedagogy of criticism. However, the achievement of a consistent
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pedagogy of meta-criticism depends on an extra dimension of
theorizing: namely, the alignment of (some fonn of) critical pluralism
with a compatible theory of education. The analyses of intention by
Neumeyer and other literature education theorists reported in the
previous chapter stopped short of providing the basis for a pedagogy
of metacriticism, precisely because they did not conceive of the
possibility that the controversy over intention (not just the
alternative stances for and against intentionalist critiCism) could
constitute a focus for instruction. This is not a matter of
'splitting hairs': a justification is required for teaching about the
radical alternatives of criticism. To neglect this is to risk a
charge of incoherence.
Given the apparent lack of material on intention as a focus for
controversy, the decision was taken that an attempt should be made to
extrapolate pedagogical implications from an analysis of the teaching
of controversial issues found in general curriculum theorizing.
Education theorists who have explored the curricular implications of
controversial material were found to distinguish between, on the one
hand, controversy that is grounded in the distinctive subject matter
and enquiry methods of particular diSCiplines, and, on the other,
controversy connected with matters of widespread public concern (e.g.,
Stenhouse, 1970; Stradling, 1984a, 1984b: Bridges, 1986). The
distinction is between 'subject-based' and 'broader conmunity-based'
controversy, respectively. According to Stradling:
Virtually all school subjects and disciplines have their
controversial issues and unresolved questions but, by and large,
these are academic disputes which do not pose serious problems
for the specialist teacher. The controversies which do tend to
be problematic are those issues on which our SOCiety is clearly
divided and significant groups within society advocate
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conflicting explanations or solutions based on alternative
values. (1984a, p.3, emphases added)
'Broader community-based' controversy is characteristically located in
the public domain; it is emotionally charged and politically
sensitive. Typical examples in this category are the nine 'themes'
originally chosen for Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project: war,
education, the family, relations between the sexes, people and work,
poverty, living in cities, law and order, and race relations
(Stenhouse, 1970). On the other hand, 'subject-based' controversy is
low-key, specialized, and socially restricted; according to Stenhouse,
issues falling in this category, especially those connected with 'the
arts' have, as their chief characteristic, that they '... do not
arouse (sic) the citizenry' (ibid., p.114). '!be controversy over
intention appears to belong to the last named category: but not only
has it failed to arouse the Citizenry, it has also made little impact
on professional fields pertaining to the arts, notably art education
theory.
'llrl.sdistinction is central to the present enquiry as a whole, not
only in view of this researcher's stated aim that it '••• will adopt
a subject-centred approach to curriculum development' (Research
Proposal, 1984, p.2), but, IOOreespecially, because it raises salient
questions concerning the epistemological foundations of the curriculum
in general. '!besubject matter of ccmmmity-based controversy appears
to be readily assimdlated into the knowledge bases of diSCiplines or
branches of disciplines as diverse as sociology, medical ethics, peace
studies, politiCS, anthropology, etc., which, in particular, renders
the demarcation of 'subjects' problematic. On the other hand, if the
177
distinction between 'subject-based' and 'broader community-based'
controversy has validity, does this imply a corresponding distinction
in pedagogical approaches or can strategies for teaching the one kind
of controversy be equally applied to the other? Such considerations
are important because writers in this area, including those cited
above, typically make the distinction between 'subject-based' and
'broader community-based'controversy in order to focus more clearly
on the latter.
The prima facie assumption that the controversy over intention is
'subject-based' (i.e., primarily an academic dispute) is open to
challenge. First, this assumption can be identified with the
'empiricist tradition of aesthetics' which Margolis (l98Ob, p.4)
systematically sought to repudiate in Art and Philosophy. It may
prove helpful to recall that Margolis's main aim in that work, of
whichhis analysis of artistic intention formeda central part, was to
develop '... a genuinely comprehensivetheory about the conceptual
relationships holding between physical nature, organismic life, and
cultural development' (ibid., p.3). Over against empiricism and
fotmdationalism in aesthetics (and in general philosophy) Margolis
insisted that artworks are 'culturally emergent entities' which ' •••
possess attributes essential to ontic analysis and aesthetic
appreciation that are themselves not perceptually accessible' (ibid.,
p.4). Accordingly, if Margolis's thesis concerning the ontological
status of artworks is accepted, it becomesnecessary to re-define the
epistemological status of aesthetics; for if determining the
boundaries of artworks is to be viewed as problematic, then marking
off the 'subject' art (criticism) fran its broader cultural context
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must be viewed as equally problematic. Hence, from an art education
standpoint, it is inappropriate to accept too readily an attenuated
conception of aesthetics which the term 'subject-based' might seemto
imply.
Second, as an elaboration of the above point, the assumption that the
controversy over intention is 'subject-based' contains the latent
misconception that aesthetic theory, as it relates to art criticism,
is a distinct discourse removed from moral, social, or political
values. The issue is not whether such values are contained in the
subject matter of art - in the case of many artworks they indubitably
are - rather, it has to do with whether or not aesthetic theory is
conducive to the development of a metacritical attitude toward the
legitimating structures, intellectual and institutional, of art and
criticism. (It is axiomatic that metacriticism involves exploration
of the links between the moral, social, or political values of art and
those of the wider cOl1llllDl.:ity.)'nle distinction between 'subject-
based' and 'coomunity-based' controversy carmot., therefore, be drawn
too firmly without, at the same time, making concessions to the
insularity and subject-centredness of a particular conception of the
(art) curriculum which is daninant on both sides of the Atlantic,
namely, teclmocratic rationality' (cf., for example, Giroux, 1981,
pp.9-11; Wellington, 1986; Beyer & Zeichner, 1987, p.314f.; Hamblen,
1
1987, pp.68-69).
In brief, the dividing line between 'subject-based' and 'cOlJlllUl'1ity-
based' controversy is not easy to define with any certainty; indeed,
the distinction itself, valid and useful though it might be up to a
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point, is not a fixed entity but partly reflects the current state of
pedagogical lmowledge which is neither static nor continuous in all
aspects of content and procedure with the grounding disciplines
themselves. The nature of 'subjects' in the curricula of schools and
other educational establishments owes as much to the history of their
developnent as to their supposedly inherent formal structure. As
Popkewitz (1987) observed:
What is taught as science, social studies, art or literature in
schooling has a greater relation to the particular history and
culture of schooling than to the practices of the disciplines
from which the subject matter is drawn. (p.344).
This observation underlines the importance for the present enquiry of
questioning the subject-/commun1ty-based distinction. Given the
interpenetration of scholarship, pedagogy and culture, it is essential
that the analysis of particular controversies, whatever their
provenance, should take place in recognition of the fact that academic
lmowledge in general is susceptible of controversy.
7.3 The 'Subject' and 'Pedagogical' Perspectives of Teachers
A detailed exposition of aesthetic controversy, such as that
concerning the issue of intention, carmot of itself determine what
should take place in the classroom. Implications for practice do not
automatically follow fran merely describing (clarifying) either an
empirical situation or an area of theoretical concern. 'lbevalues of
the researcher and consuners of research (usually teachers) must
coincide if the transfer of theoretical materials from the realm of
aesthetics to that of education is to take place. Talk of
implications is pointless unless the researcher's values are made
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explicit and, especially in a piece of theoretical research,
vigorously defended.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which the structure of
lmowledgecontent can be said to determinatively shape or influence
the way it is taught. According to Schwab(1964, pp.24-30), the
organization of lmowledge into school subjects may easily mask or
,play down' the conflicts, past and present, of the parent
disciplines. A 'tidied-up' version of an area of knowledgemakes for
easier school consumption; alternatively, in Schwab's view, a
curriculum which presents the '... revisionary character of lmowledge'
to learners through examining its 'inconsistencies and disparities,'
may prove less easy to teaCh, but will be a truer reflection of the
, ••• substantive structures of the disciplines.' AnalysiS of the
determinative function of knowledgecontent raises an issue central to
the sociology of knowledgewithin the sociology of education, namely,
that of gauging the extent to which knowledgein the curriculum is a
means of political control that 'reproduces' social reality and
perpetuates the supposed inequalities of capitalism. This
'functionalist' (Marxist) view of knowledgehas been widely challenged
Oalltty, 1985, pp.14-15) on grounds similar to those outlined above in
respect of extreme epistemological relativism (see Chap. 4.4.2). For
present purposes, it is important to consider carefully what is
implied by the claim that lmowledgehas a determinative function,
because, although this researcher rejects the crude social determinism
of some elements of Marxist theory, a case has already been made in
the context of art history (see Chap. 3.2) for regarding certain
aspects of knowledgeto be imbuedwith the values of dominant interest
181
groups. Hence it is important to recognize, as Whitty (ibid.) does,
that there are grounds for viewing the relativization of knowledge as
a procedural device for subverting our taken-for-granted
assumptions about the seemingly absolute status' of school knowledge,
without at the same time committing oneself to extreme relativism as
an epistemological position. With this caution in mind, some texts
belonging to the more radical wing of the sociology of knowledge will
be referred to in this section alongside other sources.
In seeking to take account of the values that shape the development of
curriculum knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between values
inherent in the institutional structures of the parent discipline and
those of individual teachers, albeit formed as a result of discipline-
based background and training. The values of teachers are held in
respect of some 'thing' that is deemed by them to be worth the
attention of learners. The content of a subject is not inert and
value-free, but, in the process of negotiation or mediation by the
teacher, is imbued with his/her values and interests (although
teachers' views on subject content are but one element of curriculum
change). In this sense, content may be legitimately classed as a
determinative function of classroom procedures. However, this
determinative flmction is partial because classroom knowledge
invariably reflects the teacher's perspectives on subject content and
2pedagogy. According to the radical sociologist Esland:
The knowledge components which form pedagogy have a different
intellectual heritage from the epistemologies which fom and
sustain 'subjects' and their realization has taken place within
different social milieux. (1971, p.84)
One of the great difficulties which is likely to arise in any
research into pedagogical and subject perspectives is to
phenomenologically reduce to separate analytical categories what
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is, for teachers, a total, taken for granted classroom praxis
••• If pedagogical assumptions control the intentionality about
how particular knowledge should be arranged, the subject
perspective will contain the rationales for whr certain
knowledge should be taught. (ibid., p.98, emphases n orig.)
The importance of differentiating these two perspectives applies not
only to the researcher who investigates classroom settings or the
social organization of school communities; it should also underscore
the efforts of those who engage in curriculum innovation and
implementation, whether as teacher or teacher-researcher. As Skilbeck
and Harris (1976) pointed out:
When analysing - and constructing - curricula it is as important
to understand how the totality of school experience contributes
to the curriculmn as to grasp the significance of particular
items and sequences of content. (p.42)
Hence, in a piece of theoretical research such as the present one, it
is vital to recognize that outcomes, however clearly stated from the
subject perspective, will inevitably undergo a process of
'transaction', 'negotiation', even 'reconstitution' (Es1and, OPe cit.)
in the classroom and wider cultural context of the school or college.
Nevertheless, a question remains as to the extent to which content
clarified from the 'subject' perspective determines pedagogical method
irrespective of extraneous influences (accepting the above qualified
sense of 'determine'). In this researcher's opinion, Esland makes too
sharp a distinction between the 'how' of the pedagogical perspective
and the 'why' of the subject perspective. If Bruner's view that
subjects represent 'structures of knowledge ~ inquiry' is accepted
(Ski1beck and Harris, Ope cit., p.73, emphasis added), then the
curriculum researcher's understanding of 'how particular knowledge
should be arranged' (Es1and, Ope cit.) will be drawn as much from the
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subject as the pedagogical perspective. Indeed, in the case of
content as potentially demandingas, for example, the controversy over
intention, the 'subject' (aesthetics) is undoubtedly the major
perspective on the structure and sequencing of curriculum materials
(Smith & Smith, 1981). Clear statements on 'method' are dependent,
however, on the level of specificity attached to it; that is, on
whether methods are framed at the level of 'principles' for guiding
teachers in their thinking about critical exploration in the classroom
or whether such principles are translated into 'procedures' or even
prescriptions for teaching/learning, in which case the polymorphous
character of classroom interaction would render the consideration of
factors such as social background, interests and readiness of
learners, morepressing (cf. Chap. 6.2).
Skilbeck and Harris (op. ctt ,; p.57) have suggested that, in teaching
advanced students, the subject perspective far outweighs the
pedagogical perspective, whereas for begiming and intermediate levels
of schooling, pedagogical considerations are of greater relevance.
The implication is that as a school subject becomesmore specialized,
learning methods showprogressively more resemblance to the erquiry
methods of the parent discipline. The research student in, for
example, the history of art will have internalized the cOlllllitmentsand
thinking capacities of the professional art historian. In a very real
sense he or she .!! a fully institutionalized, if not yet fully
professionalized, art historian.
If, though, controversy in aesthetics is an advanced area of content
(indeed, this claim has been madein the present enquiry with respect
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to discipline-based controversy as such), and if advancedlearners are
on a par, academically, with professional scholars, then whybother
with pedagogical considerations? Are there not grounds here for
accepting Beardsley's view that it is necessary only to clarify
subject material in order for it to be directly transferable to
instruction (see Chap. 6.2)? However, to maintain that advanced
knowledgeis the sole preserve of the advancedlearner is to obscure
the fact that a mature student's abilities are the culmination of many
years of schooling, during which the structures of advancedlmowledge
and related mOdesof enquiry are progressively anticipated. As
Passmore (1967, esp. p.429) insisted, skills of critical thinking
focused on controversial material should be taught early in the school
careers of all children and not be restricted to courses in higher
education. Ecker (1973), too, has demonstrated that artistically
unsophisticated children are capable of incipient metacritical
reasoning.
It is likely that the teacher's pedagogical perspective exerts less
influence on his or her decisions about the '. •• scope, balance,
sequence and interrelatedness of subject matter' (Skilbeck & Harris,
OPe ctt ,; p.57) for advanced learners, because problems linked to
factors like the motivation and intellectual develOpDentof pupils
tend to recede as specialization increases. Nevertheless, research
into the curricular implications of advancedmaterial camet ignore
the pedagogical significance of the stages that lead to it. ~reover,
the teacher's pedagogical perspective does not cease to be relevant
because he or she is teaching advancedlearners.
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A consideration of the interconnectedness of the subject and
pedagogical perspectives of all teachers will serve to introduce an
important area of discussion, which ls that a shift in teachers' views
about the theoretical basis of their subject can be an ~rtant first
step towards a revision of their pedagogical perspective. It is
implied by the present enquiry's emphasis on discipline-based,
controversial material that this is a one-wayprocess in which the
impetus for changecomesfrom the teacher's developing appreciation of
the nature of subject content. On the contrary, an individual may,
through working as a teacher , experience changes in epistemological
viewpoint that have repercussions for his or her subject perspective.
Hence, the idea of a one-way process from subject to pedagogy is
misleading.
'lbe role of the teacher in either perpetuating or challenging existing
structures of knowledgein relation to society is the central themeof
recent studies on the application of critical theory to education
(Schon, 1982; Giroux, OPecit.; Adler & Goodman, 1986; Beyer, 1986;
Carr & Kenmis, 1986; Gibson, 1986; Beyer & Zeichner, OPe cit. ;
Popkewitz, Opecit.). It is a matter of conjecture whythese studies
concentrate on the teacher and pay relatively little attention to the
learner. Probably this is due to the radical political ambience of
critical theory which encourages the view that attitudinal change in
teachers is a necessary condition of developing an intellectual
climate conducive to socio-political change. Moreover, it is self-
evident that the 'top-down' assumptionsof discipline-based curriculum
construction will ensure that moreemphasis is placed on instructional
than learning theory. nus claim is relevant to the present research.
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Given its central preoccupation with discipline-based content and its
emphasis on developing principles rather than procedures of
metacriticism (see Chap. 6.2), learning theory is not directly
examined. Nevertheless, beyond the scope of this enquiry, which aims
to align aesthetic and instructional theory, there is a need to define
'instruction' in terms of the tasks which both teacher and learners
are expected to perform in respect of the same pedagogical content.
In the light of comments on the relationship between teachers' subject
and pedagogical perspectives three positions can be identified.
First, there are teachers whose views of subject and pedagogy are
consistent with the 'psychometric model' and its empiricist
preconceptions (Esland, Ope cit.). Examples in the arts would be
teachers of literature operating within a Leavisite 'moral/humanistic'
view of English studies (Weldhen, 1986; Eaton, 1984), and teachers of
the history of art who '••• accept the traditional definitions of the
discipline', including notions of the artist as 'individual genius'
and ' ••• art as an autonomous self-propelling force isolated from the
cultural context' (Garb, 1984). Second, there are teachers whose
views on subject and pedagogy are, temporarily at least, in a state of
unresolved tension because changes in the definition of their subject
outside the realm of education have led them to question the adequacy
and appropriateness of their teaching. Note, for example, the
complaints of some English literature and history of art educators
that 'A' Level examination syllabuses for their respective subjects
have not kept pace with the important theoretical developnents of
recent professional scholarship (ibid.; Weldhen, OPe cit.; Eaton, OPe
cit.; Wilce, 1984; Gormally & Nurm, 1986). Third, there are those
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teachers whohave progressed beyondthe irresolution and inconsistency
(of practice, at least) of the preceding category. For such, teaching
methods and choice of subject material are grounded in the
presuppositions of the 'epistemological model' (Esland, OPe cit.),
which, in the case of literature and history of art educators, would
imply a constant readiness to adapt their pedagogical strategies to
take account of changes occurring in the definitions of their
respective disciplines (e.g., Eaton, OPe cit.; Dyson, 1989).
7.4 TeachingAboutFundamentalControversies
It is posited that the achievement of a consistent pedagogy of
metacriticism depends on the alignment of (some form of) critical
pluralism with a compatible theory of instruction. It remains to seek
an alignment of theoretical positions, but in a manner which
incorporates the insights that have arisen thus far in respect of
general education theory. First, it will be helpful to review and
reflect on key points that have emergedduring the enquiry as a whole.
At the start of the research it was assumedthat metacriticism might
be taught in two ways: either to influence learners ultimately to
favour one position on a controversial issue or to encourage
impartiality and tolerance of different positions. It was anticipated
that these two 'ccmnonsense' alternatives would be extended through
analyzing the controversy over intention in relation to controversy in
aesthetics am by consulting art and literature education texts on
teaching controversial issues (including intention). An analysis of
Margolis' Art and Philosophy in Chapter 5 revealed that controversy in
aesthetics involves complexepistemological and ontological disputes
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concerning the relationship of art and criticism. The controversy
over intention was found to be representative of the contestability of
criticism and was deemed, therefore, to be an apt focus for developing
a more sophisticated pedagogy of metacriticism than the 'commonsense'
alternatives outlined above.
Nevertheless, consulting educational texts on teaching about the
concept of intention in art and literature provided scant theoretical
assistance with which to achieve a pedagogy of metacriticism. Art and
English education theorists appeared to have made little attempt to
combine their understanding of intention with a compatible theory of
instruction. Nor had any attempted to discuss the pedagogical
implications of the controversy over intention, as opposed to
different stances on intentionalist criticism. This constituted a
problem. On the one hand, the investigation of literature education
sources demonstrated an inseparable link between ontology and critical
method, the 'what' and 'how' of criticism in the classroom (Chap.
6.3.2). On the other hand, establishing a link between the 'what' of
critical pluralism and the 'how' of approaches to teaching it did not
appear so amenable to demonstration.
It is proposed that teaching about fundamental controversies, such as
the contested concept of intention, is bound to raise 'why' issues in
relation to the 'what' (content) and 'how' (methods) of instruction.
Such controversies, if seriously presented as curriculum foci, would
problematize taken-for-granted knowledge and thereby expose learners
to the experience of intellectual uncertainties. ~reover , the
'structure' of fundamental controversies 'determines' not only that
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currfculua content be maderepresentatively problematic, but also that
such controversies should be taught at appropriate levels of
instruction.
The association of 'fundamental controversy' and 'structure' appears
paradoxical: the former conveys the sense of unresolvable tension,
whereas the latter usually denotes order and durability, even
permanence. It is claimed elsewhere, however, that the discipline of
aesthetics is a dynamicstructure which is typically revealed by its
controversial aspects (Chap. 5). The validity of that claim is lent
support by Eisner's (1989) discussion of the rationale for Discipline-
based Art Education (DBAE)in the U.S.A., in which he stated that
'structure' does not necessarily imply an acceptance of
'rationalistic' or 'elitist' assumptions about the subject 'art';
instead, it might, with morejustification, be thought of as a dynamic
concept which reflected the pluralistic and revisionary character of
such knowledge. This idea of knowledgeas a dynamicstructure dispels
the sense of paradox: dynamismis neither a state of inertia nor a
state of flux. For, on the one hand, critical practice exhibits a
large degree of continuity, which accounts for the considerable
agreement aroong critical judgements; but, on the other, the
intractability of controversies in the field of criticism sets limits
to our expectations about critical objectivity.
The dynamisminherent in the structure of a discipline will be brought
most fully to light through teaching the controversial aspects of that
discipline; however, this raises the question of deciding on a
strategy that will best represent the interplay of objectivity and
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relativism which the concept of 'structure' has been said to imply?
This question encapsulates the problem of aligning aesthetic theory
and instructional theory, which, whenit was first raised (Chap. 6.2),
was considered a problem of synthesizing aesthetic concepts and
instructional methods through consulting the writings of educational
theorists. It was seen to be theory-oriented. As the enquiry
progressed, however, it became clear that a shift of emphasis was
needed to take account of the role of the teacher as mediator of
knowledge. Recognition of the importance of this role ruled out the
notion that metacritical strategies can be formulated at a level of
abstraction removed from considerations of teacher conmitment. In
brief, it is necessary to describe the pedagogical implications of
aesthetic controversy in terms not merely of theoretical principles to
be applied to the realm of teaching, but of the kind of individual
teacher whowould embodythese principles. This represents a shift
from an exclusive concern with pedagogyto a growing awareness of the
character and role of the pedagogue.
The conclusion is reached that the structure of fundamental
controversy, such as that promptedby intention, does not merely raise
implications for the sequence and organization of curriculum
materials, but also implies a teaching stance which has moral, social
and political consequences. Though this conclusion may seem
overstated when one considers the arcane realms of aesthetic
controversy, it is sustainable by analogy with the teaching of
,cOlll'DUIlity-based' controversy. The analogy depends on the validity of
arguments already put forward by this researcher to propose (i) that
so-called 'community-based' and 'discipline-based' controversy are no
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different in principle, and (Lf.) that teachers of ftmdamental
controversy, of whatever provenance, must try to makesense, through
their teaching, of the plurality of views regarding the nature of
reality that exist both within and across the 'disciplines'.
7.5 Pedagogical Role Models
The particular role and character of the teacher implied by the
teaching of controversy has been designated most often in educational
writings by the term 'neutrality' (Stenhouse, 1970; Elliott, 1974;
Hulmes, 1979; Dearden, 1981; Stradling, 1984a, 1984b; Kelly, 1986;
Bridges, 1986; Rudduck, 1986). 'Neutrality' appears, though, an
inadequate term with which to characterize an individual who is
committed to probing and questioning the epistemological foundations
of his or her own 'subject'. However,a numberof these writers have
made the point that being conmitted to non-cOlllJlitment, i.e.,
neutrality, is not contradictory: for example, Hulmes (op, cit.,
pp.9,21), has written of the teacher 'cOlllJlitted ••• to neutrality',
whoseeks to '... proselytize on behalf of his own scepticism'. This
kind of neutrality is often associated with a relativistic acceptance
of conflicting positions on the view that objectivity is largely
unattainable, for example in the case of extreme anti-intentionalism
(Chap. 6.4.2).
A more typical usage of 'neutrality' in relation to teaching
controversy is to denote strategies in which the teacher introduces
controversial topics to learners whilst assuming an attitude of
detachment: an approach referred to in educational writings by the key
term 'procedural neutrality' (e.g., Stenhouse, OPe cit.; Stradling,
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OPe cit.; Rudduck, OPe cit.). An important characteristic of the
approach is that it is agreed upon beforehand by both teacher and
learners in the hope that it will enable the latter to express their
views on a topic unhindered by the aura of authority normally
associated with the teacher's role. Its chief advantage is said to be
that it '.•• forces students to rely more on their own critical
intelligence' (Kelly, OPe cit., p.l26), although doubts have been
voiced about its overall effectiveness on the grounds that the self-
imposed 'silence' of teachers who follow this approach is impossible
to sustain in situations where classroom debate becomes vociferous,
unbalanced, or tangential (Dearden, Ope cit., p.42). In situations
such as these, the role of neutralist is rendered unworkable and
teachers are placed in the awkward and ambivalent position of having
to switch roles in mid-stream in order to maintain their credibility.
Alternatively, 'procedural neutrality' may become unworkable in
situations where learners are unable to overcome their view of
individual teachers as authority figures, despite the best efforts of
the latter to relinquish this role (ibid.). The ambivalence of the
teacher's position is also made apparent by having both to 'feed'
leamers with factual information, whilst at the same time chairing
the ensuing debate.
'Procedural neutrality' is, therefore, provisional and limited in its
application. lhe claim that it can help to wean leamers from their
institutionalized dependence on teachers' opinions (Bridges, OPe cit.,
p.31f.) also implies that its effectiveness will diminish in inverse
proportion to the development of the ••• autonomous critical
intelligence of learners' (Kelly, OPe cit., p.129). In recognition of
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the provisional character of 'procedural neutrality' Dearden (op.
cit., p.42) insisted that it was ' ••• a technique, not a principle',
by which he meant that, whilst it could be usefully adopted as a
teaching style, it could just as readily be set aside if a situation
demandedit. By contrast, the teaching of fundamentalcontroversies
requires a more adequate basis of role-modelling than that of 'mere'
technique. It implies an individual teacher who, acting as a model
for learners to emulate, showsa critical awarenessof the theoretical
positions underlying disputes in his or her discipline and an
alertness to the parallels betweenthese and related disputes in other
fields of knowledge.
The notion of 'neutrality' is undoubtedly linked to the teaching of
controversy. nte key question, as far as this enquiry is concerned,
is what kind of neutrality will bear the full weight of implications
arising from the foregoing analysis of controversy in aesthetics?
Bridges (op, cit., p.3l) has argued that beyond 'procedural
neutrality', in which the teacher of controversy '... withholds
support from any point of view', is an approach, namely, 'affirmative
neutrality', which ' ••• supports alternative points of view equally',
but in a mannerwhich, whilst avoiding the feigned detachment typical
of 'procedural neutrality' (considering it inappropriate to the
material under discussion), nevertheless stops short of the urgency
and inventive partisanship of the teacher who favours a single
position. '!be individual who adopts a stance of 'affirmative
neutrality' is truly 'double minded' in the sense described by Elliott
(1974), that is, a 'lover of truth' whoseeks
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••• to identify now with one of the contesting points of view,
now with the other, resolving that neither (sic) shall be sold
short on any matter. (p.147).
This kind of teacher manifests commitment, but it is directed to the
merits of alternative positions in a way which preserves their unique
contributions and strenuously resists, by means of argument and
counter-argument, the adversative tendency which each position reveals
towards its rivals. The teacher who is thus 'involved on both sides'
of a dispute acts on the belief that, because fundamental
controversies contain 'insoluble problems', the triumph of one
position over another would be a too easy victory and hence a denial
of truth (ibid.). Elliott's discussion suggests that pedagogical
practice should not be concerned merely with 'enquiry', that is, the
pursuit of objective knowledge, but it should also concern itself with
fostering a 'contemplative attitude', in which learners might come to
'realize' something of the import and mystery of the world through a
personal encounter with the objects of study.
Kelly (op, cit., p.130f.) put forward a similar idea to that of
Bridges and Elliott with his term 'committed impartiality', which he
described as combining teacher disclosure on a point of controversy
with an active presentation of all available viewpoints. He
categorically denied that teacher disclosure is inimical to an
impartial search for truth on the grourxls that personally stated
convictions do not of necessity 'preclude rational analysis' (emotion
and reason should not be viewed as a simple dualism) and that teachers
have at their disposal a number of 'corrective strategies' to
counteract any manipulative effects which the statement of their
convictions might cause. He also maintained that the disclosure of
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the teacher's viewpoint early on in a classroom discussion would
enable learners to detect and thus make allowance for unintentional
bias in the teacher's presentation.
The teacher of controversy described by the above writers would
attempt to create a climate of discussion in the classroom to enable
issues to be tackled realistically, although he or she would also be
aware that the paths of enquiry are well trodden and that the
possibility of pushing back the frontiers of knowledge, nruch less
achieving significant steps toward a resolution of the controversy, is
exceedingly remote. The pursuit of truth in the context of classroom
knowledge means no more (or less) than comparing and contrasting the
respective merits of alternative positions on a specific issue through
examining arguments advanced by their proponents. In so doing,
teacher and learners would poatt.ton themselves at the frontier of
knowledge and at least contemplate, if they do not penetrate, the
territory beyond.
'lbe combination of 'conmitment' and 'impartiality' advocated by the
above writers is paradoxical, but not necessarily contradictory
(Kelly, OPe cit., p.l30). It only becomes so when ' ••• to support
alternative views equally' (Bridges, OPe cit., emphasis added) implies
an indiscriminate toleration of opposing positions, irrespective of
merit, and an avoidance of value judgements. In their separate ways,
Bridges, Elliott, and Kelly expressed their dissatisfaction with the
term 'neutrality' on the grounds that the attitude of non-involvement
which it conveys is inappropriate as a model for teaching material
that has been forged in an atmosphere of cOlllDitment. Bridges, in
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particular, distinguished between neutrality, which he said implied
indiscriminateness, and impartiality, which he defined in terms of a
rationality and critical objectivity that grants 'differential
support' to the range of available opinions (op. cit., p.31). Hence,
to grant equal support to alternative views in one's teaching in the
qualified sense allowed by Bridges need not necessarily entail an
acceptance of all views as equally valid. The structure of
fundamental controversy implies a genuine contest between well-matched
protagonists, which suggests that all views should be treated as
serious contenders in the pursuit of truth, whilst leaving open the
question as to whether one view might not, in some aspects at least,
afford greater explanatory power than its rivals.
There is, however, a problem inherent in this claim, which is
highlighted by Stradling's (1984a, p.2) assertion that controversies
arise when 'significant groups ••• advocate conflicting explanations
or solutions based on alternative values', and by Dearden's (op. cit.,
p.38) 'epistemic criterion of the controversial': namely, that '••• a
matter is controversial if contrary views can be held on it without
those views being contrary to reason'. If the teacher of
controversial material is to apply 'differential' support (that is,
judge between alternative views) then it needs to be clarified
precisely what criteria of evaluation are generally applicable. The
implication of Stradling's and Dearden's conroentsis that these can be
formulated only up to a point (examples of such criteria in action
might be the assessment of the internal consistency of arguments and
the testing of empirical claims in the light of observation); beyond
this, 'controversiality' is at its most intractable and represents the
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point of conflict between 'whole frameworks of understanding'
(Dearden, OPe cit.) each with its ownvalue system.
'nle notion of 'differential support' suggests that the teaching of
controversy ought to be evaluative as well as descriptive. Learners
should not merely be allowed to sit on the sidelines and observe, but
encouraged to engage in the pursuit of truth which lies at the heart
of the controversy under discussion 0 'nle issue of whether to support
equally all sides of a controversy in one's teaching, or to grant
'differential support', seems to imply a difference of emphasis
between a neutrally descriptive approach and one that combines
description with evaluation. Thepedagogical implications are brought
out most fully in educational writings on the teaching of comparative
religion. HUlmes(op. cit.), for example, has written of the dilemma
faced by religious education specialists who, when attempting to
'teach about' world religions (that is, in a neutrally descriptive
marmer), find themselves failing to do justice in each case to a
viewpoint which
.0. lays clatm to the wholeperson and at the sametime refuses
to be classified as just one of manypossible waysof apprehend-
ing reality. (po17).
The essence of a descriptive approach, according to Cox(1983), is
.00 that you (sic) look at religions as an external observer,
try to understand what they mean to the believer, but do not
raise the question of whether he is wise to believe, or whether
his belief corresponds to truth. (p.26)
These COlJlDeIltsuggest that teaching comparative religion poses
similar pedagogical problems to those encountered in teaching
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controversial issues elsewhere in the curriculum. They indicate that
the nature of religious belief demands commitment on the part of
adherents and, therefore, requires a corresponding atmosphere of
commitment in the classroom to do it justice. Such teaching should
also reflect religious divergence, but not at the expense of
religion's central characteristic, the pursuit or promulgation of
ultimate truth. The coaments further confirm Bridges's insistence
that the nature of fundamental controversy, whether in religion,
aesthetics, science, or elsewhere in the curriculum, 'requires
differential support' (op. Cit., emphasis added), or support that is
relative (viewpoint by viewpoint) according to specified criteria.
The teacher of controversial material ought, therefore, to be
conmitted to something more than a laudable desire to ensure that
different viewpoints are give a fair hearing. He or she must also be
prepared, at least in principle, to test the validity and theoretical
cogency of those viewpoints, even at the risk of causing offence to
some learners. It is not hard, though, to appreciate why 'grasping
the nettle' of evaluation has been largely avoided by teachers working
in the specially sensitive area of religious education.
An evaluative approach to teaching controversial issues implies that
the teacher should assist learners in identifying criteria by which
the different viewpoints can be assessed; however, the intractability
of fundamental controversy also implies that no single 'JOOnistic'
position, or theoretical 'higher ground', exists with which to
encompass those differences. Hence, there are limits to an evaluative
approach which need to be clearly taken into account, as, for example,
those contained in the American philosopher Pepper's (1946, 1970)
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discussion of eclecticism, in which he identified four alternative,
mutually incompatible 'world hypotheses' which function as 'positive
standards of cognition' (1970, p.328), Mechanism, Contextualism,
Organicism, and Formism. He claimed that forming judgements about
artworks in the light of each of the world hypotheses 'in turn' will
give the best chance of achieving the 'fullest wisdom' (1946, Chap.6
emphasis added). Pepper described this 'method' of criticism (and, by
implication, metacriticism) as 'post-rational eclecticism': first,
because it preserves intact the force and integrity of each set of
categories whilst avoiding syncretism (cf. King & Brownell, 1966,
pp.61-62); and second, because it ensures a 'balance of theories'
(Pepper, 1970, p.334). Accordingto Pepper:
Weneed all world hypotheses, so far as they are adeguate, for
mutual comparisonand correction of interpretative bias.
(ibid., p.lO, emphasesadded).
Each 'hypothesis' makes a valuable contribution towards overall
understanding, but none alone can be expected to resolve all
difficulties of interpretation. A 'method' such as 'postrational
eclecticism', or 'alternativity' (de Beaugrande, 1984) is needed in
order to realize the fullest interpretive potential of specific
artworks.
Pepper affirmed that each of the world hypotheses is valid according
to the criterion of 'structural corroboration', which means that the
investigation of phenomenawithin each 'hypothesis' is a self-
certifying process that constitutes or lends shape to reality in so
far as it generates evidence which confirms the cognitive structure
underlying the investigation itself. Observations made in this way
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are referred to by Pepper as 'danda', that is, aspects of perceived
reality that have meaning only within the theoretical matrix of a
particular view of the world. He also affirmed that each of the world
hypotheses is valid according to the more general criterion of
'referential adequacy': this impinges on interpretive activity within
the different 'hypotheses' by requiring that observations accord with
the structure of phenomena existing independently from the
determinative influence of each viewpoint. Observations made in this
way are referred to by Pepper as 'data'. In brief, danda are
characteristic of particular world hypotheses, data are common
currency.
Pepper's distinction between danda and data implies that the validity
of evidence in the former category is wedded ('hypothesis' by
'hypothesis') to a particular view of the world: hence, because it
does not carry the same weight for adherents of alternative
viewpoints, it is unlikely to provide a basis for settling disputes.
Defining the boundaries between these different types of evidence
would thus be a means of enabling the teacher of controversy to
control classroom investigations effectively by making clear to
learners where the field of dispute is open to genuine advancement and
where it is likely to remain forever problematic. By subjecting his
or her own poaf.tdonto prior scrutiny, the teacher is revealed as one
who is not afraid to test the validity of that poSition against the
learners' attempts at critical judgement. The role and character of
the pedagogue thus revealed is not that of 'the one who knows', that
is, a truth-dispenser, but an individual who, by adopting an informed
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but open stance to the problems posed by controversial issues, is a
'truth for students' (Bilkin quoted by Kelly, OPe cit., p.l32).
This distinction in Pepper's writings coincides, in this researcher's
opinion, with that referred to earlier in respect of perceptual theory
(Chap. 6.3.3). In that case, the distinction was between theorists
who emphasize the conventional 'language' of perception gained through
enculturation, and others who emphasize instead the impact of
ecological factors on perceptual processing across cultures. A
similar distinction was also discussed in Chapter 6 with respect to
the perception of artworks. It was shown that the teacher of
controversy in aesthetics needs to be aware of two possible ways of
characterizing artworks: whether to approach them as entities
requiring interpretation in their own terms, that is, as self-
subsistent objects of critical attention, or by reference to broader
standards of cognition in which moral, SOCial, and political factors
are considered. The second of these two approaches would lead to an
evaluation of artworks which neither venerated the supposed intentions
of the artist, nor held back from criticism of the social milieu to
which the artist belonged.
More especially, comparing these conclusions about teaching
controversy in aesthetics with the outcomes of the enquiry in this
chapter strongly suggests that it is the responsibility of art
educators to ensure that questioning 'taken for granted' knowledge 1s
made a central focus of their teaching and thus of the learning
experiences they offer to young people. The consideration of theory
emanating from the critical theorists examined in this chapter also
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indicates that teaching about 'subject-based' controversy, such as
that promptedby intention, would help to dispel the parochialism and
peripheral status which, with some justification, has long
characterized the place of art in the curriculum (Eisner, 1987, p.11).
7.6 S\mnary
In this chapter, the focus of the research enquiry has shifted from
considering the controversy over intention as representative of the
contestability of aesthetics, to considering the teaching of
controversy across the curriculum. This has been conducted in respect
of separate strands of educational theory. First, it was queried
whether the distinction between 'subject-based' and 'cOlllJlUI1ity-based'
controversy is as clear-cut as some writers have indicated. This
questioning was thought necessary because such writers typically
explore the pedagogical implications of 'Community-based'controversy
and avoid discussion of the teaching of 'academic' disputes (e.g.,
intention) • Hence, 8 case was made for the relevance of these
writers' proposals to the teaching of controversy as a whole.
Furthermre, the idea that pedagogical content represents a
coalescence of teachers' perspectives on (i) their own specia1isms,
and (ii) the purposes and processes of education as a whole was
explored. This enquiry has led to the conclusion that 8 pedagogy of
metacriticism, that is, teaching controversy as a specific focus,
cannot simply be defined as an alignment of discipline-based content
with instructional methods, but must also take into account the kind
of individual teacher and learner implied by that content. In brief,
the teaChing of fundamental controversy requires more than proficiency
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in the pedagogue; it also requires a value commitment. Three models
for the teaching of flDldamentalcontroversy have been identified in
educational literature: procedural neutrality; affirmative neutrality,
which grants equal support to the different sides of a controversy;
and an evaluative extension of affirmative neutrality, which grants
differential support to the different sides of a controversy and
involves the paradoxical, but non-contradictory, combination of the
notions 'coomitment' and 'impartiality'. Procedural neutrality was
shown to involve the teacher in a deliberate concealment of the
teacher's position and to result, therefore, in an ambivalencebetween
individual values and teaching style. Affirmative neutrality was
shown to represent a more consistent model for the teaching of
controversy; nevertheless, it fell short of applying evaluative
criteria to the competing positions, at least in those aspects in
which it was not possible to do so, and thus failed to represent fully
the nature of fundamental controversy as the pursuit of truth
according to someset of values. Themost consistent modelwas judged
to be that described variously by educational theorists in terms of
conmitment and impartiality. This model, which involves the teacher
and learners in some degree of evaluation of competing positions,
projects a state of pedagogical equilibrium whichmirrors the dynamic
interplay of oppoSitional forces characteristic of the controversial
aspects of knowledge. The teacher whois thus represented is revealed
to learners as a truth seeker in a realm which resists all attempts at
ultimate resolution (part of the teacher's task being to distinguish
between insoluble problems and those which are amenable to
investigation) • The approach advocated by these writers achieves a
harmonyof individual values and teaching style.
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Thewriting of this chapter has combinedanalysis with a synthesis of
insights that have emerged gradually during the course of the
research. A process of dialectical reasoning, as exemplified by
Margolis's method of analysis, has been followed (see above, Chap.
2.8) and this has led to an identification of issues underlying the
relation of content and methods of criticism. Moreover, it has
enabled the problemof aligning aesthetic and instructional theory to
be addressed more fully, though without the detail needed for the
developmentof curricular proposals, muchless a programmeof study.
The practical eclecticism thought to be implied by the teaching of
metacriticism bas been linked to a theoretical eclecticism in which
subject content, teaching stance and, particularly in the early stages
of schooling, learning development, would be brought into close
harmony. Thus it bas been assuued that practical effectiveness in the
teaching of metacriticism must be groundedin theoretical consistency
touching all aspects of pedagogy.
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CHAPTER 8
PRTICIPLES OF METACRITICISM IN ART EDUCATION
8.1 Introduction
This chapter constitutes an attempt to synthesize arguments that have
arisen during the earlier analyses of separate fields of theory with
regard to teaching controversy in aesthetics. References to
authoritative texts will be kept to a minimum,because in this phase
of the research it is considered necessary that the investigation of
theoretical 'data' in previous chapters should be superseded by an
emphasis on distilled content. This bringing together of different
contextual strands represents a new direction in the writing. Key
issues or ' findings' of the research will be reviewed, not in a
linear, clDDUlativemanner, but by drawing connectiOns between the
various levels of theory and reflecting on their significance for
practice. The aim is to translate findings into principles and
procedures for a pedagogy of metacriticism. In this cormection,
specific classes of artworks will be discussed with a view to
demonstrating ways in which metacritical principles could be applied.
The creation of new perspectives on the content and methods of art
teaching must relate to the original research problemwhich was stated
in Chapter 1.1 and reVised, or rather refined, during the course of
subsequent analysis. In particular, it is essential to showhow the
research findings can be 'used' to ' fill the gap' in art education
theory and practice identified in the analytical review reported in
Chapter 3 (see esp. Chap. 3.6).
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'lbis final chapter has two main emphases. First, a reflection on the
experience of implementing a methodological and dialogical research
strategy with reference to the problem of •cOlJlmJI1ication,' to be
followed by a review of various strands of enquiry leading,
progressively, to a synthesis of findings. Second, an extended
statement on the relevance of the research for art education
incorporating curricular proposals and rec~tioris for practice.
8.2 Reviewof Research Outcomes
In Chapter I it was stated that a major aim of the research was to
span what appeared to be a 'cOlJlllUnication gap' between two
professional realms, namely, the philosophy of art· and the teaching of
art. 'l'he subsequent investigation has been that of a teacher-
researcher in art education seeking to span a gap in his own
understanding of an important aspect of philosophical aesthetics,
namely, controversy over the link between art and criticism. 'llle aim
has been to ·cOlllllU1licateresearch outcomes to other art educators,
particularly those whohave responsibility for teaching connected with
the analytical/critical and historical/cultural domains of art
experience (Allison, 1982)• this' conmunication process' was
considered problematic because it involved a distillation of complex
conceptual material, which, though aiming to render concepts more
accessible to a wider audience, also ran the risk of minimizing their
inherent complexities to the point of misrepresentation (Chap.l. 2) •
Given the need for this researcher to develop his personal
understanding of theory as a prerequisite
a decision was taken early in the study to adopt an emergent research
strategy in which arguments arising from an analysis of different
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kinds of theory wouldbe synthesized to form an eventual statement of
curricular implications.
It is appropriate at this point to recall the kinds of theory analyzed
in the preceding chapters:
art education theory relating to the teaching of a range of
critical methods, i.e., metacriticism;
philosophical theory bearing on conceptual issues underlying
controversy betweendivergent intellectual traditions;
aesthetic theory bearing on controversy over the link between
ontology of art and concomitantmethodsof criticism;
literature education theory regarding
implications of controversy in literary
particular reference to intention;
general education theory regarding the teaching of controversial
issues across the curriculum.
the pedagogical
criticism, with
All five 'analyses' involved a combination of private clarification
and public courmmication. In the early chapters clarification was the
dominant concern; however, an attempt was also made to 'communicate'
through a distillation of concepts: for example, the seven
propositions which sunmarizedChapter 5 (see Appendix III). Hence, it
would be misleading to view the 'analyses' as exclusively hermeneutic
10 content and aims. Nor, for that matter, would it be accurate to
view 'synthesis' as exclusively a 'conmun1cation' procedure.
Analytical and synthetic thinking took place concurrently, especially
in Chapter 7 where the emphasiswas given to comparingand contrasting
different aspects of theory in pursuit of a unified and coherent
pedagogy. nte distinction between private clarification and public
c01llDUI1icationis important because, in this final phase of the
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enquiry, it is necessary to reflect on the changes in thinking that
have taken place over the research period in order to consider what
bearing findings at the private level might have on the public realm
of art education theorizing.
At the start of the enquiry into art education theory reported in
Chapter 3 it seemed tmpossible to anticipate, except in general terms,
the kinds of technical problems likely to arise in cormection with
translating aspects of different kinds of theory (philosophy of art,
literary theory, philosophy of education, etc.) into principles for
art teaching. It was necessary to adopt an approach to investigating
theory which, whilst providing a conceptual framework, would permit
flexibility in regard to the unfolding nature of the research. The
provisional character of the study was tested by three public
'conrnunications'(Rawding, 1987, 1988a, 1988b; cf. appendices IV, V, &
VI) which, coming at roughly the halfway stage of the research period,
represented attempts to discuss outcomes of the largely analytical
phases of enquiry with other art educators and also to make tentative
speculations about their relevance to art education practice.
This researcher's lmow1edge of theory at that time regarding the
teaching of criticism was largely confined to the writings of 'first
generation' American art educators such as Feldman, Smith, Ecker. and
Mittler, in which the model for critical practice in the classroom was
typically represented as a series of operations based on what were
identified as the logical components of criticism: for example,
Description, AnalysiS, Interpretation, and Evaluation or Judgement.
Existing models for teaching critiCism proved to be inadequate as a
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basis for metacritical enquiry because they are wtrepresentative of
critical diversity as revealed by this researcher's study of irony
(Rawding, 1984) and initial reading about controversy in aesthetics
with reference to artistic intention.
In the review of art education theory and practice (Chap.3) the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction was found to be a helpful means of
classifying divergent approaches in respect of the history and
criticism of art. (Intrinsic approaches lay stress on the need to
view artworks as autonomous, self-contained entities, whereas
extrinsic approaches view artworks as products of external influences,
notably the cultural tradition in which the artist stands as enshrined
in the conventions, values, interests, and expectations of the
artworld and society at large.) Textual evidence confirmed that art
educators were taking seriously the need to teach a plurality of
concepts and methodsof art. Whatappeared to be missing, though, was
a theoretical basis for teaching not just the plurality but the
contestability of art and criticism. Althoughteaching aesthetics in
relation to problems in art criticism has been on the agenda of recent
North American theorizing, particularly in the wake of Discipline
Based Art &iucation (DBAE),little has been done either to trace
cormections between a comprehensiverange of approaches and larger
philosophical disputes, or to link this range of approaches with a
compatible theory of (art) instruction. (It was asS1.lDedthat both are
essential 'components' of a pedagogy of metacrit!cism.)
'nle intrinsic/extrinsic distinction was found to be linked to the
divide between analytical and Continental traditions in aesthetics.
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Consequently, the notion of standard oppositions in philosophy and in
aesthetics was explored with the aim of clarifying conceptual issues
at the heart of disputes over the relationship of art and criticism.
The controversial aspects of aesthetics (as with any area of
knowledge) were seen to involve questions of ontology - theory
concerning the nature or being of entities (including artworks), and
epistemology - theory of knowledge.
The analysis of standard oppositions in philosophy (Chap. 4), which
was conducted with primary reference to the meta-theorizing of
Margolis, Bernstein, and Rorty, was not intended to be strictly
theoretical. Rather, it was accompaniedby speculation about how
theoretical insights arising from the analysis could be applied to
teaching a range of critical strategies in art education. First, the
idea of a 'divide' between analytical and Continental traditions in
philosophy was found to require modification. Whilst Continental
theorists are universally anti-foundationalist in regard to knowledge
and perception (despite differences in other respects), analytical
philosophers are, it seems, also divided between a dominant tradition
characterized by a positivist, empiricist view of 'objectivity' and a
more radical tendency in the post':Wittgensteinian tradition, in which
it is believed that the perceptual/conceptual apparatus of humans is
so infused with their values and interests as to make the search for
objective truth problematical. A contrast was drawn between the
perceptually restricted empiricism of muchanalytical aesthetics and
the non-:reductive empiricism of, for example, phenomenology. Taken to
extremes, this was identified as a contrast between an objectivist
stance which, through empirical elXlUiry 'discovers' reality and a
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relativism which 'makes' or constitutes it. The unwarranted certainty
of the one and the profound scepticism of the other were rejected in
favour of a middle-ground 'relativism' based on a non-arbitrary,
conventional, communal notion of truth arrived at by a continual
refinement of conceptual categories in relation to phenomena.
This polar contrast of epistemological extremes was identified as a
potential focus for teaching aesthetic criticism because it would
assist definition of the theoretical limits underlying a range of
critical stances. With this contrast in view, art teachers would be
well placed to teach about the strengths and weaknesses of different
stances in relation to the ontological and epistemological problems
involved. The next step in the research was to draw parallels between
the realm of meta-philosophy and the realm of aesthetics with
reference to controversy over the link between art and criticism and
to speculate in more detail about possibilities for art education.
The standard oppositions of philosophy regarding knowledge and
perception were found to be reflected in debates among aestheticians
over the nature of art and concomitant methods of criticism (Chap. 5).
These were identified, with reference to the work of Margolis, as the
extremes of excessive idealism and reductive materialism. A 'mdddle-
ground' position which characterizes artworks as 'culturally emergent
entities' was examined in the light of analytical and Continental
traditions. 'lbe implications of extreme and middle gro\D'ldpositions
for the practice of criticism were explored with regard to various
issues: for example, the description/interpretation dichotomy and the
validity of accepting divergent interpretations of specific works. In
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particular, the epistemological problem of how to '. •• account for
knowledge of a world that is essentially conditioned by our
understanding' (Bernstein, OPe cit., pp.75~76)was brought closer to
the realm of practice by considering the problem in criticism of
distinguishing what is descriptively 'in' a work fran that which is
interpretively imputed to it. '!his was seen to add a significantly
new dimension to the characterization of criticism in existing art
education models (Chap. 3). '!be point is that the concept 'artwork'
is philosophically problematic as regards identity and individuation;
this implies that the object of art criticism is not only the
individual work, but also the subtle interaction of artwork, artist,
audience, and critic. The next step was to consider ways in which
this dynamicview of the artwork as culturally emergent could be
applied to the teaching of critical diversity.
With this end in view, a particular issue in aesthetic controversy,
namely, that associated with the artist's intention, was examinedin
the light of education texts on teaching literary criticism in general
and intentionalist criticism in particular (Chap. 6). '!bat erquiry
explored the idea that intention is representative of the issues
examinedin the preceding chapter. '!his was to makea claim that the
interrelated issues of aesthetics could be made to appear more
relevant to the realm of critical practice by viewing them in the
context of intentionalist criticism. The different conceptions of the
ontology of art in literature and fine art raised questions about the
relation of language and perception. Abrief enquiry into perceptual
theory confirmed the continuing validity and application of the
oppositions noted earlier in regard to epistemology (Chap. 4).
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Intrinsic/extrinsic, reductionist/relativist, and materialist/idealist
distinctions were further reflected in the ecological/conventionalist
distinction of perceptual theory.
Exploring the issue of intention highlighted the problem in criticism
of taking into account external influences on, not only artistic
production, but also critical reception. This was thought to imply
that defining and tracing interconnections between the concepts
'artwork,' 'artist,' and 'critic' is essential for an understanding of
intention in given cases. Hence, it was concluded that the issue of
artistic intention is more than a dispute between those for and
against giving priority to direct biographical evidence; instead it is
a special case of a more fundamental epistemological dispute about
interpreting the 'intentional', i.e., purposive, characteristics of
all forms of human culture. This was described as a difference
between the psychological and hermeneutic conceptions of intention.
Given the view that interpreting intention is a hermeneutic task,
involving exploration of artwork, artist, and critic in relation to
reality, it was concluded that this issue is essentially metacritical.
The analysis of literature education theory was an attempt to identify
various critical methods associated with teaching intention and to
seek evidence of their use as a focus for engaging in metacriticism.
It revealed much that was helpful about possible approaches to art
criticism, but little guidance on how to align this aspect of
aesthetic theory with instructional theory. Briefly, literature
education theory proved disappointing as far as the search for a
pedagogy of metacriticism in art was concerned. Whereas a consistent
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pedagogy of criticism was thought to entail the alignment of (some
view of) aesthetic theory with a compatible poSition on the nature of
instruction, a consistent pedagogy of ~-criticism was thought to
entail the alignment of aesthetic content and instructional method
within a framework of critical diversity. Neither art education
theorists (with one notable exception) nor literature education
theorists have viewed the alignment of aesthetic and instructional
theory as a necessary task.
An analysis of general education theory on the teaching of
controversial issues (Chap. 7) led to a conclusion that a coherent
pedagogyconsists of more than the identification of suitable content
and the specification of relevant methods of instruction. Beneath
considerations of content ('what') and method ('how') in curricu1\DJl
planning often lie hidden assumptions as to 'why' such knowledge is
valuable. Much of the educational theorizing about controversial
issues was found to be directed at the problems involved in teaching
'conmunit~based', as opposed to purely 'academic' or 'subject~based'
disputes. In order to apply these theorizings with respect to
teaching about controversy in aesthetics, it proved necessary to
question the distinction between 'cOllllllmit~based' and 'subject~based'
controversy, by showing that in spite of the obvious difference
between the 'popular' and 'restricted' contexts in which these kinds'
of controversies are respectively located, there are good grounds for
maintaining a less rigid distinction. '!be force of the distinction
was found to depend on a rationalistic account of knowledge which
entails well ~efined disciplines, standardised content, and pre-
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specified learning outcomes. 'lhls was modified by emphasizing instead
the revisionary and pluralistic character of knowledge.
Theoretical texts on the teaching of controversial issues in the
general curriculum were found to be especially promising as a basis
for the ' synthesis' phase of this enquiry because of the emphasis
given to the metacritical role of the teacher. lhis was characterized
in different ways, depending on whether the ' teacher' advocated a
personal value poSition over against other poSitions, maintained an
attitude of complete neutrality, or, paradOxically, combinedadvocacy
and impartiality with the aim of transcending factional poSitions on a
given controversy. 'l1lese three characterizations were examined to
establish whether they achieved an alignment of discipline-based
theory and instructional theory and could thus serve as models for the
present enquiry.
The first of the characterizations was found to involve the alignment
of monism (aesthetic theory) and 'pedagogic partisanship'
(instructional theory). It was rejected as untenable because it
rested on the false assumption that controversy in aesthetics is more
apparent than real and could, therefore, be resolved by conceptual
analysis. The second characterization involved an aligraent of
eclecticism (aesthetic theory) and 'pedagogiC neutrality'
(instructional theory). It was judged to be incoherent because it
lacked a principle of unity for combining procedures drawn frail
competing critical standpoints. '!be third characterization involved
an alignment of pluralism (aesthetic theory) with 'coam1tted
impartiality' (instructional theory). nlis was judged to be superior
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because it did full justice to the contestability and multiplicity of
critical modes. The unresolvable nature of such fundamental
controversy was thought to necessitate an open-minded stance (although
this does not prevent the individual from holding strong convictions
in a dispute, for such convictions can be both strong and provisional
if he or she remains constantly alert to the possibility of new
configurations of knowledge). The conclusion was reached that
'committed impartiality' is the teaching stance most compatible with
the findings of this research into aesthetic controversy because it
fits the prototypic model of the metacritic, that is, one who engages
in a genuine pursuit of truth in relation to criticism whilst
paradoxically (but not illogically) believing that the resolution of
disputes is ultimately unattainable.
At the heart of 'committed tmpartiality' is the notion of differential
support. This implies that the teacher has an ethical as well as an
intellectual responsibility both to preserve the viability of
different sides of a controversy, whilst at the same time subjecting
each one, including his or her own, to critical scrutiny (which, by
implication, includes the possibility of negative criticism, at least
to some degree). 'Differential support' involves the teacher in the
task of identifying criteria by which the validity of different
viewpoints can be evaluated, thereby assisting learners to assess,
comparatively, the explanatory power of those viewpoints by reference
to criticism of individual artworks.
'Committed impartiality', and the differential support it entails, is
thought to avoid the pitfall of the teacher engaging in metacriticism
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as a purely 'academic' activity unrelated to a first order experience
of artworks. It could help to develop learners' appreciation of the
integrated character of criticism and aesthetics because it entails
'trying out' different critical approaches with artworks treated as
test cases. Hence, as a teaching stance, it has the potential to
enrich, cumulatively, the learners' aesthetic appreciation of
individual works, whilst at the same time developing their
understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of different critical
views. It implies that the various intellectual traditions which
have given rise to critical modes are necessary foci for pedagogical
enquiry: necessary, that is, because the cumulative wisdom gained by
studying these traditions can help to increase learners'
understanding, not only of individual artworks, but also the complex
interrelationships that make up the social world of which artworks are
but a part. The teacher's commitment is, therefore, to a 'both/and'
rather than an 'either/or' search for truth. Truth in this sense is a
multiple concept: its pursuance involves the teacher in a commitment
to enhance the value of the teaching/learning process by leading
learners into a richer understanding of the human condition, as
opposed to merely providing them with ready-made certainties.
To accept the full implications of teaching fundamental controversy is
to engage in a comparative, cumulative study of criticism's plurality
and contestability in which 'taken for granted' knowledge concerning
artworks is viewed as problematic. Such an approach invites an
alignment with the work of critical theorists (Chap. 7.3) whose main
aim has been to mount a critique of the relationship between
institutional knowledge and socio-political interests, with a view to
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proposing radical alternatives. (Although it was pointed out in
Chapter 7.3 that a conmi.tment to problematize knowledge does not
necessarily imply acceptance of a thoroughgoing social critique.)
Critical theorists, in the past decade, have attacked what they see as
the tendency of Western democracies to establish and perpetuate state
control through a means/ends model of educational provision in which
emphasis is placed firmly on standardized content, pre-specified
learning targets, 'technical' knowing, etc. Against this dominant
tradition of 'instrumental', or 'technocratic rationality' and its
corollaries, the 'technical' models of educational researcher and
teacher, critical theorists have proposed alternative forms of
rationality in which the model of teacher-as-reflective-practitioner
is paramount , In as much as teaching about disputes in aesthetics
contributes to reflective teaching and learning, it can be seen to
provide a focus for 'empowerment': that is, the development of an
independent attitude of thought among teachers which will equip them
to interrogate the content of curricula and to raise questions in the
minds of learners about the wider society from which that content has
arisen. The notion of 'empowerment' in this context has implications
both for the personal development of teachers through private reading,
informal discussion with like-minded colleagues and local classroom
initiatives; moreover, it has implications for art teacher training
establishments, especially for those seeking to explore ways of
challenging and developing the thinking of student art teachers
regarding the value of the analytical/critical, historical/cultural
and perceptual domains of art learning.
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8.3 Metacritical Principles
It is intended now to specify key principles that have arisen from the
1analyses of different kinds of theory in the previous chapters. These
principles, which are elemental to a discussion of metacriticism, will
be explored below in the light of their implications for curriculum.
ntey are:
(i) The teaching of metacriticism will involve differentiating between
'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' orientations of theory in respect of
analytical/critical, historical/cultural, and perceptual domains of
art experience.
(ii) Artistic intention is a prime focus for teaching metacriticism
because it is representative of disputes connected with the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in aesthetics.
(iii) The teaching of metacriticism will engage learners in a
conceptual analysis of the distinction in art criticism between
'description' and 'interpretation'.
(iv) Teaching about controversy in aesthetics would involve giving due
consideration to the bearing of perceptual theory on theories of art
criticism.
(v) The teaching of metacriticism will aim to develop learners'
understanding of the underlying theory of critical discourse, thereby
enhancing their direct experience and appreciation of artworks.
(vi) The teaching of metacriticism implies a conmitment to question
existing structures of knowledge and to provide alternative strategies
for creating new ones.
(vii) The teaching of metacriticism entails adopting a pedagogical
stance in which discipline-based content and teacher values are
explicitly harmonized.
'lbe metacritical principles are especially pertinent to the task of
developing curricula in which the four domains of art experience are
to be taught as an interactive whole. (As discussed in Chapter 3.3,
exploring the dynamic interrelatedness of the four domains, namely,
Expressive/Productive, Perceptual, Analytical/Critical, and
Historical/Cultural, is axiomatic to 'broadening the base' of art
curriculum content.) The point is that metacriticism entails rational
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and systematic enquiry into the knowledgebases of all forms of art
activity bearing on the problems of criticism. Moreover, the
metacritical principles will be formulated below in a way that gives
indications, where appropriate, of possible curricu1mn strategies.
There is no doubt, however, that commentingon principles without a
particular group of learners in mind is problematic. Considering the
variety of contexts in which learning about metacriticism could occur,
such as primary school classes, GCE 'A' U!vel art history sets,
individual tutorials for fine art undergraduates, and musemnstudy
groups in adult education, it is necessary to limit the following
discussion to general implications in the recognition that further
research studies and curriculum developmentwill be needed to 'test'
the relevance and application of the principles in actual learning
environments. Research in that vein would constitute a shift of
emphasis from principles to procedures, from theorizing about
curriculmn content in relation to method (valuable and necessary
though that has proved to be) to experimental curricu1mndevelopment.
Discussion of the principles will be illustrated by reference to
relevant examples of classes of artworks. 'lhe aim will be to
facilitate metacritical comparisons of alternative approaches with
reference to underlying theoretical frameworks. More importantly,
though, in this context, the works are chosen to illustrate the
metacritical principles and each one should be seen as an exampleof a
class or category of items. Hencemanyother examplesrelating to the
different classes could serve equally as well as those selected. (One
such class denotes works for which there is a well documentedhistory
of material changes; another class is of works which raise questions
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about the bearing of ethical standards on the artist t s choice of
subject matter.) The choice of classes is not intended to be
definitive: others might justifiably be put forward to shed light on
further facets of metacriticism latent in the principles. Given the
emphasis in Chapter 5 on the need for a broad cultural definition of
art, the choice of examples will also include items from outside the
Euro-American fine art tradition.
8.4 Curricular Implications
(i) The teaching of metacriticism will involve differentiating between
t intrinsic t and 'extrinsic' orientations of theory in respect of
analytical/critical, historical/cultural, and perceptual domains of
art experience.
TIlemost pervasive issue to have arisen from this research concerns
the problematic distinction in philosophical aesthetics between
intrinsic and extrinsic evidence. The distinction is ontological, in
that it focuses on disputes over the nature of art and the
identification and demarcation of individual works; also it is
epistemological, in that it focuses on disputes about critical
objectivity in relation to theories of knowledge, perception and truth
(Chaps. 4-6). A major outcome of the enquiry is the proposal that a
pedagogy of metacriticism depends on achieving a rationale for
teaching a range of critical stances (Chap. 6.5). This has emerged,
through analyzing the notion of controversy in philosophical
aesthetics, as an opposition of extremes (objectivism/relativism,
materialism/idealism, etc.) within which middle-ground alternatives
may also be located.
A pedagogy of metacriticism would include an exploration of aesthetic
controversy concerning the boundaries of artworks. The attendant
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difficulties could be demonstrated with reference to a class of works
that have undergone material changes over time. The Nightwatch of
1642by Rembrandt(fig.1, following page) is a particularly intriguing
example. Evidence has shownthat the painting was reduced in size in
1715 in order to fit it between two doors of a new location
(Haverkamp-Begemarm,1982, pp.18-19). Moreover, the ti tle I!!!.
Nightwatch was not Rembrandt's own: it was coined in the late 18th
century partly because '... patrolling at night was virtually the only
duty left to the city's militia' (ibid., p. 7), but also because the
relatively dark painting of 1642 had becomeconsiderably darker over
time Owingto the accumulation of dirt and varnish (ibid., cf. Bolten
& Bolten-Rempt, 1978, pp.94':'100j Clark, 1978, pp.77-79). Recent
restoration work, particularly in 1975/76, has returned the work to
something like its original freshness of colour. However, this
restoration was extensive in the range of subtle modifications and
emendations to the canvas and paint surface (Hijmans, Kuiper & Vels
Heijn, 1978, Chap.VII). It revealed the impossibility of retouching
damagedand worn parts without adding, artistically speaking, to the
original. Whether or not it matters aesthetically that this painting
has changed in significant ways (the question of authenticity is
particularly raised by restoration work) depends on the viewer' s
beliefs about the nature of art. '!hose who adopt a formalist
viewpoint tend to emphasize the self-referent1ality and particularity
of a work as experienced at a given point in time. Contextua1ists, on
the other hand, view it as an entity that is impossible to disentangle
fran the influence of spatial, temporal, and physical conditions. 'nle
350 year history of '!be Nightwatch reveals something of the
vicissitudes to which manyworks are subject during their •careers'
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FIGURE 1. Rembrandt van Rijn, The Nightwatch (detail), 1642, Oil on
Canvas, 144 in. x 172~ in. (orig. c. 152~ in. x 197 in.).
Rijksmuseum,Amsterdam
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(Michelangelo's 'Pieta', for example, has recently undergone similar
treatment). A well-documented work such as this can supply an apt
focus for comparing and contrasting different concepts and methods of
criticism. Such engagement would be directed to pOinting out the
inconsistencies of extreme formalist and contextualist positions
whilst seeking to combine the strengths of each, namely, that artworks
(in the visual arts) are physically real and yet culturally defined
within a living artistic tradition.
Problems of definition and individuation arise not just in respect of
material changes in the artwork over time, but also with reference to
what might be called the relocation of works from one culture to
another. At issue here is the appropriateness of applying the concept
'artwork' to a class of works that are alien or unfamiliar, as is the
2case with many non-Western cultural products. This is linked in turn
to the interpretive task of determining the aesthetic relevance of
meanings assigned to such products. An example of alternative
interpretations would be that of, say, a European explorer who
unwittingly treats a tribal magic stick as tinder for making fire.
Such an individual would be acting as much in accordance with cultural
patterns of behaviour as the tribespeople for whom it is an object of
veneration. If this principle is applied to the identification of
artworks, then it is clear that the capacity to recognize a particular
material entity as art (or, conversely, not to recognize it as such)
is a function of each person's cultural consciousness. The process of
enculturation by which the mores of a culture are impressed on the
individual's consciousness, may actually incapacitate that individual
from 'seeing' the works of alien cultural traditions as 'art.' This
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incapacity may apply, not only to the more esoteric conventions of
artistic production, but to supposedly unproblematic manifestations as
well (see, for example, fig.2). A pedagogy of metacriticism would
involve reflecting on the kinds of extreme positions associated with
the task of confronting such works (and, by extension, supposedly less
accessible works 'closer to home'). It could be shownthat the extent
to which assigned meanings are culture-specific or transcend spatio-
temporal categories is open to debate (Chap. 4.4.3., above). It could
also be pointed out that the Primitivism typified by artists such as
Picasso and Braqueeffectively imposedstereotypical values onto works
such as tribal masks (Hughes, 1991, pp.2O-21). 1beir notions of
formal vitality, plastic freedom, and expressive distortion tended to
obscure the conventional, ritualistic functions of masks (as has been
documented since by numerous anthropological studies). Primi ti vist
misconceptions about non-Western cultural traditions can be
perpetuated by the mannerof exhibiting so-called tribal art. In this
cormection, a likely pedagogical strategy might involve speculation
about the nonmaterial changes a tribal artefact undergoes whenwrested
from its origins and placed in a museum it serves as an object either
of curiosity or contemplation: functions for which it almost certainly
would not have been created.
Manycontemporary artists work within a global ethos emanating from
the Western fine art tradition, whereas others workwithin the limits
of local, irdigenous, non-Western craft traditions. The localized
exclusivity of many artists, whether of Western or non-Western
provenance, may easily be compromised by their products being
exhibited on a par with works from a diversity of places and periods.
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FIGURE2. Mask of turtle-shell, Torres Strai ts (Papua New Guinea),
British Museum
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Indeed, such individuals would probably be interested to learn that
their 'discourse' was one of many equally meritorious strands
constituting 'world culture.' It could be argued that the
'marketplace of ideas' concept of world culture is valid only to the
extent that the various positions represented are there by choice;
although this argument could only be applied to contemporary artists
and not to those of earlier periods. Whereas the 'art' products of
many Third World societies speak with an authentic voice to their own
social groups, they may have nothing to say to outsiders, and vice
versa. In curriculum terms, questions might thus be raised as to the
effects on the perception of art when the context of a work's
presentation displays insensitivity to the context of its production.
This would involve scrutinising the influence on critical reception of
what Barthes has called the work's 'channel of transmission' (Barrett,
1985, p.52). The implication here is that contextual knowledge is not
merely a question of becoming better informed about circumstances of
production. The term 'cultural context' should also designate
knowledge about the contexts of transmission and reception with
reference to both the host culture and that of the viewers.
In summary, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is an important focus
for eliciting an examination of aesthetic issues concerning the nature
of art and critical responses to art. Ontological problems could be
highlighted by works in which the question of authenticity is
prominent. Works from unfamiliar belief systems, such as tribal
masks, can be used to explore the links between product, producer,
audience and presentational context. This would involve reflecting on
the relevance of all such factors when seeking to define objects as
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art or to assign meanings and speculate about aesthetic value and
significance.
(ii) Artistic intention is a prime focus for teaching metacriticism
because it is representative of disputes connected with the
intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in aesthetics.
A major outcome of the enquiry reported in Chapter 6 was that appeals
to artistic intention in critical disputes reveal different sets of
assumptions about the nature of art in regard to whether contextual
knowledge is essential, more or less helpful, or irrelevant to
aesthetic judgments concerning specific works. In a pedagogy of
metacriticism, artistic intention would serve as a catalyst for
exploring the interrelationship of the concepts 'artwork' and
,cultural context.' This would bring to the fore competing arguments
at the heart of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction over what is meant
by the appearance of the art object.
Consistent with the emphasis in this research on defining controversy
as an opposition of extremes, the problems raised by artistic
intention could be used to facilitate a metacritical examination of
two irreconcilable positions in the theory of critiCism, each of which
enshrines an important truth, but fails to provide a fully
satisfactory account of aesthetic experience (see Chap. 6.3). Anti-
intentionalists rightly emphasize that aesthetic experience is
primarily directed to the materiality of the artwork.
Intentionalists, with equal justification, stress the necessity of
background information about the artist for many of the judgments that
are made about specific works (assuming that the 'aesthetic' is not
restricted to a sensuous experiencing of formal properties, but
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includes the appreciation of ideas, values, etc. camnmicated through
the mediumof art).
A curriculum based on principles of metacriticism would involve
differentiating three types of evidence relating to the issue of
intention: (1) 'internal' evidence available solely through consulting
the work, (2) biographical evidence of direct relevance, and (3)
biographical evidence of indirect relevance. The difficulties
attending this differentiation (leaving aside the question of the
reliability of documentary evidence in given cases) can be
demonstrated with reference to two broad categories, namely, abstract
configurations that symbolize precise cultur~specific meanings (type
2 evidence, e.g., fig.3) and items which appear to be merely
decorative (e. g. , kaleidoscope patterns) • '!be words underlined
indicate the complexities at the heart of this caoparison: for, though
the iconography of, for example, a William Morris wallpaper pattern
mayhave no definite communicablecontent, it nevertheless looks the
way it does because of the ideological cOlllllitmentsthat are knownto
underpin that designer's intentions in a general sense (type 3
evidence). The kinds of looking generated by such comparisons would
serve to demonstrate the bearing of intentionalist expectations on
aesthetic judgments. '!be anti":'intentionalist claim that if an
artist's intention is not apparent in the work it is therefore
irrelevant, may be countered, not just by pointing to the necessity of
corroborative biographical evidence in certain cases, but by
recognizing that the question of intention is implicit in the initial
encounter with works of art.
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From the seed-jar hole in the center (sic), representing the sipapu, or mythical hole in the earth, the Hopis
emerged from the underworld. Hands reaching out (1) represent the Hopis and all other living things coming into
this world. The womb of mother earth (2) is flanked by other lines (3) signifying the spirits of all unborn people
entering the world. The four corners of the earth (4) surround the eye of the Great Spirit (5), itself centered in the
wings (6) and head (7) of an eagle. Four rows of triangles (8) indicate the Hopis' reverence for groupings of four.
7
FIGURE 3. Dextra Quotskuyva, Modern Pueblo pottery (Hopi tribe).
Source: National Geographic, Nov. 1982, pp.602-603
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The impossibility of separating the artwork from its cultural context
may be illustrated, though, by considering the relevance of direct
biographical evidence to the subject of intention. A direct,
unasst.stad attempt, for example, to interpret Hardy's photograph
(fig.4) of an incident in the KoreanWarcould be accompaniedby the
introduction of biographical information such as the following:
The world was invited to see an Americansoldier 'share his
last drop of water with a dying peasant'. It was one of the
most telling pictures of the KoreanWar. But this poignant
situation was not quite what it seemed. The soldier had to
be persuaded by the photographer, the celebrated Bert Hardy.
And he agreed only on condition that Hardy's own water
ration was used. (Evans, 1978, p.40).
This photograph, which purports to be spontaneous, but is not,
involves a measure of deception which almost certainly could not be
3
detected solely through consulting the work. Against this point, it
might be maintained that Hardy's intention was to produce a telling
visual metaphor of what he felt was true of American soldiers in
general. Therefore, the apparent callousness of the G.I. who took
part in the photograph, and Hardy's ownmanipulation of the event,
are, on this view, a matter of indifference to the issue of intention.
Nevertheless, it can hardly be denied that backgrOl.mdinformation
about this photograph does yield a fresh perspective. 'lbrough
considering the art-historical context, it is possible to approach the
work IOOrecritically and to discover a wider range of implications,
particularly those which bear on the relationship between moral and
aesthetic judgements (see Chap. 5.5). It can hardly be tenable to
maintain that external lmowledgeof this item impairs one's perception




Bert Hardy, Korean War, Picture Post (Hulton Picture
1950, Photograph.
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(See also critical analysis of Ben Shahn's Farewell to New York - All
that is Beautiful in Rawding, 1984, pp.43-46.)
A metacritical approach would involve making connections between
different views of the nature of (artistic) reality and the validity
of evidence that is directly accessible to sense perception. For
example, it could be shown that positivist preconceptions about the
dependability of visual 'facts' are open to challenge on the grounds
that neither the photographer, the soldier in the photograph, nor the
critic are value-neutral participants. From the art curriculum
standpoint, however, the notions of 'conmitted impartiality' and
'teacher-as-reflective-practitioner' imply that a strongly anti-
positivist or anti-empiricist stance should be avoided (see Chap.
7.5) • Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of different positions
could be elicited by, for instance, contrasting analytical empiricism
with the phenomenologist's insistence on the 'speaking power of the
work' communicated in the immediacy of experience. The importance of
artistic tradition in shaping expectations of a work would be
analytically significant.
Cases of type 3 evidence of intention can be adduced with reference to
a class of artworks for which indirect biographical evidence is
readily available. Bruegel's The Conversion of St. Paul (fig.5), for
example, is a work that has attracted scholarly cormnent on how to
interpret its meaning in relation to what is known about the artist's
life. A consideration of the picture's IDOtU'ltainousetting, coupled
with the fact that in the year it was painted the Duke of Alba led an
army through the Alps with the object of subduing the Low Countries,
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FIGURE 5. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Conversion of St Paul,
1567, Panel, 42\ in. x 61\ in. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna.
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raises questions about Bruegel's intentions, particularly when it is
made in the light of knowledge concerning the artist's attitude to
life and his views on the social function of art (e.g., Foote, 1968,
pp.104-105). More pointedly, when the sheer size of the army in the
painting is taken into account, and a comparison is made between the
central figure on the horse and the bearded horseman in the same
artist's Massacre of the Innocents (who some scholars identify as the
Duke of Alba), the conclusion is strongly suggested that Bruegel was
drawing a parallel between the Catholic persecution of northern
Protestants and Jewish persecutions of the early church. Whether or
not this interpretation is plausible therefore depends on a knowledge
of general historical background and the artistic themes and modes of
representation typical of the artist. Intentionalist conclusions in
such cases cannot be confined to notions of the autonomy of a
particular painting.
The controversy over artistic intention is a prime focus for teaching
metacriticism, because it can be used to identify competing critical
approaches to specific works whilst, concurrently, permitting links to
be drawn between these approaches and broad theoretical positions in
aesthetics. The nature of background knowledge, whether directly or
indirectly related to the artist's intentions, has an important
bearing on the curricular implication which follows.
(iii) The teaching of metacriticism will engage learners in a
conceptual analysis of the distinction in art criticism between
'description' and 'interpretation'.
The equivocal nature of this distinction could be illustrated by a
contrast between examples of two categories of artworks, namely J those
236
that call for description and little interpretation with those that
require a largely interpretive approach. Alternatively, 'What is
(minimally) descriptively true of a particular work' could be
contrasted with 'What is (certainly) interpretively imputed to it'
(Margolis, 19808, p.127). This would involve differentiating twoways
of understanding the term 'interpretation', that is, between, on the
one hand, a critic's discriminatory ability in detecting subtle detail
in an artwork and, on the other, a critic's literary skill in
responding tmpressionistically to a work's emotive power. (See Chap.
5.3) •
The problem of distinguishing between description and interpretation
might be demonstrated with reference to a work such as Landscapewith
The Fall of Icarus c.1558, by Bruegel the Elder (fig. 6) • Bertram's
(1949, pp.5-6) conmenton this work that ' ••• the shepherd stares idly
at the sky, but in the wrong direction' (p.6, emphasesadded) is a
description with an interpretive gloss. Substitute the word 'idly'
with 'intently', or remove it altogether, and the meaning of the
sentence is subtly altered. '!be point is that although
straightforwardly descriptive statements (e.g., 'the man is staring
upwards') are focused on the particularities of the picture, they are
nevertheless integral to and simultaneous with the critic:' s larger
project to develop a holistic understanding of the artist's works in
relation to art itself. In the current example, straightforwardly
descriptive statements aimed at keeping an 'open mind' and remaining
true to the 'facts' of observation presuppose the critic's interest in
the 'how' and the 'why' of the shepherd's staring. It is difficult to
see how the effort to describe this work can be divorced fran
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FIGURE 6. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, Landscape with The Fall of
Icarus, c. 1558, Canvas, 29 in. x 44 1/4 in. Musees Royaux des Beaux-
Arts, Brussels.
238
knowledge of OVid's story, which has both shepherd and ploughman
looking upwardsin wonderment,or of Bruegel's smaller version of the
same scene which shows Daedalus clearly visible in the sky (Stechow,
1990, pp.SO-S1, fig.7). What bearing lmowledge of the smaller
'Icarus' wouldhave on a critic's efforts to describe the larger is a
matter of speculation. The point is that specialist lmowledgeof an
artist's oeuvre inevitably shapes the description of a single piece.
Moreover, it raises questions about the ontological status of artworks
separately conceived, for if critical descriptions are culturally
informed, then claims for textual autonomymust be treated with some
caution (cf. Rawding, 1984, pp.43-48). The realisation that Bruegel
typically hides the iconographical centre of his pictures in masses of
detail (Lindsay & Huppe, 1956, cf. fig.5) will guide the
learner /critic' s efforts at description by ensuring from the outset
that parts are related to wholes.
The need to distinguish two senses of ' interpretation' was noted by
Margolis with regard to a painting by Matisse (fig.8):
But what shall one say of Matisse's The Piano !Bsson? I may
point out to you the witty features of Matisse ' s painting:
for example, the relations between the implicit movementof
the metronomeon the piano; the elimination of one of the
boy's eyes by a diagonal, flesh-colored brush stroke - so
that we understand his attention to be metronomically
flicking back and forth between the open French windows and
the piano keyboard; the slash of brilliant green color
through the wiOOows, that diagonally captures a part of the
attention of the young pianist and confirms the field of
play beyond; the window's being open in contrast to the
imprisoning presence of the piano; the relaxed sensual
sculpture by Matisse himself placed on a foreground table
before the open windows, in contrast with an unfinished
painting, also by Matisse, which is very angular and severe,
and ambiguously placed behind the boy at the piano to
suggest an unpleasantly enforced lesson. If I point out
these features, which perhaps you had not considered or that
might be relatively difficult to confirm decisively, you
might concede that I had interpreted the painting
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FIGURE7. Pieter Bruegel the Elder, The Fall of Icarus, c. 1558,
Panel, 24\ in. x 35\ in. Private Collection.
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FIGURE8. Henri Matisse, '!be Piano Lesson, 1916, Oil on Canvas, 96\
in. x 83\ in. Museumof MOdem Art, NewYork.
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satisfactorily; you might also, I admit, say that I had
merely described the painting more accurately than another.
Wouldthere be a difference in speaking in these twoways?
(Margolis, 1980a, pp.121-122, emphasesadded)
The task of describing the Matisse appears reasonably straightforward,
whereas in the Bruegel (fig.5), close observational skills are needed
to detect details, such as the corpse under the hedge ('not visible in
small reproductions,' Lindsay & Huppe, OPe cit., p.383; cf. Bertram,
OPe cit., p.6). Nevertheless, though some of the details noted by
Margolis are readily open to scrutiny, others, while also visible, seem
to depend on the viewer forming hypotheses about the symbolic meaning
of different parts of the picture in relation to its formal structure.
The triangular composition (Sclmeider, 1984, p. 328) is evident, but
whether the relationship between the various angular shapes is anything
more than a formal device for unifying the picture is open to
speculation. 'Dle introduction of biographical information, however,
provides a different perspective on the interpretation of the painting
(ibid. , pp.328-329): the boy is Matisse's son Pierre; he appears
younger -than he was at the time the painting was produced; he had been
'destined for lIIlSic' by his father even to the extent of having his
formal education cut short to concentrate on the violin; he was
hankering to leave the family 'nest'; he was determined, as soon as he
cameof age, to join the armyam fight at the front. Such information
is germaneto the point that a critic's capacity to see and describe is
subtly affected by the knowledgewhich he or she possesses.
A comparisonof interpretive accounts based first on intrinsic evidence
and then on a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence can
facilitate a careful consideration of the descriptive/interpretive
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function of critical discourse. However, the validity of aesthetic
interpretations depends on the interpreter achieving 'compatability
with the describable features of given artworks' and conforming with
'the relativized canons of interpretation' arising from the traditions
of professional criticism (Margolis, OPe cit., p.163). Critical texts
can be used to focus on the tendency in criticism for different canons
of interpretation to be used in support of radically divergent
interpretations of a single work. These canons ('interpretive
schemata' or 'world-views') could be identified and their strengths
and weaknesses assessed in regard to the interpretation of different
kinds of artwork.
(iv) Teaching about controversy in aesthetics would involve giving due
consideration to the bearing of perceptual theory on theories of art
criticism.
Exploring the problems of aesthetic criticism involves examining
different positions on the relationship between the nature of reality
and the interpretive activity of percipients. 'lhe relevance of
perceptual theory is made apparent by comparing Allison's influential
Four Domains Model of art education with the Getty Institute's equally
influential DBAE scheme. These coincide on three counts, namely, art
production, art criticism, and history of art, but differ on the
fourth; 'perceptual domain' (Allison) and 'aesthetics' (DBAE). 'lbis
discrepancy suggests that theoretical work is needed on the part of
art educators (researchers, teacher-researchers, and teachers) in
order to elucidate the connections between perception and aesthetics
from philosophical as well as psychological and sociological
perspectives, but with the contexts of teaching clearly in mind.
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The bearing of culturally acquired expectations on the perception of
art- may be demonstrated with reference to the critical and historical
reception of a class of works such as artistic forgeries: for example,
Christ at Emnaus, 1936, by Hans van Meegeren (fig.9), which was
enthusiastically received as a Vermeer by art cormotsseurs in the
1930s. Its discoverer was the respected Vermeer scholar Abraham
Bredius:
It is a wonderful momentin the life of a lover of Vermeer
when he finds himself suddenly confronted with a hitherto
unknown painting by a great master, untouched, on the
original canvas, and without any restoration, just as it
left the painter's studio.
(Wright, 1976, p.80)
In less than a decade, though, Christ at Enmaus and several other
paintings attributed to Vermeer were exposed as forgeries. Van
Meegerenwas imprisoned for his deception.
'!be unmasking of a forgery may change the perception of the work.
People do not just feel differently about it, they may see it in a
significantly new way. With hindsight, critical attempts may be made
to explain away an original judgment by claiming that a work is
technically poor (Wheelock, 1981, pp.47-49; Meyer, 1967, pp. 54-55).
Alternatively, the claim may be made that knowledge that a work is a
forgery should not impugn our appreciation of its aesthetic qualities
because these are intrinsic and thus not subject to the vagaries of
cultural taste (Meyer, OPe cit., p.65). Both positions would seem to
be overstated, however, and may be identified with extremes in
perceptual theory (see above Chap. 6.3.3) and in philosophy (Meyer, for
example, links belief in the objectivity of 'beauty,' i.e., as an
attribute independent of the need for perception, with Platonic
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FIGURE 9. Hans van Meegeren, Christ at Emmaus, 1936, Oil on Canvas,
46 in. x 50\ in. Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, Rotterdam.
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idealism). A pedagogy of metacriticism would include the need for
discussion of the respective merits of extreme poSitions on the
artistic status of forged paintings. In such a discussion, reference
could be made to underlying presuppositions about aesthetic value in
respect of wider questions about the relationship of lmow1edgeand
perception. In particular, it wouldbe important to recognise that the
values and meanings of an artistic object change over time and
according to location. Questions might be raised about the nature of
perceptual experience. Are meanings resident in objects, projected
onto the object by the viewer, or arrived at by a process of
negotiation between object and viewer (Hamblen, 1985, p.22)? Aside
from extremes, metacriticism offers the potential for exploring the
extent to which ' ••• even the most rigorous (art-historical) research'
can, in cases such as the VanMeegeren, '... be affected by interests,
feelings, and cultural attitudes' (Villa, 1981, p.96). The effect of
cultural attitudes and beliefs on perception also extends to emotional
and physiological responses (Meyer, OPe cit., p. 56). Visually
identical objects, such as a house facade in a stage set and the front
elevation of a real house, will appear different when the observer has
lmowledgeof their separate identities (Searle, 1983, pp.54-55). As
these examples illustrate, it maybe important to consider the extent
4
to which expectations can influence perception.
It was earlier concluded (Chap. 5.5) that '... the widest possible
range of factors should be seen as relevant to the perception of
artworks and to the judgments that are made concerning them.' The
point is not only that contextual lmow1edge shapes aesthetic
perception, but that the various facets of such knowledge are
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pedagogically interesting. Part of a strategy of metacriticism here
may involve considering situations in art criticism which highlight
what Becker (1982, p.305) has called ' ••• the close relation between
aesthetic and moral beliefs.' Comparisonsmight be drawn between
classes of works which in different ways force learners to examine
their own presuppositions about what constitutes aesthetic perception.
The issue of artistic sincerity in the case of a forged painting such
as the VanMeegeren(fig.9) may seem irrelevant to sane because the
deception was perpetrated against the art establishment. After all, a
change of attribution makesno difference to the formal properties of
this and other forgeries. On the other hand, documentaryphotographs
such as Hardy's (fig.4 above) raise this issue emphatically, because
the manipulation of formal properties in the artwork occurs in
circumstances whichare tragically real. Here the argument that in art
the end justifies the meansseemsunconvtnctng, whereas in cases such
as that of the fine artist who employs a prostitute to model for a
painting of the Virgin Mary it maybe more readily conceded. A variant
of the class of works typified by the Hardyphotograph wouldbe Diane
Arbus's photographic studies of misfits and deviants (e.g., fig.10),
which raise few if any questions of artistic sincerity, though they
nevertheless place the viewer in the uncomfortable position of voyeur.
Is it curiosity that attracts attention, or is it the formal beauty of
the photographer's art? Questions relating to such images can provide
an opportunity to clarify the meaning of the term aesthetic in relation
to perception. Restricting the aesthetic to formal considerations is
problematic because it is difficult to maintain a disinterested
attitude towards works which are inescapably bound up with moral
questions of various kinds, especially those works which tackle
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FIGURE 10. Diane Arbus, Russian midget friends in a living room on
lOOth Street, N.Y.C. (detail), 1963, Photograph.
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contentious issues directly (e.g. Mapplethorpe's 'The Perfect MOment'
photography exhibition). Alternatively, the aesthetic might be
identified with reference to a wide range of factors that contribute to
and help sustain a meaningful encounter with a given work.
Artworks which can serve as a catalyst for discussions about the
relation of moral and aesthetic concerns have outstanding potential as
a focus for teaching metacriticism. Such works might be employed to
engage feelings as well as intellects and could thereby link problems
of philosophical aesthetics with the kinds of controversies described
in Chapter 7.2 above as 'cOlJlDUllity-based. ' Canceived thus,
metacriticism has an educational value far beyond the confines of
'subject-based' art learning.
(v) The teaching of metacriticism will aim to develop learners'
understanding of the underlying theory of critical discourse, thereby
enhancing their direct experience and appreciation of artworks.
Existing schemes for teaching art criticism were described in Chapter 3
as relatively lacking in theoretical input. But in principle there is
no necessary contradiction between critical enquiry in learning
situations being directly experiential ~ strongly theoretical. The
analysis of aesthetic controversy in the research as a whole indicates
that it is necessary for criticism to be theoretically well-grounded if
it is to achieve its full potential as a focus for art learning.
Although it has been philosophers in the main who have troubled
themselves with problems in aesthetics rather than artists or critics,
it would be odd if studying this kind of material did not lead to an
enhanced understanding of art: that is, via the perspective of
philosophy. A strategy is needed with which to explore differences in
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content and methods found in philosophical aesthetics. 'nle term
'strategy' need not imply a prescriptive approach: for example,
critical theory (in the technical sense) encourages the formulation of
principles rather than procedures for thinking critically (Ross &
Hannay,1986, p.10; cf. Lankford, 1984).
Pedagogical strategies in criticism lead to the critical appreciation
of art for its own sake (in criticism the intrinsic value of a
dialogical experience of actual works is paramount), whereas
pedagogical strategies in metacriticism, by definition, treat critical
appreciation more as somethingto be commentedupon rather than fully
entered into. 'nlis definition of metacriticism in curriculum contexts
is consistent with Margolis's (1980b, p.9) claim that aesthetics is a
'peculiarly strategic discipline' for the investigation of general
philosophical disputes. His point that artworks supply 'marvellously
apt examples' with which to activate and illuminate such investigation
is especially pertinent. nus is to affirm that artworks can be used
as test cases for exploring the interrelations of philosophy,
aesthetics and art criticism. A similar proposal has been made by
Eaton (1984, p.55) for combining philosophy and criticism in the
teaching of A' Level examinations in English on the grolDlCisthat
students of literature tend to ' ••• glibly employterms such as good,
great, successful, contrived, trite' with little understanding of their
meaning and significance in ethics and aesthetics. The implied
pedagogical strategy led Hamblen(1985, p.20) to affirm the educational
potential of developing adult learners' 'aesthetic literacy' through
examining artworks in relation to problems in the philosophy of art
over defining '... the nature of art, attitudes towards art, and
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reasons for aesthetic response.' In the light of these comments,and
the philosopher Searle's (1983, p.54) insistence that cultural skills
associated with perception are 'linguistically impregnated,' there is
good reason to believe that metacriticism, with its emphasis on
analysing critical discourse, is potentially a meansof developing a
capacity for art appreciation.
A major implication of the analysis of aesthetic controversy in this
research is that to teach criticism without reference to underlying
aesthetic theories is likely to be superficial for the samereason that
teaching pupils to paint in a particular style without making them
aware of the artistic context fromwhich it had originated wouldalso
be considered superficial, or at least less than ideal. In this
connection, Kaelin (1989) has argued that criticism oUght to be taught
fromwithin a metacritical and metatheoretical perspective. Hence, in
view of the variety of definitions of criticism which could be put
forward by critics and aestheticians, the teaching of metacriticism
would seem to be an essential element in what is termed 'critical
studies' (Chap3.3).
(vi) The teaching of metacriticism implies a coomitmentto question
existing structures of knowledgeand to provide alternative strategies
for creating newones.
'lbis is a particularly difficult point to extract. It refers to
arguments discussed in Chapter 7 and reiterated above (Chap. 8.2)
concerning a supposed link between the content and methods of
metacriticism and the notion of teacher 'empowerment.' It is thought
likely that the questioning attitude typical of the metacritic will be
reflected in the approach of one whoadopts the model of teacher-as-
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metacritic. '!be overriding aim of such an approachwouldbe ' ••• to
interrogate the content of curricula and to raise questions about the
wider society fran which that content has arisen' (Chap. 8.2). Froman
art education standpoint, this would involve scrutinizing artworks in
relation to underlying theories of criticism in recognition that the
values and interests associated with artworks are typically complexand
indirect, and that it is not easy in practice to unravel their multi-
layered strands of meaning. A metacritical approach could involve
comparingthe early critical reception of an artist's workwith later
statements in order to reflect on the factors, someaesthetic, some
not, leading to artistic recognition. TIle most revealing canparisons
wouldnot be those relating to artists whohad been first vilified and
then praised (most of the Impressionists, VanGogh,Kandinsky,etc.),
but vice versa. Questionsmight be raised concerning the tendency in
much recent art criticism to assume the unsullied sincerity of
established artists. Whyshould it be thought inappropriate to refer
in art criticism to reasons such as 'He did it for the money'?
(Baldwin,HarriSon, & Ramsden,1981, p.442). Critics will more likely
refer to an individual as obsessively haunted by recurring themesand
images than suggest that he or she is 'short on ideas' or is working
self-Wulgently. Hence the curriculum would need to give sane
emphasiS to scrutinizing statements of art critics with a view to
exposingunderlying assUDptionsthrough an enquiry into the ' ••• causes
and conditions of artistic productionI (ibid. ) , with particular
reference to the links betweenartists, dealers, galleries, critics,
and the art public.
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It is posited that teaching metacriticism with reference to controversy
in aesthetics will encourage independent critical thinking because it
will draw attention to the world views or ideological stances that
underHe different conceptions of aesthetic criticism. Hence, such
teaching should aim not only to explore the relationship between art
and society, but also to makeconnections at the metatheoretical level
between problems in the realm of aesthetics and in other areas of
knowledge. Studying controversial issues in aesthetics, al though
perhaps only within the capability of some, would nevertheless make
some small step towards increasing critical awareness in society and
would thus make a modest contribution to the democratization of
knowledgeon which the health of a free society depends.
(vii) The teaching of metacriticism entails adopting a pedagogical
stance in which discipline-based content and teacher values are
explicitly harmonized.
Although teacher values underlie all forms of pedagogical practice,
these mayremain Wlexamined and undisclosed where the teaching of non-
controversial aspects of a subject are concerned. In this connection,
it is quite possible for individuals to teach efficiently a programme
of study which either they do not believe in or perhaps have no
enthusiasm for. On the other hand. the teaching of controversial
content necessitates consideration by the teacher of his or her
personal viewpoint, irrespective of whether it is hidden from view,
openly declared, or presented in any of a numberof more subtle ways.
The teaching of controversial issues is clearly facilitated when
teachers are well informed about the backgroundbeliefs which shape
their views not only of art but of the nature of reality. In this
connection, earlier analyses of controversy in philosophy and
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aesthetics are particularly relevant. For example, discussion of the
incomnensurability thesis (Chap 4.4.3) led to the conclusion that
extreme epistemological positions should be avoided. On the one hand,
the meaningsand values of alien traditions (including artistic ones)
were found not to be mutually incomprehensible but to exhibit some
degree of regularity by which intercommunicationis madepossible. On
the other hand, the impossibility that one tradition or system of
thought might comprehendentirely in its own terms another system of
thought suggests that openness and non-prejudicial attitudes of enquiry
should characterize the teaching of metacriticism. Again, this is
likely to be facilitated whenteachers eschewextremes without at the
sametime succumbingto an easy-going neutrality. Testing the validity
of critical claims and theories that underlie them might properly
characterize a pedagogical commitmenthat is constantly renewed. The
art teacher whoengages in metacritical enquiry almost by definition
wouldbe coomitted to a formof neutrality whichexposes his or her own
views (as indeed any views) on the relation of art and criticism to
scrutiny and debate.
'lbere is a paradox here in that the (art) teacher - an ostensibly
authoritarian figure - is being cast in a decidedly anti-authority
role. For to encourage learners to question the status quo appears, at
least on the face of it, to be a subversive activity. 'l'hepoint is,
though, that nothing is to be lost by questioning the underlying
assumptions of curriculum lmowledge: that which is philosophically
well-groomed will withstand reasoned scrutiny; conversely, the
ideologically dubious will be revealed in its true colours. An outcome
of the enquiry into teaching controversy in general educational theory
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was that the notion of controversy involves a close consideration of
the role of the teacher (see Chap. 7.5). It was suggested that this
could be best characterized as the role model of a 'reflective
practitioner' whose authority was that of a subject specialist
cODJDittedto the pursuit of truth both within and across subject
boundaries. Such a characterization implies a teacher whose role is
authoritative rather than authoritarian.
In this cormection, the concept of ' learner' implies not merely a
passive recipient of received wisdom,but an active participant in a
process of examining, philosophically, the discourse of art and
criticism. 'Ibis would involve using and reflecting upon different
'language formats' (Congdon, 1987) in art criticism with a view to
increasing the awareness of learners at different age and ability
levels regarding the place of language in shaping aesthetic experience.
Morewidely, the aim of inculcating a metacritical attitude wouldbe to
provide a conceptual frameworkwithin which to ask questions about ways
of makingand perceiving the world, not only in art, but, by extension,
in other areas of the curriculum.
8.5 Sunmary
The synthesis of arguments which forms the basis of this chapter has
led to a statement of implications that are deemedrelevant to the
field of art education in the U.K. Thesehave been stated generally in
the form of a series of ' conceptualizations' of issues that have
emerged during the overall progress of the research. A detailed
application of the content underlying the issues lies beyond the scope
of this research, although someindication of the factors likely to be
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involved in teaching such content has been given (Chap. 8.3 above)•
Indeed, the particular contribution of this research to the field of
art education is revealed at the points where issues are formulated as
condensed conceptualizations of theory, namely, the propositions
arising from the analysis of problemsin aesthetics (Appendix III), the
curricular implications speculated on in Chapters 4-6, and the more
specific curricular implications contained in the present chapter. A
basis for detailed curriculum development is latent in the various
'implications' that have arisen. It is concluded, though, that such
developmentmust attempt to link concepts and methodsin aesthetics to
broader educational aims within which instructional theory and,
particularly in the case of younger learners, developmental theory
should be taken into account. A detailed outworking of these
implications wouldconstitute a significant contribution to current art
education theory and practice, not merely in the realm of 'critical
studies', but with reference to the study of art overall.
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CHAPTER 9
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICUWM DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH IN THE UK
9.1 Introduction
The curricular implications set forth in the previous chapter
represented an attempt to suggest waysof applying principles that had
emerged from the analyses of different kinds of theory reported
elsewhere in the study. Themain purpose of this final chapter is to
restate the key issues underpinning these principles and to commenton
the implications of the principles for curriculum development in a
more general sense. The point here is that subject-specific content,
such as the teaching of aesthetic controversy, is relevant to a wide
range of concerns both within and beyond the field of art education.
Conmentsconcerning wider relevance have been madealready (Chap. 8.3;
Implications vi & vii): however, these will nowbe extended to make
reference to some aspects of current art education prOvision. The
chapter will include a brief reflection on the effectiveness of the
research approach adopted in this study as a whole, together with
observations about its potential value for other (art) education
researchers, and will conclude with suggestions about possible avenues
of future research.
9.2 Reflective Criticism of the ResearchMethod
There is an implied obligation for research conducted for a research
degree to showevidence of the student having acquired attitudes and
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competencieswhichextend beyond the chosen topic (Allison, 1990). In
this study the analysis of educational research theory in Chapter 2
was an attempt to explore a range of positions with a view to
identifying the basis for a suitable method. However,in the absence
of precedents in the research literature, it proved necessary to
derive this synthetically with reference to a number of related
strands associated with Pearse's (1983) Interpretive/Hermeneutic and
Critical/Theoretic paradigms of art education research. The task of
establishing continuity with existing research traditions was felt to
be necessary to counter any suggestion that the present study is an
isolated 'one-off' project. It is worth pointing out with renewed
emphasis that the topic (i.e., exploring the curricular implications
of aesthetic controversy) is rooted in, and adds a newperspective to,
an ongoing progranmeof British research in the area of Icritical
studies' (Allison, OPe cit., pp.9-10). Indeed, the present research
builds upon an earlier study (Rawding,1984). The difference between
the present study and earlier studies into the educational value of
art criticism is that it involves not only a new emphaSis on
philosophical aesthetics, but a close alignment of a research topic
with a method of investigation. On the one hand, delineating a
research method (as reported in Chapter 2) set the scene for the
subsequent analyses of different kinds of theory whichwere conducted
with the a~ of reaching a cumulative, synthetic understanding of the
conceptual problems involved. On the other hand, this synthesis of
ideas and the resulting fonnulation of curricular principles could be
258
seen to cast light on problems of research method. Because of these
two positions, metacriticism permeated the whole enterprise.
This reflection on method refers primarily to conclusions reached in
the S\.DllD8ryof Chapter 2. For though parallels were drawn then
betweenmetacriticism as methodand metacriticism as topic, two other
possible 'models' which are analogous to metacriticism were also
considered, namely, 'dialectical procedure' and 'methodology.'
Comnents on each of these in tum will help to focus on the
implications of metacriticism for art education research.
With hindsight, the research could not be described as dialectical in
the sense epitomised by, for example, Margolis who sought to develop
his thesis through a gradual refinement of theory which consisted of
alternately analyzing issues in confrontation with the writings of
other theorists and resolving points of disagreement synthetically.
Rather, the present study has been at one remove from the 'cut and
thrust' of this kind of. philosophical debate. Theoretical
'synthesizers' such as Margolis, Bernstein, and Rorty were consulted
rather than seminal sources in philosophy because this class of
philosophers offered access to what, at the start of the research, was
an unfamiliar and daWlting field of scholarship. The drawback of
relying on philosophers who adopt a macro-theoretical view of the
problems of their discipline is that, unlike the philosophers
themselves, the educational researcher mayseemto be sidestepping the
need to achieve micro-theoretical understanding. 'Dialectical
procedure' is thus particularly suited to the kind of detailed
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analysis characteristic of an essentially philosophical study.
Alternatively, it is suited to the hermeneutic analysis of concepts in
relation to phenomena,such as might be expected in a study aimed at
clarifying curricular issues through a continual interweaving of
thought and action in specific learning contexts. Nevertheless,
though the present research was neither theory-intensive nor truly
phenomenological, the method used can be classed as dialectical
because i t involved an interactive process of analysis and synthesis
aimed at opening up new avenues for curriculum developuent and
research. In this respect, the gradual refinement of theoretical
understanding and the emergenceof ideas reflected more a process of
drawing connections between different kinds of theory than that of
successively challenging and then assimilating the ideas of individual
theorists or schools of thought. Hence the model of 'dialectical
procedure' proved to be particular ly apt. Rather than ' falling
between the stools' of decisively analytic or phenomenologicalmodes
of enquiry, the adoption of this methodhas led to the developmentof
a framework of ideas which could be considered basic to future
research in these more specialised senses.
As far as the present research is concerned, it is acknowledgedthat
the quality of the synthesis in Chapter 8 is largely dependent on the
quality of analysis achieved in respect of the various kinds of
theory. In this COMection, the dialectical approach adopted in the
research revealed issues which, on reflection, are thought to require
further clarification. For example, the bearing of perceptual theory
on the criticism of works of literature and art requires more analysis
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from within opposing points of view of each field of theory before a
satisfactory synthesis of this aspect of the content of the research
can be achieved. The value of 'dialectical procedure' as adopted in
this research is that it reveals the range of complex issues which the
study of art and culture entails. In that sense, it is analogous to
map-making: it involves marking out the territory selectively in order
that later expeditions can explore it in more detail. In brief,
'dialectical procedure' provides a useful analogue of the kind of
approach to theory which characterizes this enquiry as a whole. The
research 'lesson I which has been learned is that whilst
comprehensiveness and eclecticism seem to be well served by this
procedure, the excursions into detailed argument which it entails have
not been allowed to deflect the main objective of identifying key
aspects of theory in order to formulate curricular principles.
The danger of over-dependence on Margolis's explication of theory in
particular was offset to some extent by seeking to place the issues
discussed by him in the context of wider philosophical theorizing.
Moreover, questions were constantly raised from the standpoint of an
art educator concerning the potential value of such issues for
currdcuhm developnent and research. The cross-referential, rnu1. ti-
faceted approach which characterized the study as a whole was well
suited to an emergent mode of research, but what of the possible
advantages of adopting, as an alternative, a preordinate, empirically-
based strategy? At the start of the research, it was unclear which
aspects of theory were appropriate to an enquiry into the curricular
implications of aesthetic controversy. As a consequence of the
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research, however, clearly defined principles have emerged which could
form the basis for descriptive and experimental studies of groups of
learners at different stages of development regarding their capacities
to deal with or be instructed in metacriticism. As a further example,
studies could be conducted to ascertain the opinions of teacher
trainers about who could provide such instruction and how the
inclusion of this new dimension in the art curriculum might be
achieved.
In connection with 'methodology,' the research could be described as
an attempt to explore relationships between theory and method by means
of rational and systematic enquiry. This was seen, though, not as a
question of applying an existing set of 'rules' to the analysis of
'data' (in this case, theoretical materials drawn from separate
disciplines), but as a process of interpretive theorizing arising from
a comparative critical reading and re-reading of texts. Underlying
the choice of a research method for this study was the assumption that
textual material constituted the prtmary source of data. Inevitably,
this raised the question of whether a framework of ideas for
curriculum can be considered viable that has not been tested in the
crucible of practice. '!be aim of the research, however, was not to
produce a fully viable curriculum, but to discover principles on which
both the teaching of metacriticism and future research into this topic
should be based. It has, in the process, raised the potential of the
term metacriticism being applied more fully in the arena of British
art education theorizing. Subsequently, it also offers the potential
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for other art education researchers to explore methodological
implications in the light of practice.
'Ibe main drawbackof using theoretical source materials as primary
data was that in seeking to gain a broad understanding of controversy
in aesthetics, it was necessary to 'trade4>ff' depth of analysis in
regard to each kind of theory investigated. The analyses reported in
Chapters 4-7 inclusive could form the basis for further, more
detailed studies using 'methodology' as a model. Thesewouldneed to
include, though, a range of interpretive strategies in addition to
that of analyzing textual data: for example, interviews with teachers
of criticism concerning their views on the relation of concepts and
methods, perhaps coupled with a first-hand evaluation of educational
settings. The multi-levelled (i.e., hermeneutic) character of
'methodology' as a research modelbecameapparent when, following the
analysis of literature education reported in Chapter 6, outcomeswere
discussed with twoEnglish specialists, particularly the point that in
an area of the curriculum steeped in traditions of criticism there
appeared to be no widely recognized approach to teaching about
underlying aesthetics. These discussions gave some hints of a
potential for curriculum developnent in metacriticism that was not
apparent solely on the evidence of English education texts. The
research implication here is that the curricular potential of
aesthetics in respect of English and art cannot be fully explored on
the basis of theoretical analysis alone; rather, this should be
combined with a process of 'testing' and refining ideas in
teaching/learning contexts in the light of perspectives supplied by
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specialists in both subjects. Similarly, to extend and apply to
curriculum the analyses of philosophical texts, such as those reported
in Chapters 4 and 5, it maybe desirable to engage in dialogue with
philosophers themselves (a situation which does occur in the U.S.A.).
The present study has indicated the high potential and value of
bringing philosophers with an interest in aesthetics into
collaboration with aesthetically-minded art educators over the
problems of teaching metacriticism to particular groups of learners.
An additional advantage of such collaboration wouldseemto be that it
wouldoffer the potential for enhancing the intellectual status of art
in the education system at all levels; concomitantly, it wouldwiden
the appeal of philosophy by showing the relevance of philosophical
questions to the judgmentsmade about art by specialists and non-
specialists alike.
The foregoing observations on the pros and cons of 'dialectical
procedure' and 'methodology' indicate that a close parallel can be
drawnbetweenthe skills and attitudes characteristic of metacriticism
and those that are characteristic of research. It wouldbe hoped that
individuals who engage in metacriticism, like those who engage in
research, are thereby developing attitudes towards enquiry that
transcend particular topics and may thus be applied to subsequent
intellectual activity.
In sunmary, the metacritic-as~researcher model of enquiry adopted in
the present study has revealed metacriticism to be not only
appropriate but fundamental to considerations of research method.
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Comparing and contrasting theoretical orientations, detecting
commonalitiesbetween different kinds of theory, exploring the links
between critical concepts and methods, examining the ideological
commitmentsof teachers in relation to content, formulating curricular
principles and speculating about applications to practice: these and
other strategies pursued in this study are indicative of the potential
that metacriticism offers for the field of art education and, indeed,
the education system as a whole.
9.3 Metacriticism: Key Conclusions
'!be chief contribution of this study is that it makesexplicit with
reference to philosophy what is only implicit in muchof the art
education literature on teaching critical methods, especially in the
U.K. A major outcome of the study has been to make a case for
teaching metacriticism by demonstrating the need for art educators to
explore in detail the conceptual links between the nature of art and
concomitantmethodsof art criticism. For whilst the value of having
a knowledgeof contexts in criticism is widely recognized within the
field of art education, there appears to be little awareness of what
this knowledgeentails. In this connection, the study has identified
key aspects of aesthetic theory that, 10 combination, reflect not only
the diversity, but also the contestability of criticism, namely, the
distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, descriptive and
interpretive statements, moral and aesthetic judgments, and between
intentional ism and anti -intentionalism. '!bese aspects of theory are
interdependent and there is considerable overlap between them as the
discussion of curricular implications in Chapter 8 revealed.
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The emphasis of the research on relating different critical approaches
to underlying philosophical stances has been brought into focus
through exploring the notion of controversy in philosophy, aesthetics
and general education theory. It is proposed that developing
curricula with reference to controversy in these different fields of
theory would offset the largely reductionist and prescriptive approach
to teaching criticism presented in art education texts (for example,
some texts that have emanated from the debate over Discipline Based
Art Education in the U.S.A.). An emphasis on controversy would
effectively problematize the content of such teaching by stressing the
interdependence of aesthetics and criticism with reference to first-
order learning experiences with artworks. Moreover, it would help to
compensate for a lack of theoretical sophistication which, to date,
bas characterized the literature on teaching art criticism in the U.K.
(e.g., Taylor, 1986). In particular, it might serve to dispel the
vagueness and lack of direction that typifies current proposals for
critical and appreciative aspects of art learning in the National
Curriculum documents. 'Knowledge, skills and understanding' are
essential to '... the study of ••• aesthetic theories' (DES, 1991a,
4.6; 1991b, 4.9) I but it is essential also that the nature of
,critical skills and judgments about the aesthetic dimension' (DES J
1991a, 3.41) are clarified in a way that gives full weight to the work
of relevant fields of scholarship by providing a coherent framework
for linking philosophical stances with strategies for teaching art
criticism.
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A major conclusion of this study is that engagement in metacriticism
should enhance critical sensibilities. For whilst the present
research has been predominantly theoretical, this emphasis presupposes
that inadequacies of art teaching can be corrected, at least in part,
by teachers becoming better informed about underlying theory with a
view to this extending, not only their theoretical outlook, but also,
by implication, the range of practical opportunities open to them. It
is inevitable in a study of metacriticism in education that theory
will predominate (metacriticism, by definition, involves a
consideration of both the efficacy and cogency of rival theories of
criticism) • Improving one's grasp of theory, however, will not of
itself ensure an improvement in practice. '!be situation is more
complex, involving a combination of factors in which the
interrelations of theory and practice are brought fully into play.
This is to make a claim for teaching aesthetics and art criticism
together as an interactive whole. But it is more than this. In an
art education system dominated by the 'productive domain' of art
learning, there is a need to develop curricula at different levels of
art education in which learners' attempts to apply metacritical
principles are directed towards their own artistic productions and
those of their peers. An important advantage of metacriticism, then,
is that whilst it can be used to assist learners generally to develop
well-reasoned positions regarding the appraisal of works by
professional artists, it can also help them to become more critically
aware of the underlying assumptions of their own practice, whether as
critics or artists, making it more likely that their performance in
each of these capacities can be improved.
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The suggestion that art teachers ought to avail themselves of
metacritical content and methodsneeds, though, to be set against the
reality of current practice. Fewart teachers are well informed about
the analytical/critical domainof art learning (cf. Chap3.1 & 3.3);
even fewer can be said to possess a detailed knowledgeof aesthetics.
Indeed, for many individuals, their first experience of the
systematics of art criticism (let alone metacriticism) usually occurs,
if at all, when they undertake studies in higher education. It is
possible, therefore, that the expertise needed to develop strategies
for teaching about aesthetics in relation to criticism is concentrated
mainly in institutions offering undergraduate and postgraduate courses
leading to art teaching qualifications, although the nature and extent
of such expertise is difficult to determine because of a lack of
detailed information on the staffing and other resources available
nationally. Experience would seem to indicate that the task of
equipping teachers at different levels of art education with the
appropriate skills is likely to be primarily a 'top-down'
responsibility with the impetus coming from the tertiary level and
gradually permeating the whole system. This wouldseemto affirm that
aesthetics should be included as a componentof coursework in all
relevant art education institutions as a matter of policy and that,
accordingly, course leaders and administrators might properly reassess
the balance of course content and makeproviSion, where appropriate,
for including metacriticism as a taught component. Close cooperation
between departments at both undergraduate and ·postgraduate levels
would greatly facilitate such developDents and would constitute a
different emphasis to that currently given in the vast majority of
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undergraduate art courses, for which the dominant source of art theory
is the history of art. '1llesamecan also be said for those courses in
GCEAdvancedU!vel art which lead wholly or in part to a written
e.'"aUDi.nation(Chap. 3.2). '1lle introduction of metacritical content
whether at tertiary or secondary level, though, would be not only a
question of individuals sharing their expertise; for many, it wouldbe
a question of developing expertise where none at present exists.
Hence, a teacher seeking to teach metacriticism would need to be well
informed about aesthetics: but, as this present study bas indicated,
such knowledgecannot be mastered without a sustained intellectual
effort. In this connection, the provision of college-based and
sc:hool-based in~service training would be needed both to convince
individuals of the value of metacriticism and to equip them with
strategies for pedagogical implementation.
9.4 Possibilities for Future Research
The study as a wholebas openedup a numberof issues and perspectives
which could forma basis for future research. Aneed exists to expand
the curricular implications presented in Chapter 8 by developing and
testing a progranme of metacritical enquiry in which teaching and
learning strategies are incorporated within a structured sequence of
content. Part of that progranmecould involve studying the effects of
teaching metacriticism with reference both to canonical works (as in
the present research) and to the art products of learners at specific
educational levels. rus might include, for example, an attempt to
assess the value of such teaching as a means of enhancing artistic
creativity. Anotherneeded direction wouldbe to explore in depth the
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common ground between art and literature education, particularly with
reference to intention. For, whilst literature education has proved
largely unhelpful as far as developing a pedagOgy of metacriticism is
concerned, this field nevertheless represents a wealth of knowledge
and experience on teaching criticism in the context of wider
theoretical concerns.
Beyond the sphere of art education, aspects of the teaching of
metacriticism could offer the potential for research into the
development of cross-curricular skills and attitudes. The links drawn
in the research between art and disciplines such as literature and
social studies education indicate 'that metacriticism ought not to be
treated as a peripheral activity suitable only for the study of art at
GCE Advanced U!vel and above, but rather should be made a part of
disciplined study across the curriculum not only at those levels but
also in both primary and secondary education. The potential value of
adopting metacritical approaches within education suggests that the
possibilities for research are considerable. For example, comparing
and contrasting what it might mean to 'be metacritical' in subjects as
diverse as art, SCience, and humanities could help to illuminate
cOJllOOnepistemological problems as well as clarifying distinctive
subject-specific controversies.
Furthermore, there is scope for conducting research into the validity
and effectiveness of teaching metacriticism from within a
multicultural perspective. '!'hiswould constitute a new area of
curriculum research, particularly in the U.K. where multiculturalism
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is not usually conceived in terms of raising questions about meaning
and objectivity. This might prove to be a highly contentious area of
research as it might involve, for example, exploring the implications
of attempting to respond critically to artworks from different
cultures whilst speculating on the respective merits of the belief
systems represented. Such a perspective would give a different
emphasis to current multicultural approaches which tend to assumethe
equal validity of different forms of belief whenthese are interpreted
within their ownterms of reference.
These suggestions about possible avenues of future research are made
largely on the basis of theoretical analysis; they are, however,
firmly oriented towards trial and implementation in actual learning
situations. It is essential that attempts to build on the outcomesof
this study should tackle seriously the problem of coommicating to
other teachers (cf. Chap. 1.2), as this cannot be conducted on the
strength of theoretical analysis alone. Few practitioners read
academic theses. Hence, the need to address teachers at a more
pragmatic level begins rather than ends with the present research
involving, as it does, a continuing cOlJlllitmentto test ideas in the
classroom and to report outcomes by means of lectures, seminars,
articles and other forms of dissemination (see, for example, Rawding
and Wall, 1991). '!he process of reporting the positive outcomesof
this research is essential to its success as a contribution to the
field of art education.
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9.5 SuDmary
'nle purpose of this final chapter has been to assess the possible
benefits of the research through taking a detached look at the study
as a whole. 1hl.s involved a critical reflection on the problems
encountered in devising and implementing a research 'method' and
resulted in some speculations being made about strategies which could
be adopted in future studies. Observations were made about the
researCh outcomes and these led to a discussion of those aspects of
theory and practice that offer the potential for further, more
detailed enquiry. In a discussion of key conclusions, the value and
high" potential of metacriticism as a curriculum focus was stressed.
It was shown to be relevant to both art education and the knowledge
bases of disciplines other than aesthetics that have attracted
philosophical interest and debate. In this connection, it was argued
that metacriticism would contribute not just a valuable new
perspective to the area of 'critical studies,' but also would offer
the potential for exploring foundational epistemological issues in the
curriculum as a whole. The formulation of metacritical principles in
Chapter 8 and the ensuing discussion of implications for curriculum
development and research could be viewed as a unique contribution to
current art education theorizing about the function and status of art
within the curriculum. Additionally, it could be seen to provide a





1. '!be distinction between 'restricted-' and 'extended profession-
ality' originated with Hoyle (Stenhouse, 1975, pp.143-144). '!be
former term denotes a good classroom teacher who is pragmatic
rather than theoretical and whose horizon of professional interest
is largely parochial. '!belatter denotes an individual who, though
conmitted to sound classroom practice, is also concerned with
developing curricula within a global perspective by keeping abreast
of, and even contributing to, educational theorizing in their
chosen field of study. '!be distinction cannot be pressed too
closely in respect of individual cases; moreover, the term
'restricted professionality' is a descriptive term and thus does
not imply an inferior class of teachers (cf. Open Univ., 1972,
pp.24-25).
Chapter 2
1. '!be eclecticism inherent in this strategy constitutes a novel
research perspective, at least in the field of art education. '!be
strategy could also be applied to researching theoretical issues in
other areas of the curriculum, for example, with regard to teaching
literary criticism or the investigation of topics such as abortion,
embryo research, euthansia, pollution, etc. in humanities and
social studies education. In both these areas it is likely that
teachers and learners will explore the implications of different
attitudes am approaches to the text or topic at hand and will
speculate to some degree about the cogency of underlying theories.
Such theories also underlie different attitudes and approaches to
research. Hence, investigating theory in any discipline involves
reflection on the method of investigation itself.
2. '!be term 'essentially contested concepts' was first coined by the
philosopher Gallie (1964) to designate a class of concepts (e.g.,
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Christianity, art, democracy) which, historically speaking, have
been the loci of seemingly \Blendingdisputes over how they are to
be applied. Rival groups of disputants adopt distinct, though not
exclusive, sets of criteria for applying such concepts.
Controversy prevails because (i) no general principle exists with
which to adjudicate competing claims, and (11) circumstances may
yet occur that would force any such concept to be revised.
According to Gallie (p.181; cf. p.161), different versions of an
essentially contested concept have 'features' in COlllDOll.What
distinguishes them concerns the relative importance attached to one
feature over another. For example, the concept of art encompasses
the artwork, the artist, the audience, the tradition in which the
artist stands, and the social values either tmplicitly or
explicitly communicated between artist and public. Gallie outlined
several major theories of art, each of which gives priority to one
or other of these features (pp. 170-178).
3. '!be impact of 'interpretive' enquiry on educational research
generally has been less noticeable in Britain than in the U.S.A.
However, some indication of its emergence in the 1980s in Britain
can be gained by comparing the first and second editions of Cohen
and Manion's (1980, 1985) standard text on educational research
methods. In the second edition, the introductory chapter is
described as an '••• expansion and major rewrite' of the original
version necessitated by an increasing incidence of research studies
representing various alternatives to 'positivistic social SCience',
(pp.6-10; cf. pp.27-31). Indeed, the importance of such
alternatives is reflected by these authors' recognition of '••• !!2
conceptions of social reality' (ibid., emphasis added), namely,
'normative' and 'interpretive' paradigms of educational research
(see esp. pp.38-39). '!be impact of interpretive enquiry on !ll
education research in Britain for the same period was, according to
Allison (1986), rather less marked. Noting that only 32 out of 695
studies in his Index of British Studies in Art and Design Fducation
could be categorized as 'interpretive', he conmented that, '•••
Interpretive or naturalistic research is relatively new in
educational research, which accounts for its low incidence.'
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(p.12)• 1bere is, however, every reason to believe that the full
impact of interpretive enquiry on art educational research in the
U.S.A. will gradually cometo be reflected in the British context.
Chapter 3
1. nus point also applies to other curriculun areas, particularly
those which fall under the rubric of 'the arts.' An outcomeof the
enquiry into literature education (see Chap. 6) was that
considerable scope exists for English specialists to explore the
pedagogical tmplications of divergent approaches to literary
criticism. Curriculun research is needed to apply the scholarly
insights of recent aesthetics of literature to the teaching of
English in schools. Probably the samecould be said for other arts
subjects such as music and dance, not to mention the sciences and
the humanitites. Metacriticism is, therefore, not solely a
philosophical approach to the criticism of art, but it has
implications for the interpretive aspects of many forms of
knowledgeand enquiry across the curriculum.
2. In the context of this enquiry the word 'art' as it occurs in
conjunction with 'criticism' and 'history' should be understood by
the reader as synonymouswith 'art and design'. Thepoints raised
maythus be considered applicable to a wide range of visual forms
which includes not only works of so-called fine art but also
designed artefacts arising fran both European and non-European
cultural traditions.
3. CEMRELis an acronym for the Central Midwestern Regional
Fducational Laboratory. In the institution's literature it is
described as '.. • a private, non-profit corporation supported in
part as a regional educational laboratory by funds from the US
office of Education's Departmentof Health, Education and Welfare.'
4. A major objection to the inclusion of art criticism in the art
class is advancedby those practitioners who, according to Eisner
(1972a, pp.9-I0), maintain that 'excessive verbalisation kills
art'. '!be point of this objection is two-fold: first, that
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discursive speech is alien to visual media such as painting and
sculpture and C8lU10t therefore coomunicate the Wlique aesthetic
qualities of such works; and second, that to analyse works of art
is to dissect them and thereby eviscerate them of meaning. 'nle
first part of this objection is easily countered, The critic's
performance is not intended to provide a substitute for the
spectator's direct experience of works of art; rather it acts as a
guide-post or pointer to artistic qualities and significances which
might otherwise remain hidden to the less discerning (Hospers,
1975, p.40). A further consideration is that spectators themselves
show a marked desire to share their aesthetic experiences of art
works with others, to justify their critical opinions of such
works, and to consider competing appraisals. Redfern (1976, p.63)
observed that the claims of some for 'aesthetic appreciation being
a purely personal matter' were belied by this almost universal
tendency of spectators to talk about art (cf. Feldman. 1972.
p.451). Many artists also verbalise about their art in the form of
letters, pamphlets, manifestos, interviews, etc., as revealed for
instance by Chipp's (1968) celebrated anthology of writings on
modem art. Whilst this does not mean that the artist's
explanation of his or her work is necessary for interpretation, it
at least indicates that discursive language is an important aid to
artistic understanding.
'nle second part of the objection, that critical activity is both
primarily and inappropriately analytical, is partly justifiable.
As Andrews (1980, p.177) pointed out, 'the label "critical
analysis" tends to have scientific and quantitative connotations':
thus conceived the term is clearly incompatible with the complex
and often idiosyncratic ways in which art is produced.
Chapter 4
1. The term 'standard oppositions' is Bernstein's (1983, p.1 passim).
It is used by him to designate contrasting epistemological
positions: 'objectivism versus relativism, rationality versus




1. Hermeneuticshas been defined as ' ••• the science or art of making
interpretations' (Kaelin, 1989, p.208). Theorists in this largely
Continental strain of philosophy seek not merely to define the
explicit procedures of critical interpretation, but to articulate
the links between artwork, interpreter, and the artistic and
critical traditions to which these belong. It is axiomatic in
hermeneutic theory that no critic can ever hope fully to relinquish
his or her personal history, incorporating, as it inevitably does,
all of the backgroundbeliefs, attitudes, and predilections that
together constitute each person's individuality. Indeed there is
no good reason whythese personal biases should be drscounred, On
the contrary, the dynamicnature of criticism is forged when (to
employ a standard phrase of hermeneutic theory) the critic's
'horizon' is 'fused' with that of the artwork. What matters,
however, is that the critic's horizon should not be allowed to
dominate or imposeupon the work: it is to be a relationship of
mutual give and take, not an enslavement, or violation of the
work's integrity. In particular, theorists in the hermeneutic
tradition call into question the 'subject/object schema'
characteristic of linguistic analysis in which the artwork is
treated as subservient to the percipient. Positively, emphasis is
placed on the speaking power of the artwork; on its capacity to
engender experiences of emancipation and self-disclosure. A good
introduction to hermeneutics and its key figures is Palmer (1969).
Chapter 6
1. Beardsley employedthe terms 'instructional' and 'educational' more
or less interchangeably: for example, ••• the "theory of
instruction" (which I take to be a substantial part of what is
often called "educational theory") ••• ' (p.S). According to
Rowntree's (1981) Dictionary of &iucation, 'instruction' is ' •••
often used (especially in the U.S.) as a synonym for TF.ACHn«; or
even for EDUCATION,but generally used in the U.K. to refer to
'I.'RAININ:; that enables the learner to carry out somefairly routine
skill'. If Rowntree's assessment is correct, then it needs to be
madeclear to the anticipated British audience for this research
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that 'instructional theory' in the present chapter is meant to
convey the broader definition implied by Beardsley's statement.
The term 'pedagogical' is employedin this chapter as synonymous
with 'instructional' broadly conceived. Funk & Wagna11'sStandard
College Dictionary defines 'pedagogical' as, 'The theory of howto
teach'. However, as far as this research is concerned, it is
deemedessential that 'how' to teach be articulated in terms of a
theoretical linkage with the 'what' and 'why' of teaching as well.
2. According to Lyss (1983), anti-intentiona1ists divide the 'real'
properties of artworks into two classes:
1) primary or surface features (such as redness), and
2) qualities which are emergent from the primary features (such as
balance, mrlty, elegance).
'!bey distinctly deny that properties which require contextual
knowledgefor their detection are real properties, namely, those
which cannot be directly discerned in the workand have instead to
be attributed by inference (such as 'sincerity', which is, of
course, a veiled reference to an artist's intentions).
Intentiona1ists would reply to this that not even the primary or
surface features are inference free. Whilst they may be more
easily discerned, this does not make themdifferent in kind, only
in degree.
3. A similar point can also be maintained for the subject of irony,
for, as Nathan (op. cit., p.254) suggested, 'It is perhaps in this
area ••• that the inclination towards intentiona1ism is strongest'
(cf. Rawding, 1984, pp.6-11). '!be main characteristic of irony is
that it presents an overt, surface meaningwhich is subverted, in
the act of interpretation, by a covert meaning. '!be two levels of
meaning are, typically, opposites. SUbtler forms of irony, in
particular, represent an attempt to deceive at least somemembers
of a target audience (Kaufer, 1977, pp.94-98) am thus, for reasons
similar to those outlined above in respect of forgeries, these
works require an approach to interpretation that is specifically
and intrinsically concerned with the issue of intention.
Nevertheless, this does not entail that critics whointerpret irony
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need to be conrnitted to a search for biographical evidence of
intention. Nathan (op, cit.) for one, in similar marmerto that of
Wimsatt and Beardsley, distinctly repudiated an 'intentionalist '
approach, insisting instead that direct information of this kind is
neither necessary nor often helpful for achieving a correct reading
of ironic works.
Whether or not ~ critic employs direct independent evidence of
intention, the subject of irony interpretation (whichMargolis did
not discuss) aptly illustrates Margolis's wide-ranging ccmnent
that:
It is quite impossible to ascribe representational
properties to an artwork without implicating the artist's
intentions. (p.l88).
4. As in the workof Marcuse(1968; see, for example, ''!be Affirmative
Character of Culture', pp.88-133). Commentingon Marcuse's
position, Wolff (1983) stated that he began in this essay' ••• by
criticizing the "affirmative" concept of culture, whichby one means
or another simply confirms and supports the existing unequal order;
against this he counter-poses a "negating" culture which can take
issue with society.' (p.42).
Chapter 7
1. The term 'technocratic rationality' has been widely used by
(critical) theorists in the field of teacher education, particularly
in the U.S.A., to denote the emphaSisgiven in a majority of teacher
training institutions to developing efficient and conformist
teachers rather that questioning ones. In particular, it is
claimed, managementskills in the classroom are given greater
prominencethan the ability of teachers to penetrate the moral and
ethical implications of educational knowledge. This
characterization of teacher education seems less convincing when
applied to the British context, although without pressing the point
too vigorously, the recent introduction of the National Curriculum,
particularly the stress placed on developing scientific and
technological capability, invites a close scrutiny of the
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perspectives afforded by critical theory. Akey British theorist is
Gibson (1986).
2. The anthology in which Es1and's article was first published (Young,
1971) is widely recognized as a seminal work in the sociology of
knowledge(e.g., Bembaum,1977; Karabe1& Halsey, 1977; Sharp 1970;
Blackledge & Hlmt, 1985; Beyer & Zeichner, 1987). According to
Bembaun, 'Fsland' s influential article ••• is representative of the
strong relativist position within the!!!!! SOCiologyof education'
(p.13, emphasis added): a trend in academic thinking which emerged
in the late 1960s in Britain and was centrally concerned with ' •••
the necessity of rendering problematic what counts as educational
knowledge' (Sharp, OPectt ,; p. 77). '!be radical relativism inherent
in Esland' s position has been challenged (Blackledge & Hunt, ope
cit., p.294f.) using arguments similar to those employed in the
context of philosophical aesthetics by Margolis (see Chap. 3.3.2).
For example, to claim as Fsland and others have done, that lmow1edge
is socially constructed in the radical sense that it serves the
interests of dominant groups in society, is to fail to appreciate
that in respect of ' ••• knowledge, ideas and beliefs ••• questions
of origin and function are quite unrelated to questions of truth and
validity' (ibid., p.297). Nevertheless, in spite of the
oversimplifications of Fsland' s position, his critique of the
underlying assumptions of the objectivist conception of educational
lmowledgeis especially pertinent to the present research, given the
emphasis of the research on exploring the curricular implications of
contestability in aesthetics.
Chapter 8
1. In this cormection, Finch's (1986) notion of the 'enlightenment'
role of research seems, at this culminating point of the thesis. to
be particularly apt. Finch's work was discovered as a consequence
of examining a range of educational texts bearing on the nature and
methods of research (Chap. 7, below). Aside from her account of
different role models of research, her format for presenting
'findings' was recognized as pertinent to the present research. 'lbe
emphasis of the final chapter of her book on synthesizing insights
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gained from enquiring into different aspects of her topic is germane
to the writing of the present research 'report' for reasons already
given (e.g., Chap. 1.2). In particular, her practice of condensing
key issues in the form of underlined sentences and then following
these with brief expositions has been adopted as a model for the
current presentation of curricular implications.
2. 'Alien' here can equally well be applied to certain sub-groups of
the Western fine art tradition which, in recent years, have brought
questions of artistic status and aesthetic value dramatically to the
fore: e.g., the minimal sculpture of Carl Andre and the so-called
'objectionable' art photographyof Robert Mapplethorpe.
3. The caption in 'Picture Post' (16/9/1950) reads as follows:
All is not brutality in the KoreanWar. He was just an old
gentleman of Korea minding his own business, when the front
caught up with him. He wasn't hit, but the horror of the
battle was too muchfor him. He collapsed, and a G.I. took
him into the shade of a wall and gave him water, but the old
mandied.
Hardy's (1985) own account of the incident is more honest, but it
conveys a rather less optimistic view of human nature:
After we had got what we needed, we walked some distance
back along the hot dusty road, \Dltil we came to an old
farmhousewith a gateway and a courtyard. There were a lot
of Americansoldiers milling around the courtyard, but none
of them seemedto notice an old Koreanpeasant lying on the
ground in the blazing sun.
I decided to have a closer look. He must have collapsed
from exhaustion, or heat, or both. '!'here was a smear of
blood, still wet, on the wall behind him, where he had hit
his head in falling. His eyes nickered, so he was still
alive, but his lips were parched. I thought I'd give him a
drink of water to see if that did him any good, but then I
had a better idea: one which would give me a good picture.
I asked an Americansoldier if he wouldmind giving the old
man somewater while I took the photographs. The American
smiled: 'Sure', he said, 'Just so long as the water CaDeS
out of your bottle and not mine.' As far as I was
concerned, it was a small price to pay. I took a few
pictures and we carried him into the shade. (p.118).
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4. The reality of the assertion can be illustrated with reference to an
anecdote from this researcher t s ownteaching experience. In a pilot
study designed to test the capacity of lower secondary school pupils
to recognize visual irony in art (Rawding,1984, p.54f), a group of
12 year old girls was asked to write downindividual responses to
C.R.W.Nevinson's painting Paths of Glory, which depicts two dead
soldiers face downin the mudof No Man's Land next to a fence of
sticks festooned with barbed wire. Several pupils interpreted the
sticks as trees stripped bare of leaves owing to the onset of
winter. One even wrote that the men in the picture were taking a
nap. These responses, and others in a similar vein, gave proof that
the 'distance' between the girls' cultural milieu and that of the
artist made it difficult for them to 'read' the visual information
correctly and thus reach a convincing judgmentof the work.
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APPENDIX I ABSTRACT OF M.A. DISSERTATION IN ALLISON, B. (1986)
'INDEX OF BRITISH SnroIES IN ART AND DESIGN EDUCATION'
p, 399.
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~WDING. Hr. Hichael 0
1984
IRONY IN TilEVISUAL ARTS: AN EXPLORATORY INVESTIGATION OF
INTERPRETATIVE ABILITIES IN 10-13 YEAR OLD SCHOOL STUDENTS.
H.A.(Art and DesiGn Education), CNM
Duration Of Project: 12 months
InstItution: Leicester Polytechnic
Abstract
Characterlstics of irony in literature identified. Distinctions
drawn between irony and related modes (satire, parody,
burlesque, etc.). Concept of Irony considered in its applicatlon
to visual art~, with partlcular reference to works of Otto Dlx
on theme· of "'War Cripples'. Developmental theory regarding the
nature of adolescent response to verbal problems (esp. that of
Peel) utilised to develop a model for categorization of written
responses to simple ironies in verbal and visual (o~.
Descriptiv~ study employing 97 subjects indicated that the
ability to recognise and interpret Irony is signiflc.ntly








APPENDIX II EXAMPLE OF ARGUMENTATIVE AESTHETIC CRITICISM: EXCERPT
FROM CLARK, T.J. (1973). 'IMAGE OF THE PEOPLE: GUSTAVE
COURBET AND THE 1848 REVOLUTION' •
1. The counterweight (to 'The Stonebreakers') was the 'Burial at
Omans,' and a bizarre one it was. There are plenty of paintings
of ritual, or the Christian sacraments, but none of them is much
like this. It is not simply a question of sympathy or the lack
of it, for there are many pictures of ritual which we are invited
to contemplate with some degree of distaste: the long series of
Bacchic dances, the 'Worship of the Golden Calf', or later, in
lOOrepolemical mood, Hogarth's 'Enthusiasm Delineated'. But the
very word "enthusiasm" indicates what is unique about the
'Burial' • At least the Maenads or the Children of Israel were
hell-bent on their pursuits; they were clearly animated by
belief, even if in false gods; for the artists who portrayed
them, it seemed unthinkable to dissociate ritual from some fona
of religious experience.. But this is what Courbet has done in
the 'Burial at Omans'. He has given us, in an almost schematic
form, the constituents of a particular ritual, but not their
unison. He has painted worship without worshippers; the occasion
of religious experience, but instead of its Signs, vivid or
secretive, a peculiar, frozen fixity of expression. (This
applies to individual faces and to the image as a whole.) It is
not exactly an image of disbelief, lOOre of collective
distraction; not exactly indifference, more inattention; not
exactly, except in a few of the women'sfaces, the marks of grief
or the abstraction of mourning, more the careful. ambiguous
blankness of a nliC face. Andmixed With it, the grotesque;
the 1ii1bOUS, re aces of the beadles and the creaking gestures
of the two old men at the graveside.
2. In formal terms, the 'Burial' has many sources. It takes its
general format fran a painting Courbet saw in Holland in 1847,
Vander HeIst's 'Banquet of Captain Bicker'. But it stiffens and
simplifies that format, so that the componentsof the situation
are each displayed with the greatest possible clarity, heads
focused in an even light, crucifix silhouetted against the sky,
the main figures arranged in distinct, alDost rhetorical poses.
The way in which this is done owes a lot to the popular print.
Not, I think, to any print in particular, though there are echoes
of several: the f8IIX)US'Degre des ages 'with its proceSSion from
childhood to senility, the various 'Souvenirs mortuaires', the
'!obrt et convoi de Marlborough', even the 'Convoi funebre de
Napoleon•• But these are echoes more than borrowings, and
Courbet owes most to the artisan engraver' s general approac::hto
his subject: his clear, cut-out foms, his clumsy, dramatic
gestures, the way each part of his image is organized to convey
the 'lmits' of a ritual or a social situation. 'Dle popular print
exists to give information, to leave its public in no possible
doubt about what happened, whowas there, who was most important,
who lost, who won. Its form derives fran its function, and
Courbet copied both.
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3. At the same time he looked again at the "official" tradition.
In the 'Burial' he is less reliant on Rembrandtthan before, and
closer to Spanish painting: look at the pose and drapery of the
beadle who stares out of the picture, and the way the head,
shoulders and sleeves of the kneeling gravedigger are juxtaposed
with the red and black behind them. (This is typical of Courbet:
the pose of the gravedigger is taken straight fromVander HeIst,
but the wayhe is placed against the beadle owesnothing to the
Dutch and a lot to Velazquez or Zurbaran.)
4. In other words, the 'Burial at Omans' is built fran very
disparate materials; and, in detail, the materials are fairly
distinct. But structure is what counts$iWt detail; and looked
at whole the 'Burial' is anythiilg bUt a id. 'i1iemost obvious
thing about it is its simplicity; though even this is not
straightforward. Simplicity on this scale, with this intractable
material, is somethinga painter builds rather than finds.
5. Courbet has gathered the townspeople of Omans in the new
graveyard, opposite the cliffs of Rochedu Chateau and Roche du
fblt. He has painted tm)rethan forty-five figures life-size in a
great frieze over eight yards long, arranging the figures in a
long row which curves back slightly round the grave itself; and
in places, following the conventions of popular art, he has piled
the figures one on top of the other as if they stood on steeply
sloping ground. And towards the right of the picture he has let
the mass of mourners congeal into a solid wall of black pigment,
against which the face of the mayor's daughter and the
handkerchief which covers his sister Zoe's face register as
tenuous, almost tragic interruptions. He has used colour
deliberately and dramatically, in a waywhich has little to do
with the careful materialism of ''!be Stonebreakers', to symbolize
matter; almost as our eyes moveright, to threaten the faces put
upon the solid ground•. (Canpare the 'Burial' with the preliminary
charcoal sketch, and one can see quite easily how this was done.
In the sketch, for instance, the second row of mourners appears
inteDDittently 'behind' the first, cost\m!s and faces nearly
obscured. In the paint!i1g they are moved upward, their faces are
revealed, and their mourning dress provides a black frame 'above'
the faces in the front row, filling the spaces between the heads
and continuing the black surface which begins at ground level.
'D1e effect is crucial: look, for example, at the faces and
kerchiefs of Courbet's three sisters, in the front row towards
the right, am caupare the eJIl)tional weight of the image in the
sketch and the painting.) Black is the basis of the 'Burial at
Omans', and two sequences of colour are played against it, over
the picture's whole length. First the flesh colour of the hands
and faces; second, the plain white of handkerchiefs and collars,
lace caps, spats, the priest's triDmings,the gravecl1gger's
sleeves, am the glossy hide of a dog. At the left of the
picture the same colours are put in negative: the black of
crucifix, caps, aM belts against the surplices of the
choristers, black crossbones and black tears on the pall itself.
('lhis last is a deliberate, and typical, reversal of the facts.
All the prototypes in popular art and embroidery - for example,
3
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the coffin of Marlborough - showa black pall decorated with gold
or white tears and skull. In the sketch the pall was still
neutral in colour and without decoration; it was only when it was
turned round and made part of the group behind the priest that
its form and colour were decided.) Finally, Courbet adds two
notes of stronger colour, the beadles' costumes and the blue and
grey of the old man's coat and gaiters. He cleared a space above
the old man's head and used the grey and blue to punctuate the
black surface at its halfway point; and he placed the crucifix
and golden censer as a second hiatus at the left.
In other words, the 'Burial at Omans' is carefully and subtla
constructed. '!be repetitive forms of popular art are an:iJD8tana reorganized; the monotoneof black is accented just enough to
keep it alive and active against the faces. Look at the sketch
once again, which is far closer to the crude straightforwardness
of the 'Souvenirs mortuaires', and it is clear what kind of
intelli~ce has been at work: breaking and turning the long Bne
of heads; drawing the black into dense clusters and making the
white area a more positive interval in the picture; creating just
enough space, between crucifix and censer, or between priest and
graved1gger, to make the various groups distinct. Nothing is
enlivened teo much: the forms of popular art show through the
picture like a skeleton: no device is strong enough to obscure
the basic theme, the faces etched in even light against the mass
of black below them.
7. This is the picture's structure. It is more complex than it
seems at first sight, but it can be described step by step, with
sane ldnd of certaintly. Beyond this point, when we start to ask
about the picture's meaning, the real difficulties begin. What,
to put it briefly, is the 'Burial's' affective atmosphere? What
are the mourners' attitudes and emotions, and what is Courbet' s
attitude to the event portrayed? Is there sane meaning - as
Courbet's friend Buchon suggested - to the juxtapostion of the
priest and the peasant gravedigger, linked as they are by the
beadles' pock-marked faces?
Wehave to answer such questions in the face of an image which
deliberately avoids emtional organization: by that I mean the
orc:.l-testration of forms to mimic and underline the emotional
comotations of the subject. In the 'Burial' there is no single
focus of attention, no climax towards which the forms and faces
turn. lA!ast of all is the picture organized around the sacrament
of burial: hardly a single face, save perhaps the graved.1gger's,
is turned towards the priest, and the line of heads at the right
of the picture looks the other way entirely - away frCD the
coffin and the crucifix. (Canpare the sketch once again: the
faces there are all turned attentively towards the grave.)
8.
9. There is no ex~ of gaze or glance, no reciprocity between
these figures. y the inquisitive, upturned face of the
serving-boy seems definitely to look at sanethingj the rest are
averted, impassive, the eyes seemingly focused on the air. Hen
share the same expression, but we could not indicate their state
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of mind - grief, gravity, even indifference - with any
confidence. 'ntey share faces, but do they share emotions? Is the
'Burial' a sacrament or merely a social occasion? It is both,
clearly, but are the two tragically or comically mixed? Should
we trust to our laughter at the beadles' noses, or yield to our
empathy with the women's tears? Should we call it, as
Champ£leury did, a simple record of provincial life, or should we
give it the force of allegory, as Buchondid, and call it a new
Danceof Death?
10. Weare not inventing this perplexity. Critic after critic,
when the 'Burial' reached Paris late in 1850, asked the same
questions, though with more rancour. It was ~eCiSelY its lack
of ~' declared 'si~ficance' which offende most of 811; it
was~ way the 'BUri~ seemedto hide its attitudes, seemedto
contain within itself too many contraries - religious and
secular, comic and tzagic, sentimental and grotesque. It was
this inclusiveness, this exact and cruel deadpan, that made the
'Burial' the focus of such different meanings. It was an image
that took on the colours of its context; and perhaps it was
disigned to do so.
N.B. Para. Nos. added.
Single quotation marks indicate author's use of italics.
Underlining indicates direct quotations (Chap. 2.3.2).
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APPENDIX III LIST OF PROPOSITIONS SUMMARIZING MAIN POINTS ARISING
FROM ANALYSIS OF PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHICAL
AESTHETICS.
1. Theontological status of artworks is impossible to account for in
strictly perceptual or non-perceptual terms, as is indicated by the
problems of identity (discriminating natural, artifactual, and
artistic forms) and individuation (fixing art types by reference to
their token instances).
2. The logical difficulties attending the concept 'artwork' are only
resolvable by relocating aesthetics within a theory of culture. In
this regard, the concepts 'cultural emergence' and 'physical
embodiment' provide a theoretical basis for identifying and
characterizing non-perceptual qualities of artworks by reference to
their material properties.
3. The logical difficulties attending the concept 'artwork' are
highlighted by the problem in criticism of distinguishing between
,internal' and 'external' evidence (i. e., between properties of the
work that call for description and those that call for
interpretation). Whilst somecritical statements are unequivocal, and
are thus eaSily distinguished as referring to either internal or
external properties, the greater proportion of such statements
demonstrate that it is impossible clearly to demarcate what is
descriptively present in an artwork fran what is interpretively
imputedto it.
4. It is a characteristic of aesthetic judgements that these are
validated on grOlUldsof plausibility rather than on an either-or
definition of truth. However,the validation of critical statements
depends on their achieving compatibility with what may be
descriptively specified of given artworks and on their confOrmingwith
particular interpretive schemata arising from the traditions of
professional criticism. Critical enquiry should, therefore, be
hospitable to the possibility of maintaining equally plausible
interpretations, in individual cases, of (at least some)artworks.
5. Critical discourse is not logically l.Uliformin character, nor
easily discriminable in terms of aesthetic and non-aesthetic concepts;
instead it admits of a wide range of aesthetically relevant
terminology that encompasses moral, political, religiOUS, and
otherwise ideological perspectives.
6. Direct biographical evidence of an artist's intention can be
aesthetically relevant because, in given cases, it informs us about
properties which could not be perceived solely through consulting the
artwork.
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